



European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions

EPSSE 2023

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Emotions – More Like Stars or Constellations?

Pre-Conference Workshop of the 10th Annual Conference of the
European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions

14th June 2023, University of Tartu
Organized by Heidy Meriste, Bruno Mölder and Uku Tooming

- 10:15-10:30 Introduction by Heidy Meriste
- 10:30-11:30 Cecilea Mun “Of Stars and Constellations: Charting the Waters With an Eye Toward Cooperation”
- 11:30-11:45 Break
- 11:45-12:45 Charlie Kurth “When Is an Emotion a Biological Adaptation? A Look at Shame and Guilt”
- 12:45-14:15 Lunch break
- 14:15-15:15 Peter Zachar “Analogies and Disanalogies Between Emotions and Psychiatric Disorders: Folk Concepts, Essences, and Natural Kinds”
- 15:15-15:45 Break
- 15:45-16:45 Bruno Mölder “An Interpretivist Perspective on Emotions”
- 16:45-17:00 Break
- 17:00-18:00 Juan R. Loaiza “The Ontology, Epistemology, and Politics of Folk Emotion Concepts in the Science of Emotion”

ABSTRACTS Pre-Conference**Of Stars and Constellations: Charting the Waters with an Eye
Toward Cooperation**

CECILEA MUN

In my recent monograph, *Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion* (2021), I argued for a pluralistic approach to an interdisciplinary science of emotion, which I refer to as meta-semantic pluralism about emotion. In doing so, I made a distinction between four fundamental categories of theories of emotion (realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism). The theories of emotion that constitute each of these four categories are unified in accordance with their response to two fundamental questions: 1) Are emotions objective kinds or subjective kinds; and 2) are emotion terms in the science of emotion trans-theoretical terms, following Putnam's (1973) use of the term "trans-theoretical." In this presentation, I will discuss the fundamental attributes of each of these four categories of theories of emotion, and explain how these categories can considerably clarify the discourse in the interdisciplinary science of emotion. I conclude by presenting my arguments for meta-semantic pluralism about emotion, which is ultimately a realist approach to an interdisciplinary science of emotion.

When Is an Emotion a Biological Adaptation? A Look at Shame and Guilt

CHARLIE KURTH

Are emotions adaptations, the sorts of things that would merit being called natural or biological kinds? To answer this question, I take shame and guilt as case studies. Building on a range of work in philosophy and the cognitive sciences, I begin by specifying a set of criteria that tell for an emotion being an adaptation. Based on these criteria, I then argue that while we have good reason to think that shame is an adaptation, we have little reason to say the same about guilt. This is a surprising conclusion. After all, when it comes to claims about the evolutionary origins of these emotions, guilt and shame are widely thought to stand and fall together. But the discussion of shame and guilt is significant in two further ways. First, we see how a biological-oriented account of shame can accommodate the individual and cultural variation in shame experiences that is often taken as evidence against it being a biological kind. Second, we gain insight into what guilt is given that it is not an adaptation. The overall result, then, is a better understanding of the nature of emotions and how we should study them.

Analogies and Disanalogies between Emotions and Psychiatric Disorders: Folk Concepts, Essences, and Natural Kinds

PETER ZACHAR

Many interesting analogies exist between kinds of emotions and kinds of psychiatric disorders. Critics have claimed that both are primarily folk, not scientific concepts. They can both be construed as possessing essences or lacking essences. These disagreements are further complicated by various non-essentialist models of natural kinds for both emotions and psychiatric disorders. Some disanalogies are that emotions are short term episodes and partly identified by being attributed to an object, neither of which is true of most psychiatric disorders. If constituted, emotions are seen as psychologically constituted whereas psychiatric disorders are largely seen as constituted by the practices of classification and psychological measurement. The study of both can benefit from interdisciplinary attention but are also subject to common barriers to interdisciplinary collaboration.

An Interpretivist Perspective on Emotions

BRUNO MÖLDER

The aim of this talk is to delineate the implications of interpretivism for the study of emotions. Interpretivism is a general approach to the mind on which the possession of mental properties is constitutively dependent on a certain kind of ascription. It has not been explicitly developed for emotions, and it should be distinguished from psychological constructionism about emotions, including its interpretivist variants. An important aspect of interpretivism is that it takes the mind and mental states to be “shallow”, that is, circumscribed by our folk psychological conception. It follows from this assumption that mental kinds do not have a deeper essence that would lay beneath the folk psychological classification. The individuation of mental kinds is not independent of us. It depends on our interests and purposes in social interaction and on the particular outlook of our folk psychology. The same applies to emotions insofar as they are taken as mental kinds.

I argue against the idea that emotions are natural kinds, as far as emotions are understood through folk psychology. Natural kinds are classes of homogeneous entities that are individually-independent from our minds and that support inductive generalizations. Conceiving emotions through folk psychology and not as natural kinds has implications for the study of emotions, for it makes sense to focus more on the (conceptual and empirical) study of our folk conceptions.

That leaves open the issue of the relationship between folk emotion terms and the related theoretical notions used in affective science (such as “core affect”, “affect program”, “emotional episode”, etc.). On the latter, interpretivism does not preclude empirical work. However, do folk and scientific notions refer to the same thing? I discuss possible positions an interpretivist could take in this regard and conclude that the kinship of folk notions of emotion and scientific notions is more a matter of policy

than a fact. It depends on whether we are interested in emphasizing the continuity between the folk conception and its scientific refinements.

The Ontology, Epistemology, and Politics of Folk Emotion Concepts in the Science of Emotion

JUAN R. LOAIZA

One important question in emotion science concerns the role of folk emotion concepts in the construction of scientific theories. According to one view, emotion concepts are an integral part of scientific theories, either in the sense that they are constitutive of emotions or in the sense that they anchor scientific concepts. According to another view, folk emotion concepts must be kept separate from scientific concepts, mainly due to their failure to satisfy criteria necessary for empirical research. In my talk, I will defend a view of the first kind, that is, I will argue that folk emotion concepts should anchor scientific concepts. This is because abandoning folk emotion concepts risks changing the explanandum of scientific emotion theories in problematic ways. After I present arguments for this position, I explore some consequences of this approach. Specifically, I will claim that adopting this view raises the question of which folk emotion framework to adopt as the basis for anchoring. Answering this question, I argue, calls for both ontological, epistemological, and political considerations. I conclude by sketching an account of the use of folk emotion concepts that concedes some degree of relativism while maintaining a scientifically tractable picture of emotion science.

European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
EPSSE 2023 Main conference

Thursday 15th June – Saturday 17th June
University of Tartu

Thursday 15th June

Educating emotions amidst ecological crises

IMKE VON MAUR

In her book “Feeling Power” (1999) Megan Boler argues that “[i]n order to name, imagine and materialize a better world, we need an account of how Western discourses of emotion shape our scholarly work, as well as pedagogical recognition of how emotions shape our classroom interactions.” (1999, p. xiv) She provides a feminist and power sensitive approach to both education and emotions by assuming them to be sites of social control as well as means of transformation. *Education* thus is on the one hand an institution that functions to maintain the political status quo and social order, and on the other hand “a potential site of critical inquiry and transformation, both of the self and of the culture” (ibid.) *Emotions* are considered to be embodied, habitual and historically specific means to gain information about meaning which are subject to culturally contingent feeling rules, shaping what students and teachers feel and how they evaluate the adequacy of these emotions. Yet, emotions can also be “a mode of resistance—to dominant cultural norms, for example, or to the imposition of authority.” (ibid.) – as has been argued by other feminists before (cf. Alison Jaggar’s (1989) much acknowledged “outlaw emotions”). Boler and Jaggar are primarily concerned with challenging “emotional sensitivities” and “inscribed habits of (in)attention”, as Boler calls this, with respect to the status quo of racist and sexist societies.

In this presentation I aim to explore the applicability of a “pedagogy of discomfort”, as worked out by Boler, for an investigation of emotions in educational contexts concerning the various ecological crises of our times (among which I count climate change and biodiversity extinction, but also crises regarding the relationship between humans and their

environments more broadly). My presentation aims to demonstrate that one if not *the* crucial educational aim in order to materialize a better and a sustainable world is to become aware of emotions' power to naturalize and conserve but also to criticize and transform the toxicity of the western "imperial mode of living" (Brand & Wissen 2021). The emphasis regarding educational aims of Boler's approach and also of more recent similar accounts on the affective and enactive nature of "transformative learning" (Maiese 2017, 2019; Stapleton 2021) lies on flexibility, openness, tolerance for ambiguity and discomfort which are related to the (social) identity of the feeling person. This allows to provide an account according to which "educating emotions in times of ecological crises" is not mainly about learning to become shocked by selective and concrete devastating consequences of global warming or factory farming, or to panic about "the crisis as such", but to be able to experience and question our "affective commitments" (Jasper 2018) within our mundane everyday practices.

Nudging Emotions in Moral Education: Inviting a Wicked Problem?

CHARLIE KURTH

Cultivating one’s emotions—learning to feel anger, say, at the right time and in the right way—has long been viewed as a central to moral education. Recently, a diverse group of educators, philosophers, and entrepreneurs has pointed to “emotion nudges” as a powerful, but under-utilized tool in our emotion cultivation efforts (Valor 2016, Engelen et al. 2018, Suh 2016). The core idea is straightforward. We know that nudges can bring better choices (Thaler & Sunstein 2008); this suggests they can also bring better feelings. In fact, adding artificial intelligence to the mix would only seem to make emotion nudges more powerful (Green 2019). Moreover, the initial results are intriguing. For instance, merely placing “watching-eye” icons in online chatrooms can prompt feelings of anxiety that help curb the proliferation of vicious posts (Park 2022), and virtual reality simulations can engage stereotype-challenging empathy (Bedrik 2017).

But while nudges may be a good way to promote things like retirement savings, their appropriateness for moral education is much less obvious. In fact, I argue that in pursuing emotion nudges, we are courting trouble: Given what emotion research tells us about emotions and our ability to shape them, the use of emotion nudges to promote moral education brings a distinctive and vexing set of scientific and ethical challenges. To draw this out, I focus on three intertwined issues.

(1) We can start by asking which nudges work. But this seemingly straightforward question is actually extremely complicated. For instance, recent findings indicate that cultivation techniques that are effective in shaping one emotion are likely to set us back with regard to others (Hafenbrack 2022). Moreover, our ability to cultivate an emotion appears to vary depending on which emotion we’re focusing on (Nussbaum 2004,

Kurth 2019). So how can we design effective nudges given how little we know?

(2) This first set of issues invites a turn to AI, where big data and machine learning can help us optimize our nudges. But can it do so in a way that gives voice to the emotions of underrepresented groups? If not, then, AI-driven nudges threaten to further marginalize the already marginalized. Importantly, this second issue concerns more than just determining who gets to make these decisions, for there's also the deeper problem of making these decisions in the absence of any consensus on what the relevant feeling norms should be (witness recent debates about who can be angry and when (e.g., Pettigrove 2012, Srinivasan 2018, Cherry 2021, Flanagan 2021)). Relatedly, some the most "exciting" nudges—virtual reality simulations that engage empathy so that users can experience what it's like to be a cow going to slaughter or an undocumented worker being smuggled—are morally dubious insofar as they invite tokenism, deception, and voyeurism.

(3) Here one might hope that dialog and democracy can help us work through our competing values and curb our enthusiasm for ethically suspect applications. But recent controversies about social emotional learning suggests such hopes are naïve—for, alas, talk of emotion and emotional education has become the latest hot-button issue of our culture wars.

Fans' Standing to Blame Female Celebrities

CARME ISERN MAS

In May 2018, the Spanish singer Aitana was the target of harsh criticism because of a picture of herself wearing a swimsuit, which she posted on her social media. Her fans blamed her for perpetuating aesthetic, gendered pressures on body image, and disordered eating. And only a few hours after posting the picture, the hostility got so intense that she ended up deleting the picture from her social media and posting several messages explaining how overwhelming the situation had been for her. In the philosophical literature on blame, and specifically on ethics of blame, there are certain conditions which must be met for someone to have standing to blame, namely, to be in a position to express a judgment of blameworthiness and some hostile attitude (Bell, 2013). Among those conditions, those which are frequently mentioned in the literature are: the hypocrisy condition (Cohen, 2006), the involvement condition (Todd, 2019), and the business condition (McKiernan, 2016). Other conditions which are not that broadly debated are the warrant condition, or the contemporary condition (Bell, 2013). Leaving apart the discussion on whether those conditions justify the expression of blame, I use them to show how fans usually lack standing to blame their idols. In this paper, I argue that in many circumstances fans do not have the standing to blame female celebrities. First, I start from a broad understanding of blame, characterized as a hostile reaction triggered by someone's transgression (Menges, 2017; Pickard, 2013; Strawson, 1974; Wallace, 2011; Wolf, 2011). Secondly, I review the basic conditions to the standing to blame, namely, non-hypocrisy condition, non-involvement condition, warrant condition, and business condition. Then I show how fans are not necessarily in positions that violate these conditions and argue for the need of a fundamental condition to the standing to blame: a symmetry condition. According to such condition, one would have no standing to blame someone else when the relationship between them is not symmetrical in a relevant, moral sense. This is the condition that fandom

violates, especially when they blame female celebrities. Following Medelli's (2022) analysis of the structures of power between fandom and their idols, and their specific impact on Black women, I conclude that because of the asymmetries between fandom and celebrities, the expression of blame by fandom runs the risk of being experienced as coercion. Finally, I draw some practical implications from my argument.

An Account of Non-Moral Blameworthiness

ELIZABETH VENTHAM

This paper argues in favour of non-moral blame and blameworthiness, and demonstrates what the best account of them should look like. In doing so I will show that non-moral blame and blameworthiness are actually common and familiar phenomena, even though we don't usually think of them in those terms.

Non-moral blameworthiness requires that there are non-moral normative domains, such as aesthetics, prudence, or friendship. I will argue that the best account is a holistic one: aesthetic normativity, for example, involves not only aesthetic values but aesthetic obligations, blameworthiness, blame, and more (see, eg Archer & Ware 2018 for examples). A person who is aesthetically blameworthy, for example, might be a person who fails to manifest the appropriate aesthetic will (analogous with a morally blameworthy person who fails to manifest (morally) good will – see, eg, Arpaly & Schroeder 2013 or Hieronymi 2004).

Much of the existing literature is critical of non-moral blame, and even less is said about non-moral blameworthiness. Matheson & Milam (2021) argue against the permissibility of non-moral blame, arguing that counter-examples often fall into the “moralizing trap” (p.212), and are actually cases of moral blame disguised as the non-moral kind. I argue that this trap isn't as dangerous as they suggest, and that it's consistent with the concept of non-moral blame to suggest that much of it can overlap with moral blame. As long as non-moral norms are also doing some obligating work, then they can produce non-moral blame, and we can find agents who are non-morally blameworthy. For example, many of our aesthetic obligations may be moral obligations as well, particularly if we think about creating or celebrating art that brings out the best in others, that can help us to understand ourselves, or helps people generally to flourish. Here we can separate two sources of obligations: an obligation to aesthetics, in which one is obligated to display the art (for

example) because of something about the aesthetic value, and another moral obligation to display the art because of the joy and fulfilment that doing so will bring to others. Failing to display this art (and, say, destroying or repainting it instead) will make a person both morally *and* aesthetically blameworthy.

It might seem like non-moral obligations don't have much of substance left when all of the moral components have been stripped away. Matheson & Milam think this is the case, giving the example of a shoemaker who makes a bad pair of shoes. When the only things left are reactions that come from non-moral wrongs, they argue: "We can feel displeased or dissatisfied with [the shoemaker's] failure. But neither grading nor displeasure counts as blaming." (ibid p.206) I respond by appealing to the holistic approach, and argue that the criticism uses a particularly *moralised* idea of obligations. Non-moral obligations will often look different to us than moral ones, and we're likely to think of them as carrying less normative weight depending on how much we value aesthetics compared to, say, morality.

The Role of Shame in Cases of Hermeneutical Injustice

SOPHIE GODDARD

In this paper, I examine the role of shame in cases of hermeneutical injustice. Using homosexuality and the experience of ‘the closet’ as a central example, I argue that shame can render agents unable to identify with the concepts they require to understand and articulate their experiences.

In part one, I explain hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when an agent is unable to understand or articulate a significant area of their social experience due to a gap in the interpretive resources required to do so; this may be because the concept does not yet exist or because the agent has not yet been exposed to the concept (Fricker 2007).

In part two, I draw attention to cases in which, despite having access to a concept which fits their experience, an agent may be unable to identify with the concept because it has shame attached. I illustrate this with the example of being ‘in the closet’; even if an agent has access to a healthy concept of homosexuality, if their social environment is one in which shame is attached to this concept, the agent will perceive a threat of rejection from the group if they identify with it.

In part three, I take a closer look at shame in this context and argue that it works to: 1. distance the agent from the concepts required to understand their experience; 2. direct the agent to seek to identify with other concepts which do not fit their experience; and 3. prevent the agent from sharing their experience with others.

I make use of an attachment-based understanding of shame, in which “a significant part of shame’s power derives from the fear of being excluded” from the group (Lynd 1958) and “shame should be understood as a means by which people try to preserve their loving relationship to others” (Block Lewis 1987).

The strength of this perceived threat should not be underestimated; what is at stake for the agent is their feeling of security and belonging, and rejection from the group can feel

terrifying. As Lynd points out, the need for attachment can be so great that when “someone is overwhelmed by shame, they may confess to a crime [they did not commit], inviting punishment in order to re-establish even through condemnation, communication with others” (Lynd 1958).

The absence of a shame-free environment to allow identification with the necessary concept prevents the agent from adequately understanding their experience. They may instead seek to identify with other concepts which further obscure their experience, for example they may pathologise or dismiss their own same-sex attractions to preserve their self-conception as heterosexual and ensure continued attachment to the group. Finally, the nature of shame prevents the agent from sharing their experience with others, which inhibits an important means of overcoming hermeneutical injustice.

I conclude that shame plays an important role in cases of hermeneutical injustice, distancing the agent from the concepts they require to understand and articulate their experiences, and preventing a means of overcoming their oppression.

The desire for love: how an atmosphere of shame can distort it

MATTI SYIEM

The desire for love and affection runs deep in all of us. However, its vulnerability makes it easily susceptible to perversion and distortion, especially when nurtured in an unwholesome environment. This paper will explore the relationship between shame and moral development. More specifically, it will look at how an atmosphere of shame can negatively impact this desire, affecting a child's moral relations with others and the world at large.

One philosopher who reflects on the relationship between this desire and shame from a phenomenological perspective is Fredrik Westerlund. He paints a picture of our existential condition by highlighting two fundamental human concerns that filter our ways of being with others – the desire for love and fear of rejection. He further maintains that our capacity to perceive ourselves as how we come across to others influences our efforts to secure love. Thus, to the extent that we are governed by the desire for affection and the fear of rejection, we would like to be loved by others and avoid rejection. And since we can sense how others see us, it isn't hard to fall into the trap of wanting to appear affirmable in the eyes of others with the hopes of obtaining love. Shame is the emotion that arises when we see ourselves as non-affirmable or unloveable in the eyes of others. According to Westerlund, it is ultimately egocentric as it involves no moral concern for others but only concern for one's affirmability.

Grounding this paper in Westerlund's phenomenology of shame, I will look at two examples. The first example (taken from Hugo Strandberg's book "Forgiveness and Moral Understanding") will examine the predicament of a foster child whose relationship with her parents is based on unforgiveness and shame. Given her deep desire for love, I show how such an unforgiving environment can cause her entire being to rest on getting her parents' approval, thus distorting her desire to be loved. Since everything she does becomes mediated by the desire to make a favourable

impression in her parents' eyes, this can rob her of developing her own relation to her actions and, more dangerously, from relating to others with love.

Instead of looking into an atmosphere of forgiveness, my second example will focus on the well-loved rebellious child, Pippi Longstocking, from Astrid Lindgren's book, "Pippi in the South Seas." In contrast to the foster child, her desire for love has not changed into the need for affirmation. She is immune to this need and, therefore, free from shame. The question that I will examine is whether Pippi's lack of shame is a problem at all, morally speaking. I claim that although this lack does not make her morally superior, it makes her attitudes towards others less about herself and her affirmability and more about being attuned to those around her. It enables her to go beyond herself, unlike those caught in shame, who are self-conscious about how they appear.

Bias in Affective Computing

KRIS GOFFIN

Affective computing is a term that refers to all forms of ways that computers are used to analyze emotions. A prominent example is emotion recognition software. Different algorithms and AI's can track given an input (facial expressions, vocal expressions) which emotions one is feeling. This is often used by corporations in generating personal advertisements; as in educational software. A significant problem with ERS is that it is highly unreliable.

For instance, ERS often displays a gender bias: women are more often perceived to be anxious and nervous than men, even when they have the same facial expressions. Using this in hiring decisions can negatively impact women's chances of getting hired. ERS errors often disadvantage already disadvantaged groups, such as people of colour and women. ERS is biased, and it is of great societal importance to break this bias.

I will focus on the following controversial applications:

1. Advertisement: Emotion recognition software used by companies that create algorithms for targeted advertisement.
2. Border control technology: emotion recognition software is used in technology checks whether people form a threat. For instance immigrants and asylum seekers facial expressions are recorded and scanned.

Most of these affective computing A.I.'s rely on Basic Emotion Theory (BET). BET states that people only have a limited set of (universal) basic emotions. Each emotion corresponds to a characteristic facial expression. Constructivists, such as Lisa Feldman Barrett, criticize BET-based affective computing by stating that emotions lack universal markers. They argue that there are no basic emotions; there is no fixed set of emotion, which is universal. Also there is no one to one correspondence from facial features to emotional kinds.

In this paper, I present an in-between account in which I state that emotion recognition software is biased. Some biases are due to cultural differences. Others are due to more insidious racialized and gender-based stereotyping. So it not the case that there is a crystal clear one to one correspondence between facial expressions and emotional kinds. Nor is it the case that “anything goes”. It is rather the case that emotion recognition software is more or less able to track different emotional kinds, but it can be biased in various ways. This will lead to (sometimes very harmful) errors.

I will present an account of bias in ERS. I argue that algorithmic bias in ERS mirrors human bias. I will suggest ways in which we could minimize bias in ERS.

Racist Statues and Affective Technologies

ALFRED ARCHER

In June 2020, a group of Black Lives Matter Protestors in Bristol, England pulled down a statue of slave trader Edward Colston that had stood in a prominent position in the city center and threw it into the river at Bristol Harbor. This was a striking example of a wider international phenomenon of campaigns to remove memorials promoting a racist world view. For example, in 2015 the Rhodes Must Fall campaign in Cape Town, South Africa, successfully campaigned for the removal of a statue to the British Colonialist Cecil Rhodes which occupied a prominent place at the University of Cape Town. In the United States, over 160 memorials to the Confederate States of America have been taken down by or in response to protesters. Most of these removals have taken place since 2015. These high-profile public campaigns by anti-racist campaigners to remove statues has provoked significant public debate about the ethics of removing or preserving such monuments.

In what way might racist public statues wrong those affected by racism? In recent years, philosophers have provided two general kinds of answer to this question. According to some, such statues may wrong people by causing *harm* through expressing harmful messages (Burch-Brown, 2017; Timmerman, 2020; Archer and Matheson, 2021). According to others, these statues wrong through expressing disrespect (Schulz, 2019; Lai, 2020; Lim, 2020). Either way, the question arises as to how statues cause these wrongs. Philosophers have responded to this question by drawing on speech act theory and philosophy of language to explain the ways in which statues may be seen as “speech-like” (Scarre, 2019; Shahvisi, 2021; Friedell and Liao, 2022).

My aim in this paper will be add a different theoretical perspective to this discussion which, I will argue, can provide a deeper understanding of both the harm caused by racist statues and the attachment that many people feel towards them. I will argue that while speech act approach

provides a useful starting point for thinking about what is wrong with racist statues, we can get a fuller understanding of these harms by drawing on resources from recent work in situated affectivity. I will argue that public statues can be understood as a form of affective technology and that this can both help us understand both the deep affective harms caused by racist statues and offer a possible explanation as to why some people are so strongly opposed to their removal.

Anger Towards All Men: A Fittingness Account of Non-Agential Collective Responsibility

BARIŞ C. KAŞTAŞ

Studies on expressions of anger against gendered oppression are well documented in feminist literature. A subset of this emotion is anger that is directed at all men by women and minority groups due to gendered injustices, or Anger Towards All Men (ATAM). ATAM is notable particularly because its target is a non-agential collective. Such collectives are not seen as suitable targets for traditional theories of responsibility. Furthermore, most discussions of feminist anger focus on its moral defensibility (Nussbaum, 2015) or its pragmatic utility (Cherry, 2021). Focusing on ATAM allows us to consider the prior question of *fittingness*. ATAM is an emotion with a wide spectrum: it can involve minor annoyance at men in general due to small slights, as well as expressions of rage caused by traumatic oppression that holds all of the patriarchy responsible. Discussions around such an emotion should then focus not on the ethics or pragmatics of its expression, but its fittingness for its target.

According to D'Arms and Jacobson (2000), fittingness for an emotion measures whether the emotion successfully evaluates its target through its *shape* (is the emotion qualitatively coherent for its target?) and *size* (is the emotion quantitatively proportionate for its target?). Fitting anger, then, is anger that is qualitatively and quantitatively coherent given its target. The two-axes of fittingness allow for granularity when discussing the coherence of an emotion: A feeling might be partially fitting because it succeeds in fitting qualitatively but not quantitatively, or vice-versa. If ATAM's fittingness as an emotion is proven, further discussion of whether non-agential collectives can be responsibility bearers becomes viable.

I argue that ATAM can be fitting because targeting all men is plausible to a sufficient extent, both qualitatively and quantitatively. I will also

argue that ATAM in its various forms can serve as an instance of communicative anger, where the aim is to express that one has been wronged and demands empathy and genuine understanding that they were wronged. Empathy here can be established following Remy Debes's (2017) account of empathic narratives, which stresses the importance of narratives in empathic judgements. I will argue that the narrative model of emotions can justify an emotion's fittingness. While the role of the angersome perpetrator in empathic narratives is usually limited to agents, I argue that non-agential groups composed of agents (such as 'all men') can also fulfil this role in certain situations, making narratives in which all men rouse anger fitting. The anger is fitting so far as it endorses some action for empathy or change, and is proportional to the injustice that took place.

If my argument that ATAM's accountability anger can be fitting holds, two questions are worth considering: (1) If non-agential groups can be fitting targets of accountability, can they bear other kinds of responsibility as well? (2) If narrative understanding plays an important role in our understanding of responsibility as accountability, how far does it illuminate our understanding of other forms of responsibility? I consider these questions briefly at the end of the paper.

How we created the hero narrative from our emotional system of fear?

MYKYTA KABREL

Philosophers argue whether emotions themselves have a narrative structure or whether it is we who create a narrative to understand and explain complex emotions. In the paper, I take the position of the latter. The research solves the problem through a case study of the most famous and common human narrative, namely, the hero's journey. As an explanatory base of its origin and development, I take psychological and affective neuroscience theories on the ancient mammalian fear system, the so-called “anti-predator defense system” (A. Ohman et al., 2001). I argue that the hero narrative originated under the emotional system of fear and our conscious reflection on it. *How does it work in non-human animals?* The anti-predator defense system produces fear and behavioral reactions related to it. The system is needed to regulate mammalian behavior in unknown territory where it is possible to meet a predator. When a territory is already known and safe, the system works in sleep mode, and fear is not produced. However, when an animal steps into unknown territory, the defense system produces fear reactions and increases stress (S. Popov, 2011). The task of the animal in new territory is adaptation through exploration. The animal who manages to do it successfully takes all the benefits of new territory, including food and the possibility of reproduction. Here's what success looks like in the animal world. *But how does it work in the human world?* A prototype of all hero narratives is the story of St. George the victorious. We can observe the pattern in movies, books, myths, stories, legends, and everyday life. It looks like this: some hero voluntarily meets with a danger of the most significant scale (in the classic version, this is a dragon). The hero copes with the threat (defeats the dragon) and receives various benefits in return (usually a kingdom and a maiden). We can find some analogies in the symbol of a dragon as a collective image of a predatory cat (head of dragon), predatory bird (wings and the ability to fly), and snake (body of

dragon), which manifests the danger in all types of environment (B. F. Batto, 1992). We can also draw a parallel with a kingdom and a maiden, where a kingdom is various goods, including food and lower rank animals as subordinates, and a maiden as a direct expression of an opportunity for reproduction. Based on this, the paper's central question is how an inner unconscious mechanism and instinctive animal behavior becomes an outer and articulated human scenario. As we can see, the behavioral pattern in non-human animals is the same as in humans, regardless of the existence of the narrative. Therefore, a structured narrative is a post hoc formation that appears with the conscious reflection on unconscious behavior. The paper reveals this thesis using evolutionary, semiotic, psychological, phenomenological, and literary approaches. In conclusion, I apply the predictive processing framework, which in this context acts as a reasonably attractive explanatory mechanism.

Embodied affectivity. Investigating the relation between bodily expressions and affective experiences

FRANCESCA FORLÈ

In the context of contemporary 4E-cognition-approaches to the study of the mind, in this paper I will propose an embodied account of affective experiences.

In line with phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1945, Krueger 2020), scholars have recently argued that affective experiences can be regarded as having a hybrid structure, constituted both by internal aspects (e.g. the lived experience of the subject) and external ones (the bodily gestures and expressions) (Krueger 2018, Krueger and Overgaard 2012, Overgaard 2012).

In this theoretical line, I will specifically investigate the relationship between affective experiences and their bodily expressions. As Krueger and Overgaard (2012), I will argue that bodily expressions can be seen as constitutive proper parts of the expressed affective experiences, so that the former cannot be said to be merely *caused* by the latter. Specifically, I will propose that bodily expressions are linked to the lived affective experiences by means of *motivational*, as opposed to causal, *connections* (Husserl 1952, Stein 1917).

In order to argue for this thesis, I will introduce the difference between *bodily expressions* and mere *physical accompaniment* of experiences (Stein 1917, 1922). The idea is that phenomena of physical accompaniment are understandable in terms of psychophysical causality, where some psychic experiences have causal effects on body functions. In these cases, the bodily modifications happening to the subject do not depend on the meaning of the experiences but just on the way the body reacts in specific situations. Conversely, in the case of bodily expressions, the connection between an affective experience and its expression is motivated by the specific meaning of the experience, so that – I will argue

– such a connection is not merely a causal or contingent one, but a constitutive one.

On the basis of such a meaningful relation between an experience and its expressions, I will also argue that there are some constraints to the possible variations of the bodily expressions of an experience that specify the invariant structure of that type of experience and its expressions (Husserl 1900-1901, 1913). For instance, even though there can be different expressions of shame, this emotion cannot be expressed *in any way*, i.e. it does not seem to be expressible by means of a haughty, arrogant, and supercilious behavior. Such constraints define the invariant structure of shame's possible bodily expressions, still leaving room for to the wide expressive variability among human beings. It will also be suggested that this invariant structure is what allows one to perceive different bodily expressions as conveying the same experience.

Expressing emotions in psychotherapy

JOANNA KOMOROWSKA-MACH

It is often held that therapeutic change depends on the client's expression of emotions. This view has been especially emphasized within the Carl Rogers' person-centered approach and its developments, such as Eugene Gendlin's focusing-oriented therapy, but many other approaches accept that part of the "talking cure" is to give voice to previously unnamed feelings.

In such process the therapist encourages the client to give attention to unclear and vague feeling and to try out words, descriptions or metaphors that might express it. However, when we take into account skeptical considerations of introspection and private language, pioneered by Ryle and Wittgenstein, it is unclear how verbalizing previously unnamed, vague feelings is even possible and why capturing one's own emotions in such way should be beneficial for the client.

In my speech I want to reflect on how expressing one's emotions contributes to the progress in psychotherapy. I will first present Purton's (2014) analysis of the process of verbalizing one's own feelings in therapeutic process and then I will discuss his view on how does it contribute to the change in psychotherapy. I will argue that what is the most beneficial from therapeutic point of view is not the fact that by finding new way of grasping our situation we are also finding new, more adaptive ways of responding to it, as Purton suggests, but rather the fact that while repeating such experience we learn flexibility in re-evaluating such situations and adjusting our reactions in the long term.

Affective self-doubt: heteronormativity and queer desire

TRISTAN HEDGES

When I first 'came out' to my mother about my sexual identity, the first question she asked me was "but... how do you know?". Although this is not typical of all 'coming out' stories, it reflects a mechanism of heteronormative enforcement which functions to elicit various forms of emotional suppression, regulation, and self-scrutiny which I bring under the heading of *affective self-doubt*. What is interesting about exploring affective self-doubt within the context of desire is the way in which – unlike doubting the aptness of one's anger (Srinivasan 218) – this particular manifestation of self-doubt can entail existential feelings of inner turmoil, being ill-at-ease, and discrepancies for one's narrative self (Ratcliffe 2008; Carel 2013; Ortega 2016). Affective self-doubt is not only doubting one's affective responses, dispositions, and their aptness, but can also entail a more existential self-doubt of whether these affective responses should be interpreted as constitutively significant for one's public and private identity. In this paper I demonstrate how certain experiences of self-doubt should be understood as a site of affective injustice and affect-related hermeneutic injustice (Whitney 2018; Gallegos 2021; Archer and Mills 2019). The context within which I explore these affective injustices is the normalising power of a heteropatriarchal society to foster experiences of both affective and existential self-doubt in subjects who experience queer desires (Foucault 1980, 1995; Butler 1993, 1999; Ahmed 2014; Rodemeyer 2018; McWhorter 1999). Within this paper I focus on two central dimensions of queer desire which correspond to two forms of self-doubt. Firstly, an affective form of self-doubt felt toward one's sexual desires and sexual orientation; secondly, an existential self-doubt experienced in relation to whether one's queer desire is constitutively significant for one's sexual or gender identity.

To achieve these aims, I structure the paper as follows. First, I offer a brief overview of how self-doubt has been conceptualised as both productive and destructive. Second, I describe the affective-intentional

structure of sexual and romantic desire and discuss how such desire is existentially significant for one's personal identity and orientation onto the world (Díaz-León 2017; Wilkerson 2009; Ahmed 2006). Third, I then draw a distinction between affective and existential self-doubt. The former is a self-doubting of one's sexual desires, attractions, and consequently one's sexual orientation. The latter is a form of self-doubt which has one's self-conception in relation to sexual and gender identity as its intentional object. I argue that both forms of self-doubt are affectively unjust as they give rise to inappropriate and harmful emotions, whilst also not granting sufficient recognition or freedom to appropriate affective responses. Further, both forms of self-doubt obscure a significant area of one's social experience from both *self-* and *collective* understanding (Fricker 2007); this process can be made sense of under the heading of affect-related hermeneutic injustice. I then conclude with reflections on the implications my account has for wider discussions of affective injustice, and the productive potential of anti-heteronormative self-doubt.

The origins and the creative power of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger

ANNA-LIZA STARKOVA

One of the triggers for paradigmatic turns in political philosophy and theory is the increase of uncertainty in the contemporary world and, consequently - growing anxiety. Besides the ongoing war in Ukraine, there are multiple crises taking place including the western democratic world. The increasing uncertainty that defines the social and political realms intensifies the inability to predict the future. Such a situation requires new theoretical approaches that would emphasize the role of emotional, unconscious, and existential dimensions in political processes, decisions and the place of the individual within there. One of the examples of such methodological turns in political theory is ontological security theory, which focuses on anxiety and insecurity in politics on both the individual and collective levels. It relies on the premise that there are no stable and objective meanings for knowledge formation and that political reality is continuously altering. Ontological security theory is derived chiefly from the philosophy of existence and psychoanalysis. Thus this work focuses on the existential perspective of *anxiety* by arguing for the importance of the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger for the conceptualization of individual anxiety within the collective dimension of existence. *In this paper, anxiety* is approached as a fundamental mode of existence, rooted in the ontological structure of individual existence. Furthermore, it implies that *uncertainty* is always a present and unavoidable condition of reality. As a response to uncertain reality, anxiety forces individuals to establish firm explanations for their existence. Thus, the problem is as Arendt (deeply influenced by both thinkers) stresses later that anxiety and loneliness could make us catch up with any suggested certainty.

In the first part, this paper explores how Kierkegaard introduces the concept of anxiety as one of the central issues of existential philosophy that helps us to reveal the individual self and subjectivity that is vis-à-vis

universal laws and objective truth. The second part focuses on Heidegger's understanding of anxiety inherent in Kierkegaard's key assumptions on anxiety and the self. Anxiety in this part is revealed in its relationship to the ontological structure of Dasein and several elements of the latter – *fear, care* and the fundamental ontological characteristics unified by care: *falling, thrownness, existentiality* – that are disclosed through anxiety. As a result, anxiety discloses Dasein in its ownmost possibilities.

Relying on Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the paper chapter suggests that anxiety should not be simply “managed” and eliminated as behaviourist approaches propose. Instead, anxiety can be understood as a creative power that uncovers individual authenticity and multiple potentialities of seeing ourselves and relating to the world and others. Thus, it opens a space for new beginnings through a spontaneous action, including spontaneous thought that reaches beyond the dominant paradigms of thinking.

Moral understanding in Psychopathy: discussing The Gates of Janus philosophically

SARA COELHO

One of the things that is much-debated in the philosophic literature about psychopathy is whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their actions. Psychopathy is a controversial construct that has been classified as a clinical condition but not as a mental disease. In the DSM-V, the concept of psychopathy has been included in the classification of Anti-Social Disorder but not is defined by it (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Specialists agree that psychopaths are characterized by a lack of guilt and remorse, disturbances in empathy, lack of fear and anxiety, egocentrism, manipulative behaviour and impulsiveness. Many psychopaths turn out to be criminal offenders. What has been puzzling professionals over the years is that while psychopaths seem at first to comprehend his actions, they are not affectively moved. In virtue of their affective reactions, researchers are inclined to doubt that psychopaths fully understand their actions. However, they remained inconclusive about whether the impairment relies on rational abilities or emotional abilities.

In the philosophical literature, psychopathic condition started to be studied within the moral debate between rationalists and sentimentalists (Malatesti, 2010). Rationalists believe that our moral behaviour is rooted in reasons. Thus, they defend that psychopaths lack moral understanding due to deficits in reason. The general thought is that psychopaths display an egocentric thought. Some contend that psychopaths are unable to universalize rules (Kennett, 2002), to attend to others motives or ends or even are unable to comprehend some type of values (Smith, 1984). Sentimentalists argue that moral actions stem from emotions. Therefore, they agree that empathy impairments and the lack of moral emotions (sympathy) forbid psychopaths to have a complete moral understanding and to be motivated to perform moral actions (Duff, 1977). Based on modern empirical findings in moral psychology, the philosopher Heidi

Maibom recently proposed that the absence of moral emotions is not the cause of amoral behaviour in psychopaths (Maibom, 2018). She thinks that we should re-conceptualize psychopathy and face the condition as a spectrum, where psychopaths possess a deficit of empathy rather than an absence. In this context, she posits that psychopaths are unable to feel distress in response to imaginary scenarios and that's the reason why they cannot be considered morally responsible.

Philosophers have supported their argumentation referring to examples of characters from novels or of case-studies from the psychiatric and psychological literature. As far as we know, no work in philosophy literature has built the argumentation on a self-report from a psychopath. So, we propose for the first time to access the self-experience of psychopath and sustain our argumentation with examples collected from that self-report. We do so by studying the autobiography *The Gates of Janus* by Ian Brady, a psychopath and a serial killer and try to deduce what his writings tell us about his personality. This goal is achieved by doing an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, a qualitative method from social sciences. The role of the researcher is to answer a research question by trying to interpret the data, group it into themes and sub-themes and allowing an understanding of the lived experience of the subject. In this case, the purpose is to consider the existence/absence of emotions and the type of thoughts (egocentric/non egocentric). This orientation allows us to review the text by examining traces that speak in favour or against a rationalist and a sentimentalist position.

The recurrent descriptions based on three predetermined themes, arguments, emotions and empathy, show that psychopaths are capable of universalize rules and have values of its own. Based on our analysis, we argue that Maibom is right to claim that psychopaths exhibit some empathy. However, we then argue that Maibom is wrong to conclude that psychopaths are incapable of experience distress towards imaginary scenarios.

Affective injustice and medically unexplained symptoms

ELEANOR BYRNE

Philosophers have recently become equipped with the notion of ‘affective injustice’ which describes—broadly—injustices done to a person in their capacity as an affective being. Archer & Mills (2019) further developed the notion by showing that subjects of affective injustice are often pressured to emotionally regulate in ways that are harmful to them.

In this paper, I articulate how affective injustices can target ill people, particularly ill people with poorly-understood bodily and affective symptoms. This is not necessarily through pressure to emotionally regulate, but rather, through (often unconscious) pressure to align oneself to over-simplified narratives about oneself and one’s symptoms. I articulate the additional harms of these affective injustices, namely that the narratives can facilitate problematic political strategy.

Philosophers are increasingly exposing that our conceptual frameworks regarding the interaction of biological, social and psychological (including emotional) factors in illness are insufficient, with the biological dimension often disproportionately centred (think talk of ‘neuro-centrism’, ‘biological reductionism’, etc). I begin with the fairly straightforward claim that these conceptual limitations cause hermeneutic injustices targeting people with poorly understood bodily and affective symptoms.

This hermeneutic problem can play out the following way: people who experience such symptoms are then vulnerable to a dilemma whereby, in an attempt to make sense of their experience, they are disposed to either (i) deflate the affective dimension of their experience and inflate the bodily dimension or (ii) inflate the affective dimension of their experience and deflate the bodily dimension. Either way, the framing of the experience is insufficient, only ever capturing one isolated dimension of an inextricably dynamic experience. This is what constitutes the *affective injustice*.

Harms follow both horns of the dilemma. On (i) the affective dimension of experience is dismissed or ‘explained away’ in ways which can warp the person’s illness narrative. However, the person is comparatively protected from certain prejudices which target people with psychiatric illness. On (ii) the affective dimension of the experience is acknowledged, yet inflated in ways which can also warp the person’s illness narrative. This can dispose the person towards ‘psychologisation’ of the self and others which, as is well documented, can result in misdiagnosis or mistreatment.

Given the comparative protection from prejudice, (i) is generally more attractive. I suggest, however, that this often feeds unhelpful political strategy such as ‘strategic essentialism’. A documented problem with strategic essentialism is that frames a heterogeneous group as homogenous. Many people, if nebulously, recognise this mischaracterisation. Hence a further problem, I suggest, is that it creates polarisation and resistance, where the harms of (ii) are also emboldened. A greater appreciation of this affective and epistemic predicament is required in order to mitigate these harms in the relevant populations.

Friday 16th June

Panel on Emotional Self-KnowledgeEDWARD HARCOURT, PILAR LÓPEZ-CANTERO, ALBA MONTES SÁNCHEZ,
AND UKU TOOMING

A book symposium on Montes Sánchez, Alba and Salice, Alessandro (eds.), forthcoming in June 2023, *Emotional Self-Knowledge*. New York: Routledge.

Participants: Edward Harcourt, Pilar López-Cantero, Alba Montes Sánchez, Alessandro Salice and Uku Tooming.

The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. While philosophers of emotion tend to give affectivity a central role in making us who we are, the philosophical literature on self-knowledge focuses overwhelmingly on cognitive states and doesn't give a special place to the emotions. Traditionally, there has been little dialogue between both fields or with other philosophical traditions that have important contributions to make to this topic, such as phenomenology and Asian philosophy. *Emotional Self-Knowledge* remedies this situation by bringing together philosophers from the relevant fields to explore two related sets of questions: Firstly, do philosophers of emotion exaggerate the importance of our affective lives in making us who we are? Or is it philosophers of self-knowledge who misunderstand emotions? Secondly, what is the role of emotions in self-knowledge? What sort of self-knowledge can be secured by paying attention to our emotions? All in all, this volume fosters our understanding of two topics (self-knowledge and emotions) with rich but undertheorized connections, and it constitutes the first volume specifically devoted to the issue of affective self-knowledge.

This group panel features an introduction by the editors, followed by three short presentations by individual chapter authors, who will explain how their contributions to this volume illuminate the relationship between emotions and self-knowledge. Following these presentations, we will open the floor for a discussion with the audience.

Alba Montes Sánchez and Alessandro Salice: Introduction

This introduction gives an overview of the book and the main thematic threads that run through it. First, it situates the volume as an endeavor to contribute to the literature on “substantial” self-knowledge (Cassam 2014), which is both difficult to get and personally valuable for its subject. Thus, most chapters explore different facets of the idea that, due to their evaluative character,

affective states can give us access to what we care about and value, and thereby they can help us obtain knowledge of fundamental aspects of our person like, e.g., our character traits. Furthermore, the book explores what (else) affective states illuminate and what they obstruct about us, which sorts of spaces for self-knowledge they provide, how do they affect the dynamic formation of our self-concepts and self-narratives, through which mechanisms they foster or hinder self-knowledge and which roles do other people play in emotional self-knowledge.

Uku Tooming (and Kengo Miyazono): Affective Forecasting and Substantial Self-Knowledge

In our contribution to the volume, we argue the difficulty of attaining substantial self-knowledge, such as knowledge of one’s character, values and aptitudes, is explained by the fact that substantial self-knowledge requires having at one’s disposal evidence about one’s emotional responses across a range of situations, but that evidence is not easy to get. In order to get evidence about those responses, people usually have to resort to affective forecasting and there is a lot of empirical evidence that

people's affective forecasts tend to be inaccurate. The resulting view implies that emotional self-knowledge is the precondition for the type of self-knowledge we care about the most.

Edward Harcourt: Acquiring Self-Knowledge from Others

Acquiring certain sorts of knowledge of myself is generally thought to be easier for me than it is for anybody else. Along with this familiar idea comes another, that the way in which I know at least some things about myself is different from, and less roundabout than, the way or ways it's available to others to know about me. But sometimes, it seems, others know me better than I do: they are a 'mirror' to ourselves from which we can learn things we wouldn't know otherwise. The aim of this chapter is to explore what this idea might amount to. In doing so, I don't offer the familiar argument that others can function as reliable witnesses. I rather focus on the thought that others can be—in senses to be explained—a *direct* source of my knowledge of myself. Various phenomena which exemplify this are appealed to in order to question the priority of self-knowledge over others' knowledge of us; to explore the idea that there's a kind of spontaneous knowledge of me that is the common property of myself and of others who know me; and to explore the relevance of emotion and of our *ordinary aliveness to one another* to the transactions in which I learn about myself from others (and teach others about themselves).

Pilar López-Cantero: Three Stages of Love, Narrative, and Self-Understanding

The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? Here, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, which is maintained during the

middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feelings that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other.

Panel on Loneliness in Psychopathology

TOM ROBERTS, JOEL KRUEGER, AND LUCY OSLER

Loneliness is a near-universal experience. It is particularly common for individuals with (so-called) psychopathological conditions or disorders.

In this panel, we set the scene by exploring the experiential character of loneliness, with a specific emphasis on how social goods are experienced as absent in ways that involve a diminished sense of agency and recognition. We, then, explore the role and experience of loneliness in three case studies: depression, anorexia nervosa, and autism.

We aim to show that even though experiences of loneliness might be common to many psychopathologies, these experiences nevertheless have distinctive profiles. Specifically, we suggest that: (i) loneliness is often a core characteristic of depressive experience; (ii) loneliness can drive, and even cement, disordered eating practices and anorectic identity in anorexia nervosa; (iii) loneliness is neither a core characteristic of autism nor a driver but is rather commonly experienced as stemming from social worlds, environments, and norms that fail to accommodate autistic bodies and their distinctive forms of life.

Overall, we attempt to do justice to the pervasiveness of loneliness in many — if not all — psychopathologies, while also highlighting the need to attend to psychopathology-specific experiences of loneliness, agency, and (non-)recognition.

Understanding Recalcitrant Mental States: Emotions, Perceptions, and Intuitions

GIULIA CANTAMESSI

A mental state is *recalcitrant* when it persists despite being in tension with a corresponding judgment. In this paper I aim at providing an in-depth understanding of recalcitrant emotions, recalcitrant perceptions and recalcitrant intuitions thanks to an extensive and thorough contrastive analysis which highlights their distinctive features. By focusing on their connection with motivation and action, my arguments will also bring out why as agents we have reason to care about recalcitrant states.

In philosophy and moral psychology, much attention is devoted to *recalcitrant emotions* (RE), which conflict with an evaluative judgement (e.g., fear of a dog despite judging that it is not dangerous). RE have become a touchstone for philosophical theories of emotions and have been recently brought up against perceptualist theories. The problem with perceptualist views, according to a common objection, is that they understand RE to be similar to *recalcitrant perceptions* (RP). These theories, it is argued, misconceive the phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance, as by assimilating RE and RP they do not account for the fact that RE are irrational whereas RP are not, and incorrectly end up ascribing no irrationality to RE. In light of the recognition of this asymmetry in the ascription of irrationality, a common trend in the literature on emotions is the search of differences between RE and RP which can explain what makes the former but not the latter irrational.

In this paper, I shall firstly show how the comparison between RE and RP is often unduly simplified in the literature, as only certain instances of visual illusion (such as the Müller-Lyer illusion) are mentioned as examples of RP. One needs instead to acknowledge that RP are a heterogeneous phenomenon and that some but not all RP share certain features with RE, whereas other traits seem to be typical of RE only. Another weakness of the standard analysis of recalcitrant states is that it

leaves out another phenomenon which is instead worth taking into account, namely *recalcitrant intuitions* (RI). In the case of a recalcitrant intuition, a proposition strikes someone as true even if it is not believed. RI, and in particular *moral* RI, bear significant similarities to RE. Importantly, both types of states are intrinsically motivating, are likely to interfere with one's behaviour and actions, and take part in defining one's character and personality.

After examining these phenomena and the different expectations and evaluations they come with, I shall question the claim that RE and RI (or better, agents experiencing RE or RI) are ipso facto *irrational*. I shall argue that the features distinguishing RE and RI from RP do not justify ascribing irrationality to RE and RI as such rather than to acting upon RE or RI, which is a contingent consequence of these states. Moreover, I shall claim that having RE or RI amounts to being presented with certain contents not aligned to our judgements and that being in this condition does not per se make us irrational.

Francis Bacon and Stoic Emotion

MATT ANDERSON

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) provocatively stated in his *Advancement of Learning* (1605) that most philosophers before him had failed to provide an adequate treatment of emotions in their ethical writings, and that the best doctors of such knowledge were instead poets and historians. Despite this bold assertion, in this paper I contend that Bacon's moral psychology was in fact significantly influenced by his engagement with the Stoics. I illustrate this influence by investigating the nature of Bacon's complaint about previous moral philosophy, before treating some of his principal works on ethics including his letters and the *Essays* (1597, 1612, 1625). Bacon's wariness of emotions as 'diseases of the mind' culminated in a Stoic occupation with constancy and tranquillity of mind, which consistently guided his practical prescriptions for managing emotions healthily.

Bacon's complaint against previous treatments of emotions stems from his belief that they were mostly too abstracted from the 'true nature of things', and therefore fail to provide practically useful insights into how emotions affect the mind and how we should approach any attempt to manage our emotions. Such considerations are especially important for Bacon's intensely social ethics, which calls for an outward-looking detailed analysis of emotional relationships between various people, given the impact emotions have on social life as well as individual wellbeing. In response to these deficiencies Bacon developed what he called a 'georgics of the mind', which was designed to address the practical shortcomings of previous ethical thinkers.

The georgics of the mind is exhibited in a number of Bacon's letters and especially in his widely read *Essays*, and I will discuss some principal examples in what follows.

In his *Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his Travels* (ca. 1595-97) Bacon is occupied with the question of how we can manage our emotions

without compromising our constancy and control over ourselves. A similar emphasis on constancy in relation to hope is prominent also in *Of Earthly Hope* (1597) from Bacon's *Meditationes Sacrae*.

In the *Letter and Discourse to Sir Henry Savile* (ca. 1596-1604) Bacon suggests that emotions can be 'used' to spur students to industry in their intellectual pursuits, following Seneca's guidance (in *De Ira*) on how instances arise where emotions can be carefully kept under control to pursue rational interests.

As for the *Essays*, in *Of Death* Bacon expounds on how effectively managing our emotions is crucial to overcoming fear of death; *Of Revenge* provides a wary treatment of what can go wrong when we seek vengeance in an emotionally charged way; and *Of Anger* prescribes a noticeably Senecan attitude towards anger, in relation to both how it arises and how we should treat it in ourselves and others.

“We are all victims now” -- Understanding the spread of victimhood identities through resentment and self-victimization

MIKKO SALMELA

The spread of victimhood identities in the context of grievance-based identity politics threatens liberal democracies externally and from within. Examples include 1) dominant group self-victimisation (Sharafutdinova, 2020; Reicher & Ulusahin, 2020; Medvedev 2020); 2) continuous victimhood narratives that persist from the past with different perpetrators (Szabo, 2020; Szabo & Lipinski, 2021); and 3) the new victimhood culture on the progressive left (Campbell & Manning, 2018). These cases come out as anomalous in extant research of collective victimhood that focuses on actual victims of oppression or intergroup violence (Vollhardt, 2020; Alexander et al., 2004). We propose to understand the proliferation of victimhood identities through the theoretical lens of *ressentiment*. We hypothesise that the present social, economic, and ideological conditions in contemporary neoliberal societies feed *ressentiment* which makes the espousal of victimhood identities appealing. *Ressentiment* is relevant for two reasons: first, it is driven by negative emotions involving a self-reproaching victim position which in *ressentiment* is transformed into a morally superior victim identity which, secondly, provides justification for the other-directed moral emotions, as well as a foundation for collective victimhood that is validated and reinforced with peer others (Anonymised, 2021). Finally, we outline a two-track theory of *ressentiment* that distinguishes between two avenues, individual and collective. This new theory highlights personal and collective self-esteem and the need for social and intergroup recognition as concerns underlying the emotions that drive individual and collective *ressentiment*, respectively.

Philosophy and Ressentiment – A Precarious Alliance

FREDRIK WESTERLUND

This paper explores why philosophers – and intellectuals and artists more generally – have tended to be drawn to resentment as a basic attitude. The paper comprises two main tasks. First, I outline an account of resentment which both draws on and critically departs from Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s classic accounts. I argue that resentment is a defensive psychological attitude that is rooted in our drive for social recognition. The function of resentment is to ward off perceived threats to our social standing and self-esteem. In resentment, we downgrade the prevailing values and ideals of our group that we have internalized and that we feel unable to live up to. At the same time, we place superior value on traits that we exemplify and on tasks that are within our reach. Finally, we entertain hopes of revenge, that is, of being recognized and praised for our traits and achievements by some imagined future audience. Second, I argue that the reason why philosophers are prone to resort to resentment stems from one of the central difficulties of the task of philosophy. The difficulty I have in mind consists in the fact that the very task of pursuing and speaking the truth about matters essentially requires us to independently think through and be open to the phenomena in question without being led by the opinions of our reference groups. Since the matters studied by philosophers tend to be ideologically and morally charged, investigating them without regard for prevailing opinions is difficult. This predicament, I suggest, makes philosophers prone to adopt the attitude of resentment as a way of achieving some freedom from the pressure of complying with the opinions and values of their group and allowing them to postpone their hopes for recognition and affirmation. However, resentment is a dangerous ally since it brings with it its own tendencies toward self-deception and distortion.

I Can't be Held Down': The Myth, Magic, and Music of Queer Joy

ROISIN MAEVE

Brian Massumi defines joy as “a desire for more life or more to life.”¹ For Spinoza, joy was the ultimate affect because it increases our power to act or “persevere in existence”.² Audre Lorde famously wrote that joy is an act of resistance, which crucially enables a sense of belonging and connection.³ Andrea Lawlor, the author of the queer novel *Paul Takes the Form of a Mortal Girl*, stated that they are queer “because I find it fun to be queer, not because it makes me feel virtuous [and] not because I was ‘born this way’.”⁴ FATT Projects, a queer art collective based in Birmingham, declare in their ‘themifesto’ that they “make for others to connect to queer joy. And through queer joy we will heal”⁵. However, influential queer theorists have forged arguments that equate queerness with darkness (Halberstam); argue queerness is an intrinsically melancholic attachment (Butler); or of scholarly interest because of its negativity and trauma (Cvetkovich); or shame (Sedgwick), and argue that queerness is endemic to the death drive because queer people cannot give any reproductive future to society (Edelman). How can queer joy be understood amongst this plethora of work celebrating queerness for its negativity? This paper argues that joy is interesting. Moreover, joy is a vital part of the lived experience of queer people, offering a form of resistance, a survival strategy, an affirmative actualisation, and at other times, an assimilationist retreat. Queer joy can be charted in queer aesthetics and works by LGBTQIA+ artists, writers, and musicians. In our art and praxis, queer joy emerges as an intensity that allows us to imagine and embody new worlds and ways of being. However, the theorisation on joy is startlingly obscured within queer theory, which overwhelmingly revels in the negative potentiality and propensities of queerness. Rather than kill our darlings of darkness, this paper excavates the tenants of queer theory in search of queer joy. Surprisingly, joy is located within the militant polemics of the antisocial queer thesis. Moreover, queer joy is indebted to the prior decades of work on queer

melancholia, shame, and negativity. However, is it still appropriate to operate under the assumption that the only thing politically indispensable about queerness is its political unacceptability?⁶ Thinking with and against figures such as Jose Esteban Muñoz, Jack Halberstam, Lee Edelman, Sara Ahmed, Audre Lorde, and Baruch Spinoza and drawing from the queer worlds envisioned by electronic Hyperpop musician, SOPHIE, this paper begins the task of collating an archive of queer joy. From this eclectic archive, this paper poses some theoretical pathways to expanding scholarship to include joy as a vital source of queer imagination, ingenuity, and potentiality. Additionally, I argue that queerness offers us insight into how joy can be an every practice of desiring — and demanding— more life or more from life.

Feminist curiosity as the aim of travel

PILAR LOPEZ-CANTERO

Philosophers have an unsolved dilemma with respect to travel. Initially, it seems that travelling can only be a good thing, with the opposite being insularism and narrowmindedness. However, travel can be morally damaging, from the obvious environmental harm of flying to the reinforcing of reinforcing colonizing practices and ‘white saviour’ attitudes (Selinger & Outterson 2010). From this, we can conclude that there can be *better* and *worse* types of travelling.

One strategy to distinguish between the good and the bad travel is to distinguish between *tourists* and *travellers* in function of what they do and what they believe. Tourists have a reputation of passivity and gullibility, and that view has been at the centre of the discussion in Tourism Studies for the past few decades. Ruud Welten (2014, 71) summarizes both sides of the debate between those who see tourists as “impressionable and passive onlookers” and those who argue that tourists can be aware and active: “they choose, and the impressions they acquire during travel provoke reflection”. Welten’s endorsement of the latter view seems reasonable, since even if some tourist practices foster gullibility and are mainly passive, it seems extreme to fully deny tourists’ autonomy. Like Welten argues, tourists learn about themselves and travelling, even when engaging in stereotypical tourism practices, is a self-determined route to construct their own identity.

In my paper, I use the example of the film *Eat Pray Love* to show how focusing exclusively on autonomy and the ability of self-reflection, although promising, is not the best way to distinguish between good and bad travel. Instead, I use Perry Zurn’s (2021) discussion on feminist curiosity as a necessary condition for good travel. For Zurn, feminist curiosity does not only consist on adopting a feminist outlook, but has a more general deconstructive aim: it “privileges collaborative inquiry and a generous listening to the embodied, material realities of the here and

now”. Translated to the question of travels, this deconstructive attitude is in direct opposition with the inquisitiveness and impartial observation that are traditionally attributed to the good traveller in figures like Walter Benjamin’s (1983) *flaneur*. I argue that this attitude is an essential condition of good travelling.

Finally, I address an objection from elitism. Most people who travel engage in traditional tourist practices which do not leave space for this sort of attitude. This is also the only kind of travel that is economically viable for many. I argue that establishing feminist curiosity as the aim of travel entails not only a change in the attitudes of individual travellers, but also an institutional requirement to support the contribution of local epistemic communities, as well as a requirement from epistemic communities to engage in narrative resistance (reference redacted, manuscript under review).

“Adjusting the lens: Compersion, Buddhism, and the four immeasurables”

HIN SING YUEN

Compersion is an affective state that is receiving attention in the context of consensually non-monogamous constellations (monogamish, open, polyamorous or anarchical relationships, swinging etc.) in which all partners involved agree to have extradyadic sexual or romantic relationships. In this context, the feeling of compersion is typically described as a decidedly positive emotional reaction to one’s partner’s enjoying time and/or intimacy with another person, which has in the past led some to reduce it to ‘the opposite of jealousy.’ Recent years, however, have seen an increased research interest in this seemingly startling emotion that has shown that this reduction is too simplistic, because jealousy and compersion are part of an intricate web of related responses to certain situations, neither of which is ‘the’ only option possible. Some polyamorous people describe compersion as an ambivalent emotion that includes both positive and negative reactions, sort of a joy that co-occurs with pangs of jealousy. A more nuanced characterization that acknowledges the complex intersectional nature of compersion thus seems prudent.

Part of what makes understanding compersion so difficult are the hetero- and mononormative expectations, assumptions, and prejudices still prevalent in Western culture. Making compersion intelligible against such a background is like trying to convey the idea that parallel lines can intersect in a world in which everyone’s geometrical intuitions are Euclidian through and through: Incredulity is inevitable—unless there is a radical shift in perspective. We therefore suggest a non-Western, in particular Buddhist, perspective which, we argue, is better able to let us understand that and why love and/or intimacy need not be an affair between two people only than our typical Western perspective. In particular, we approach compersion through a Buddhist lens based on the ‘four immeasurables,’ i.e., non-egocentric states that Buddhists take to

promote well-being, and their ‘near enemies,’ i.e., states which are easily conflated with them, but egocentric and harmful. Our goal is not to formulate a definition of compersion, nor to raise a normative bar for anyone who feels compersion, but to describe important facets of this often misunderstood affective state that stand out more clearly against a Buddhist background than they might otherwise do. We do so by analysing extensive interviews in which polyamorous people report on their experiences of compersion. The Buddhist perspective on compersion as an ‘affective orientation’ that results from this, we argue, may not only enrich the uninitiated’s understanding of compersion, but also help people in consensually non-monogamous relationships to detect warning signs that the way they view some aspect of their relationship may be have a self-deceptive tendency and potentially detrimental, even unhealthy, consequences. In addition, the cultivation of compersion in the way suggested arguably contributes to people’s flourishing in *all* kinds of relationships can also shed light on how, for instance, aromantic or asexual partners emotionally experience their relationships. And lastly, Understanding compersion along Buddhist lines also shows that non-monogamous relationships might in fact be compatible with at least some forms of Buddhist practice.

Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships

VIVIAN PUUSEPP

Many authors acknowledge that people share emotions in various social contexts. How shared emotions are conceptualized is, to a certain extent, a matter of theoretical preference. It depends on what we want to explain. My aim in this paper is to explain the role of social relationships for shared emotions. Moreover, I want to provide a plausible account of shared emotions that:

1. would not compromise our intuitions about the individualism of emotions;
2. recognizes the social nature of such emotions;
3. enables us to understand how shared emotions enable people to bond; and
4. enables us to locate shared emotions within a larger taxonomy of different kinds of social emotional phenomena.

I will begin by defining emotions as affective states of individuals that have specific physiological, phenomenological, and intentional sub-components which change dynamically over time and are connected to some behavioral inclinations. (By “intentional”, I do not mean “voluntary”. I use the term “intentional” the way it is used in philosophy of mind and phenomenology to refer to the property of mental states of being about, representing, or standing for things, properties, and states.) My paper focuses on the phenomenological and intentional aspects of shared emotions.

To describe the phenomenology of shared emotions, I hypothesize that any shared emotion has a specific feel to it, which I call *the sense of closeness*. The sense of closeness has at least two aspects: hedonic and

social. The sharing of an emotion is experienced as rewarding, even if the shared emotion is unpleasant – this is the hedonic aspect of the experience. The social aspect points to participants feeling more intimate with one another when they successfully share emotions.

To analyze the intentional element of shared emotions, I borrow from Helm the distinction between the *target*, the *formal object* and the *focus* of an emotion. I argue that when people share an emotion, their relationship is at the focus of their experience. In other words, part of what it means to share an emotion with you is caring about our relationship. By drawing insights from relationship science in general and *relational models theory* in particular, I elaborate on and explore the idea that shared emotions track social relationships as their foci.

Two Types of Feelings of Belonging

ALBA MONTES SÁNCHEZ AND THOMAS SZANTO

Belonging is a widely used notion in sociology, psychology and political philosophy, usually in connection with issues such as identity politics, migration or nationalism. In all these fields, a distinction is routinely drawn between belonging in an objective or institutional sense (e.g., citizenship) and belonging in a subjective, experiential sense (a sense or feeling of belonging) (see Antonsich 2010). However, despite the widespread use of this latter notion, an adequate account of the feelings of belonging that distinguishes them clearly from related phenomena like group identification or attachment is still missing. This becomes particularly clear when one tries to investigate the emotional impact of migration, where phenomena like acculturation stress, nostalgia or migratory grief are researched in isolation of each other, without paying heed to the fact that they share a common root in challenged or altered feelings of belonging. In this talk we therefore seek to articulate an account of feelings of belonging, their phenomenology and affective-intentional structure, that can remedy this lacuna.

The feelings of belonging have recently been conceptualized in roughly two ways. According to one account, they qualify as an “existential feeling”: a “way of finding oneself in the world” or a background affective orientation that shapes an individual’s space of possibilities (Ratcliffe 2008). As such, they amount to a pre-reflective sense of togetherness or of being “us” that allows us to experience the world at large as a shared space (Wilde 2021). According to another proposal, feeling belonging to a group

can be conceived as an episodic feeling, akin to other standard emotions. As such feelings of belonging have an intentional target (the subject’s relation to the group), a formal object (the hedonically positive value of certain commonalities or congruences between oneself and the group)

and a focus of concern (roughly, a concern with fitting in and being valued by other group members) (Szanto forthcoming).

We will fathom how these two conceptualizations relate. Rather than being exclusive alternatives, we suggest that we need both, in particular to understand complex processes of disturbances of belongingness. We argue that episodic feelings of belonging arise against the backdrop of an existential feeling and respond to its disturbances and alterations. Drawing then on the the above-mentioned case of emotional reactions to migration, we show that conceptualizing belonging as an existential feeling is what allows us to make sense of the ways in which the emotional responses that are typical of migration processes are interlinked.

Vulnerable empathy: Some thoughts on Aristotle

ALESSANDRA FUSSI & HEIDI MAIBOM

In *The Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that someone who does not feel vulnerable to the misfortunes that befalls another, cannot, or will not, feel *eleos*, variously translated as pity or compassion, for that person. Although the idea is discussed by philosophers of history (Oele 2010, Poore 2018) and ethics (Crisp 2008), it is an idea that hasn't been taken up much in research on empathy and compassion. Whereas research on empathy is very sensitive to the breadth and quality of *experience* in empathizers, little attention has been directed at their emotional dispositions and proclivities. We use Aristotle's suggestion as a springboard for examining this feature of empathy and compassion. The first finding is that although there is some support for the idea in the empirical literature, the studies tend to focus on relevant experience more than emotional dispositions. This is a problem because one can have had the relevant experiences and yet fail to empathize with people undergoing the same hardship or suffering (Batson et al. 1996). It seems one must have the right *attitude* towards one's prior experience, among other things. The second finding is that people who feel powerful tend to experience less empathy than people who do not (Galinsky et al. 2006, Galinsky, Rucker, and McGee 2016). The powerful often feel invulnerable to many kinds of hardships and suffering. The third finding is that (primary) psychopaths have little sense of their own vulnerability (they rate high on fearless dominance, Lilienfeld et al. 2012), little ability to *imagine* harm befalling them (Patrick, Cuthbert, and Lang 1994), and famously experience little empathy for others. The evidence, therefore, seem to support the important role of feelings of vulnerability in empathy and compassion. We outline the implications of the importance of vulnerability to how we conceptualize empathy, how it unfolds in everyday life, and how to cultivate it. Lastly, we speculate about the consequences for our theories of moral emotions and morality more generally.

Saturday 17th June

A critique of the dualist account of guilt

HEIDY MERISTE

There seems to be a growing trend of arguing that the phenomena that some folk psychological emotion concept is supposed to capture fragments into distinct natural kinds which are not species of the same genus. Paul Griffiths (1997) has argued this for emotions in general, and more recently, Francesco Mancini and Angela Gangemi (2021) have defended a dualist view of guilt in particular. I will focus on the latter but will try to illuminate the problems with fragmentationist proposals in general.

According to Mancini and Gangemi (2021), certain problem cases like the possibility of guilt feelings over victimless crimes that involve no harm to others (e.g. masturbation) and for cases of not promoting other people's well-being that fall short of violating moral norms (e.g. leaving the hospital while your wardmate received a fatal diagnosis, and not being there for her) motivate the conclusion that guilt feelings fragment into two independent types – deontological and altruistic. Whereas deontological guilt is a matter of violating moral norms, altruistic guilt is a matter of not promoting other people's well-being.

Firstly, such an account runs the risk of cherry-picking only one possible distinction along the lines of which the sphere of guilt could be divided. In fact, it is not even clear which one, because the distinction between failing to promote well-being versus violating moral norms is soon substituted with the distinction of going against the principles of communal versus some higher (divine/natural) order, which does not really overlap with the former. Taken in unison, such crisscrossing distinctions do not yield a neat overall division. (For a similar point, see Robert Roberts's (2003) critique of Griffiths (1997).)

Secondly, going for dualism, or, in fact, any -ism that refers to a small number of fragmenting elements, is just a way of substituting one dream of neatness with another, when instead we should abandon the pretensions of neatness in the first place. Once we give up the idea that emotions have necessary and sufficient conditions and adopt a prototype approach that allows for fuzzy edges, it becomes unnecessary to proliferate the number of emotion types in order to do justice to a relatively small number of borderline cases.

Thirdly, there is the risk of overemphasizing borderline (often even pathological) cases *at the expense* of central ones. Guilt dualism results in the insistence that valuing morality is always distinct from valuing other people's well-being and diagnoses paradigmatic cases as instances of double guilt. This involves a heavy distortion of what morality is paradigmatically about, as moral norms often derive their force from valuing the well-being of other people. While there may be contexts where focusing on the borderline cases proves useful (as pointed out by Mancini and Gangemi, in clinical psychology, altruistic and deontological guilt seem to map well with MDD and OCD), yet in other, more daily, contexts a more unified account that focuses of prototypical cases and allows for fuzzy edges may prove more suitable. I will finish by drawing the contours of such an account.

The Affective Dynamics of Humiliation, Violence, and Redemption

RUTH REBECCA TIETJEN

In this talk, I develop a philosophical analysis of the affective dynamics of humiliation, violence, and redemption in the context of terrorism and asymmetric political conflicts. I argue that violence, as a reaction to experiences of humiliation, is not only a form of retaliation and self-defense but also an expression of the quest for redemption and self-transcendence. While the concepts of redemption and transcendence are religiously connotated, I take the model to apply to a broader, also non-religious context (e.g., terrorist attacks of the misogynist Incel movement) (de Graaf 2021; Janse forthcoming). In my analysis, I draw on literature in philosophy of emotion as well as neighboring disciplines, especially social psychology, political sciences, history, and religious studies.

In the first part of my talk, I offer a phenomenological analysis of humiliation, thereby drawing on recent psychological literature on terrorist violence (Leidner et al. 2012; Linder 2006; McCauley 2017) and highlighting three features of humiliation. First, humiliation is a compound of other- and self-directed emotions. On the one hand, it targets a person or group of persons and accuses them of an attack on one's dignity (think, e.g., of rape, torture, a political system of occupation, or the desecration of religious objects and symbols) (Honneth 1994); on the other, it involves shame as a reaction to one's failure to adequately react to the injustice inflicted upon one. The experienced failure thereby characteristically encompasses both one's failure to prevent the violation from occurring in the first place and one's failure to adequately react to it (e.g., retaliate against it) once it has occurred. This explains the characteristic temporal structure of humiliation. Second, experiences of humiliation that motivate terrorism typically involve both personal and social/collective dimensions – i.e., individual experiences of humiliation, experiences of humiliation inflicted upon people one is personally attached to, and experiences of

humiliation based on group identification. Third, although typically associated with the “weak” side, experiences of humiliation in the context of asymmetric conflicts occur on both sides – those of the allegedly “weak” and those of the allegedly “powerful.”

In the second part, I explore how violence as a reaction to humiliation serves the purpose not only of retaliation and self-defense but also of individual and collective redemption. The other-directed moral dimension of humiliation accounts for the retaliatory dimension of humiliation. The group identification characteristically connected to humiliation explains why violence as a reaction to humiliation is experienced as self-defense. Finally, violence allows the subject to transform their negative self-perception and achieve redemption on both the individual and group levels. They are no longer passive and powerless (shameful and guilty) but active and powerful (virtuous and honorable) – as expressed in their capacity to destroy others. In this regard, there is a difference between terrorism (here understood as actively engaging in terrorist violence) with its aim of transcending aggrievement and the broader phenomenon of so-called aggrieved identities in which one’s aggrievement becomes dialectically interwoven with the group’s collective identity (Salmela & Capelos 2021).

Exploring Positive Emotions

PÍA VALENZUELA

Philosophy scholars and even scholars outside and inside contemporary psychology have questioned the meaning of “positive” emotion. According to Goldie, we should avoid understanding or analysing emotion in simple terms. We should not reduce it in terms of attraction or aversion, pleasure, or distress, positive or negative because emotion is a relatively complex state. Pawelski observes that some unpleasant emotions may be necessary for various aspects of well-being, particularly those including self-fulfilment, professional success, and interpersonal relationships. Therefore, that which is positive should not be defined as pleasant but as that which promotes optimal functioning.

We may agree partly with Goldie’s and Pawelski’s statements. Emotions are truly not that simple, and indeed we can experience mixed feelings in emotions, which makes it almost impossible to isolate and describe their expressive pattern. Jealousy is a particularly complex emotion, including love, anger, and fear of loss.

While avoiding simplification, according to Arnold, we can certainly identify and name basic emotions with positive or negative valence. We can identify those that occur as a reaction to the primary conditions explained by Arnold: having an object that is good or bad for us; a present or absent object; an object that is easy or difficult to attain (or avoid).

Although admitting a higher sense of the positive concerning flourishing, we can understand by ‘positive’ emotions those desirable affective states which commonly direct us toward things deemed beneficial to the human person.

Arnold considers positive emotions in a higher sense those expressing love for everything good, true, and beautiful.² Among the emotions described as positive, Arnold mentions love, admiration, love of beauty, interest, the joy of doing and making, mirth and laughter, religious emotions, and happiness. It would be worthwhile to explore them and understand their value.

How emotions matter for trust and distrust?

MARGIT SUTROP

Compersion is an affective state that is receiving attention in the context of consensually non-monogamous constellations (monogamish, open, polyamorous or anarchical relationships, swinging etc.) in which all partners involved agree to have extradyadic sexual or romantic relationships. In this context, the feeling of compersion is typically described as a decidedly positive emotional reaction to one's partner's enjoying time and/or intimacy with another person, which has in the past led some to reduce it to 'the opposite of jealousy.' Recent years, however, have seen an increased research interest in this seemingly startling emotion that has shown that this reduction is too simplistic, because jealousy and compersion are part of an intricate web of related responses to certain situations, neither of which is 'the' only option possible. Some polyamorous people describe compersion as an ambivalent emotion that includes both positive and negative reactions, sort of a joy that co-occurs with pangs of jealousy. A more nuanced characterization that acknowledges the complex intersectional nature of compersion thus seems prudent.

Part of what makes understanding compersion so difficult are the hetero- and mononormative expectations, assumptions, and prejudices still prevalent in Western culture. Making compersion intelligible against such a background is like trying to convey the idea that parallel lines can intersect in a world in which everyone's geometrical intuitions are Euclidian through and through: Incredulity is inevitable—unless there is a radical shift in perspective. We therefore suggest a non-Western, in particular Buddhist, perspective which, we argue, is better able to let us understand that and why love and/or intimacy need not be an affair between two people only than our typical Western perspective. In particular, we approach compersion through a Buddhist lens based on the 'four immeasurables,' i.e., non-egocentric states that Buddhists take to promote well-being, and their 'near enemies,' i.e., states which are easily

conflated with them, but egocentric and harmful. Our goal is not to formulate a definition of compersion, nor to raise a normative bar for anyone who feels compersion, but to describe important facets of this often misunderstood affective state that stand out more clearly against a Buddhist background than they might otherwise do. We do so by analysing extensive interviews in which polyamorous people report on their experiences of compersion. The Buddhist perspective on compersion as an ‘affective orientation’ that results from this, we argue, may not only enrich the uninitiated’s understanding of compersion, but also help people in consensually non-monogamous relationships to detect warning signs that the way they view some aspect of their relationship may be have a self-deceptive tendency and potentially detrimental, even unhealthy, consequences. In addition, the cultivation of compersion in the way suggested arguably contributes to people’s flourishing in *all* kinds of relationships can also shed light on how, for instance, aromantic or asexual partners emotionally experience their relationships. And lastly, Understanding compersion along Buddhist lines also shows that non-monogamous relationships might in fact be compatible with at least some forms of Buddhist practice.

Meta-Emotions as Meta-Cognitions Versus Relations

CECILEA MUN

Meta-emotions are typically understood as emotions that are about other emotions (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997; Ferrari and Koyama 2002; Jäger and Bartsch 2006; Mendonça 2013; Howard 2017; Belli and Broncano 2017). Christoph Jäger and Anne Bartsch has specified the structure of meta-emotions in the following way:

Meta-emotions are occurrent or dispositional intentional emotions had by some subject S at some time (or some period of time) t , taking as their objects at least one of S 's own dispositional or non-dispositional affective states or processes that occur, or are believed by S to occur, at (or during) t or some (period of) time prior or later than t . (Jäger and Bartsch 2006, 186)

Meta-emotions are, therefore, regarded to be a kind of meta-cognitive experience, and one of the key defining features of meta-emotions as meta-cognitions is that they are a kind of reflexive awareness of the emotional experience that is its object. For example, Gottman et. al noted that their concept of a meta-emotion “paralleled the area of meta-cognition, which referred to the executive function of cognitions” (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997, 6). They elaborated on this notion by noting that, within the context of their investigations on parent-child interactions, what they meant by “the meta-emotion structure construct, specifically, is the parent's awareness of specific emotions, their awareness of these emotions in their child, and their coaching of the emotion in their child” (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven 1997, 6).

In contrast to such understandings of meta-emotions, I provide an account of meta-emotions as relations. More specifically, I argue for understanding meta-emotions not as emotions about emotions or a kind

of meta-cognition, but more so as felt relations that structure our entire emotional repertoire with respect to this relation. Furthermore, they do so by contributing to the construction of the system of values that guide our emotional responses. To do so, I begin by providing a brief summary of the essential features which seem to define meta-emotions understood as meta-cognitions, and I contrast this with what I mean by “meta-emotions.” I also discuss how Belli and Broncano’s (2017) account of trust as a meta-emotion is consistent with my understanding of meta-emotions as relations, and I propose that there is a way in which one can understand love as a relational meta-emotion. I conclude by suggesting how these two accounts of meta-emotions—as meta-cognitions and as relations—need not to be competing theories, but rather speak to the complexity of our meta-emotional experiences.

Why the Motivational Theory of Emotions cannot be a Comprehensive Theory of Emotions

DIMITRIS GORGOGIANNIS

In 2014, Andrea Scarantino introduced a new theory of emotions — the Motivational Theory of Emotions (MTE). According to this theory, emotions are delineated and differentiated by their specific (in)action tendencies/action reflexes, their distinctive relational goals, and their discrete core relational themes, given that “the informational-/motivational function of each emotion is to achieve the relational goal when the core relational theme is instantiated”.

In simple terms, the emotions (as reported by Scarantino) are designed to motivate us to do X (a relational goal), when Y (a correspondent core relational theme) is instantiated.

I will argue that his theory is deficient in many respects. First, I will say that Scarantino’s MTE is highly dependent on events and their appraisals. My view is that it is possible not to have physical or mental events and their appraisals, and still have an emotion. I will provide examples of categories of emotions which crop up without any preceding (mental or physical) events.

Second, I will argue that there are serious objections against Scarantino’s teleological explanations of what emotions are. He offers some (supposedly) tentative examples for specific emotions, which are depicted in a table where the above are correlated: Emotions - (In)action tendencies/action reflexes - Relational Goals - Core Relational Themes. I will support, with examples, that the correlations he describes are not definitive at all, as more than one emotion can be linked with the same action tendency, or more than one action tendency can be associated with the same emotion. Scarantino acknowledges this possibility. I will state that we can think of possible actions for the same emotion that can range from

diverse to opposing. Such a list of a priori large number of outcomes/actions, I will claim, render the importance of the motivational thesis trivial, or at best, irrelevant.

Moreover, I will say that it is not clear at all, that the core relational themes and the relational goals of some emotions, are the ones described in his paper. Again, with specific examples, I will maintain that we could think of entirely different themes and goals for some described emotions.

Lastly, Scarantino (rightly) explains why sub-cortical emotions, are genuine basic emotions, exhibiting bare minimum hedonic properties. The problem is, I will hold, that on the one hand those sub-cortical emotions are still emotions. On the other, they are not satisfied at a cognitive and conative level as proper emotions should have, according to his theory. This contradiction adds an extra threat to the MTE.

For those reasons, I will conclude, the Motivational Theory of Emotions cannot be seen as a Comprehensive Theory of Emotions.

Emotional momentum of philosophical thinking: Adorno on fantasy

ALŽBĚTA DYČKOVÁ

While establishing fantasy as a crucial element of philosophical reflection Adorno says that “once the last trace of emotion has been eradicated, nothing remains of thought but absolute tautology” (*Minima Moralia*, Verso, London 2005, p. 123) and suggests the importance of emotionality as an integral of philosophical conduct of thoughts. Adorno’s own philosophical motivations can be scarcely read as not carrying any emotional charge. After all, any philosophy contemplating about the possibility of philosophy after Auschwitz can hardly lack emotional momentum. One of Adorno’s most quoted passages talks about philosophy that can be responsibly practised in face of despair and his texts are interspersed with mentions of philosophical longing for reconciliation and redemption. Nevertheless, it is not only his philosophical motivation that is emotional. Adorno claims that thinking itself has to include its own impulses that have been both preserved and surpassed.

In my presentation, I will attempt to explicate the origins of Adorno’s reflection on emotionality within philosophizing and describe what potential for philosophical thought Adorno’s insights carry in this regard. Adorno talks about emotionality of philosophical conduct rather implicitly, however, we can clearly link his idea of emotionality of thought to his concept of fantasy and come to the conclusion that it is crucial for one of his central philosophical ideas, namely the one of constellation within whose creation fantasy is the intellectual faculty that rearranges thoughts into conceptual configuration that may hope to shed light on the nonconceptual metaphysical experience.

Through reconstruction of Adorno’s insights regarding emotionality of fantasy I hope to prepare ground for answering the following question: what kind of insights can we reach once we do not eradicate the spontaneous element of our thought as the traditional philosophy does? Or in other words, what philosophical insights which otherwise remain sealed for traditional thought are according to Adorno possible for emotional philosophical reflection?

Lovers of the Good, Trackers of the Best

FRANCESCO ORSI

This paper argues in favour of non-moral blame and blameworthiness, and demonstrates what the best account of them should look like. In doing so I will show that non-moral blame and blameworthiness are actually common and familiar phenomena, even though we don't usually think of them in those terms.

Non-moral blameworthiness requires that there are non-moral normative domains, such as aesthetics, prudence, or friendship. I will argue that the best account is a holistic one: aesthetic normativity, for example, involves not only aesthetic values but aesthetic obligations, blameworthiness, blame, and more (see, eg Archer & Ware 2018 for examples). A person who is aesthetically blameworthy, for example, might be a person who fails to manifest the appropriate aesthetic will (analogous with a morally blameworthy person who fails to manifest (morally) good will – see, eg, Arpaly & Schroeder 2013 or Hieronymi 2004).

Much of the existing literature is critical of non-moral blame, and even less is said about non-moral blameworthiness. Matheson & Milam (2021) argue against the permissibility of non-moral blame, arguing that counter-examples often fall into the “moralizing trap” (p.212), and are actually cases of moral blame disguised as the non-moral kind. I argue that this trap isn't as dangerous as they suggest, and that it's consistent with the concept of non-moral blame to suggest that much of it can overlap with moral blame. As long as non-moral norms are also doing some obligating work, then they can produce non-moral blame, and we can find agents who are non-morally blameworthy. For example, many of our aesthetic obligations may be moral obligations as well, particularly if we think about creating or celebrating art that brings out the best in others, that can help us to understand ourselves, or helps people generally to flourish. Here we can separate two sources of obligations: an obligation to aesthetics, in which one is obligated to display the art (for example) because of something about the aesthetic value, and another

moral obligation to display the art because of the joy and fulfilment that doing so will bring to others. Failing to display this art (and, say, destroying or repainting it instead) will make a person both morally *and* aesthetically blameworthy.

It might seem like non-moral obligations don't have much of substance left when all of the moral components have been stripped away. Matheson & Milam think this is the case, giving the example of a shoemaker who makes a bad pair of shoes. When the only things left are reactions that come from non-moral wrongs, they argue: "We can feel displeased or dissatisfied with [the shoemaker's] failure. But neither grading nor displeasure counts as blaming." (ibid p.206) I respond by appealing to the holistic approach, and argue that the criticism uses a particularly *moralised* idea of obligations. Non-moral obligations will often look different to us than moral ones, and we're likely to think of them as carrying less normative weight depending on how much we value aesthetics compared to, say, morality.

Drug of choice or compulsive use of drugs: on the role of emotions in addiction

RACHEL FRENETTE

Any inquiry on addiction is confronted to the puzzle of understanding why some people continue using drugs¹ despite the harmful effects it has on them². Is it a defect of the brain, of the will, of rationality or of self-control? The answer to this question does not have to be homogenous or single leveled³. Indeed, Hanna Pickard (2021) even hopes that heterogeneity becomes the new paradigm for theories of addiction. Nevertheless, we may still wonder whether addicts have something in common in the underlying reasons why they reach out to drugs in what becomes self-destructive manners. In this line of thought, Edward Khantzian defends the view according to which addiction is a way to self-medicate oneself (Khantzian, 1985; 1997; Khantzian and Albanese, 2008). To summarize, the self-medication hypothesis (SMH) considers that addicts use drugs in order to alleviate and soothe a certain state of being. The SMH has also been endorsed by psychotherapists, namely Beth Burgess (2016), who recognizes a truth in the saying “hurt people hurt people”. For Burgess, most, if not all, addicts hurt themselves by using because they have experienced great pain in the past. Although this perspective might come off as fairly intuitive, the most predominant view of addiction, according to which addiction is a brain disease (Leshner, 1997; Heilig, 2021), cannot explain this phenomenon. As a matter of fact, the view that addicts are self-medicating presupposes a certain form of control, and of choice, on their part. In other words, the process of self-medication cannot merely be an effect of an uncontrolled and involuntary action caused by brain malfunction. This incompatibility can only be countered by adopting, at least partly, an Addiction-as-Choice perspective. Fortunately, there happens to be many other reasons why such a perspective is more accurate than a model of addiction as a brain disease (Heyman, 2009; Henden, 2016; Pickard, 2017). But the fact that addiction can be conceptualized as a choice, and that it can be chosen in order to ease

sufferings, raises two questions. First, why doesn't everyone enduring distress become addicted? Second, how can addictions to substances be cured if they are somewhat helpful for the addicted individual?

In this presentation, I wish to reflect on these questions by first assessing the incompatibility problem between an Addiction-as-Brain-Disease perspective and the SMH. I will then specify how exactly emotions are related to addiction by pulling from the SMH and from first-person accounts of addiction. This will bring me to defend an Addiction-as-Choice perspective, which will be defined through two main aspects, its locality and its alternative. Then, I will evaluate the role of emotions and certain affective states in recovery. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the implications of my perspective of addiction in relation to the practical rationality of addicts.

On the Emotions of Allies

MICHAEL GREER

An “ally”, in the social justice sense, is someone who aids an oppressed group and/or person in the face of social injustice. This paper considers three emotions that seem crucial to the motivational and “libidinal” structure of being an ally: guilt, shame, and empathy. How do negative emotions to do with anxieties around being a “bad ally” shape the subject of political action and social justice discourse?

I first consider the motivational and “libidinal” structure of allyship: why do people desire to become social justice allies, and how do they try to convince other people to become allies? I argue that aspiring to be the figure of the “good ally” structures relatively privileged persons’ worldviews in a way that encourages the affects of guilt, shame, and empathy. I posit that the focus on being a “good ally” stems from what I call the *paradigm-based* model of allyship. This model uses the ethical ideal of the “good ally” to posit that non-ideal allies do not exist, or are bad: for instance, it would support criticisms of “performative allies” *qua allies*—they are not real allies or are bad allies. The ethical ideal of the “good ally” serves to shame and motivate empathy and guilt in would-be allies.

I then survey canonical critical and feminist positions on the usefulness (or lack thereof) of guilt, shame, and empathy in political psychology (Meyers; Peck; Hartman). In particular, I consider the critique of empathy and “spectacle” found in Saidiya Hartman’s *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. She argues that it is politically problematic that empathy and the “spectacle” of black death have been historically necessary to elicit activism from those who are privileged. I apply these findings to the case of allyship, concluding that these emotions risk drawing allies into “bad faith” interactions with people they view to be more marginalized than they, and projects of social justice in general. Bad faith is an existentialist

term used to describe the refusal to confront one's situation as a living human being, instead "ossifying" oneself (and others): acting as if human beings were *things* or *objects* instead of radically free subjects.

Can people trust their feelings?

ACHIM STEPHAN

There is no straightforward answer to the question whether people can trust their feelings. Often, they can and should do so, but not always. Mostly, feelings inform us appropriately about ourselves and about the world. Pain normally informs us about bodily damages, but sometimes it misleads us: some people feel pain without any body part corresponding to it (e.g., in phantom pain). And sometimes we feel hungry, although further eating would rather support obesity. A similar diagnosis can be given for emotions, which will be in the center of the talk. But there is a difference between hunger and pain on the one side and emotions on the other. Hunger and pain only inform us about ourselves, emotions inform us about the world and our standing towards it. Nobody else's feeling of hunger or pain refers to what gives rise to my hunger and my pain. But everybody else can develop emotions towards the same events and objects that trigger my emotions. Thus, we have a basis to compare and reflect on our emotions towards the same events and situations.

The following considerations aim at exploring when we can trust that our emotions inform us appropriately (or truly). Although the folk notion of appropriateness can be understood in various ways (moral, prudential, epistemic, fitting), only one of them, namely fittingness, is relevant for our main goal. Our emotions inform us appropriately about the external world if they are fitting.

There are at least three different types of scenarios in which we should be cautious about trusting our emotions, that is to say, in which they might not be fitting for principled reasons (and not because we just misperceived a certain situation, e.g., taking a toothless dog to be dangerous):

(1) Some emotions are byproducts of mood disorders. A general anxiety might, for instance, disturb and color all further experiences of

worldly events, or an uncontrolled aggression might be a burden in conflicting encounters with others. In such cases, the corresponding emotions often do not inform correctly about the events in the world.

(2) In more mundane cases, emotions are co-influenced by the moods we have. If we are in an angry mood as a consequence of trouble at work, we might feel and respond quite inappropriately toward our happy, but nevertheless noisy children. Whereas being in a relaxed mood might prompt us to play and have fun with them.

(3) Philosophically more interesting, though mostly hidden to us, are cases where our affective biography seriously influences our emotional responses. Often, emotions reflect the values and morals of families, groups and societies, in which the emoting person was enculturated. We might not be aware of such an influence at a certain time within a rather homogenous society. Diachronic comparisons within the same society and synchronic comparisons to other societies reveal however that we might encounter quite different emotional evaluations depending on the forms of life we belong to. Which one deserves to provide appropriate emotions?

Trust from mistrust

MARK ALFANO

Nietzsche poses the question, “How *could* anything originate out of its opposite? Truth from error, for instance? Or the will to truth from the will to deception?” (BGE 2) He suggests that many people cannot bring themselves to accept that things of great value might be “derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire.” But, he contends, possibly “whatever gives value to those good and honorable things has an incriminating link, bond, or tie to the very things that look like their evil opposites.”

Nietzsche’s interest in the origins of epistemic values in their opposites dates back to (HH AOM 215), where he attempts to trace the “integrity of the republic of the learned” to patterns of trust and mistrust among scientists. He claims that scientific progress is made possible because “the individual is *not* obliged to be *too mistrustful* in the testing of every account and assertion made by others in domains in which he is a relative stranger,” but that this trustingness is licensed by the fact that “in his own field everyone must have rivals who are *extremely mistrustful* and are accustomed to observe him very closely.” The looming presence of these rivals makes it unrewarding and unappealing to engage in fraud or sloppy reasoning. And when scientists engage in questionable research practices under such conditions, they are liable to be caught and corrected.

Though he was writing before the era of modern peer review, Nietzsche anticipated some of its structural features. In this paper, I offer a more detailed account of the origins of warranted trust in systems and psychologies that cultivate mistrust. I contend that trust in experts by laypeople resembles trust in scientists by other scientists, and that more attention needs to be paid to the geometry of networks of trust and mistrust. I go on to characterize several ways to improve such networks through strategic (global) and tactical (individual) rewiring, as well the disposition to adopt more or less trusting attitudes depending on the

group one finds oneself in. Thus, I adopt a role-based virtue epistemology modeled on Astola (2021), who argues for the importance of what might be seen as a vicious role when one's group lacks the mistrust that makes trust reasonable. Or, as Nietzsche puts it in BGE 34, "As the creature who has been the biggest dupe the earth has ever seen, the philosopher pretty much has a *right* to a 'bad character.' It is his *duty* to be suspicious, to squint as maliciously as possible out of every abyss of mistrust."

I conclude by presenting empirical evidence (n=989) that people who report a disposition to adopt the gadfly role are more likely to reject medical misinformation and unwarranted conspiracy theories, more likely to accept warranted conspiracy theories, more likely to perform well on tests of numeracy, cognitive reflection, and intelligence, and more likely to correct their own errors in light of social feedback.

Program

The conference will take place at **University of Tartu, Lossi 3, 51003 Tartu, Estonia**. All times are **Eastern European Summer Time**.

Time	Room A: Lossi 3-328	Room B: Lossi 3- 319
09:00-09:30 Registration		
09:30–09:55	Welcome and introduction with Heidi Maibom, Alfred Archer, and Heidy Meriste	n/a
10:00–11:30	Session 1A – Educating Emotions Chair: Achim Stephan	Session 1B – Blame Chair: Alfred Archer
10:00–10:45	Imke von Maur - Educating emotions amidst ecological crises	Carme Isern Mas - Fans’ Standing to Blame Female Celebrities
10:45–11:30	Charlie Kurth - Nudging Emotions in Moral Education: Inviting a Wicked Problem?	Elizabeth Ventham - An Account of Non-Moral Blameworthiness
11:30–12:00 Break		
12:00-13:30	Session 2A – Shame Chair: Heidi Maibom	Session 2B – Bias & Racism Chair: Tom Roberts
12:00–12:45	Sophie Goddard - The Role of Shame in Cases of Hermeneutical Injustice	Kris Goffin - Bias in Affective Computing
12:45–13:30	Matti Syiem - The desire for love: how an atmosphere of shame can distort it	Alfred Archer - Racist statues and affective technologies

13:30–14:30 LUNCH		
14:30–16:00	Session 3A – Anger and Fear Chair: Bruno	Session 3B – Expressing Emotions Chair: Joel Krueger
14:30–15:15	Bariş C. Kaştaş - Anger Towards All Men: A Fittingness Account of Non-Agential Collective Responsibility	Francesca Forlè - Embodied affectivity. Investigating the relation between bodily expressions and affective experiences
15:15 – 16:00	Mykyta Kabrel - How we created the hero narrative from our emotional system of fear?	Joanna Komorowska-Mach - Expressing emotions in psychotherapy
16:00-16:30 BREAK		
16:30 – 18:00	Session 4A – Doubt and Anxiety Chair: Lucy Osler	Session 4B – Psychopathology & Illness Chair: Heidi Maibom
16:30 – 17:15	Tristan Hedges - Affective self-doubt: heteronormativity and queer desire	Sara Coelho - Moral understanding in Psychopathy: discussing The Gates of Janus philosophically
17:15 – 18.00	Anna-Liza Starkova - The origins and the creative power of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger	Eleanor Byrne – Affective injustice and medically unexplained symptoms
19:00 EPSSE’s 10th Anniversary Reception Drinks and Buffet University of Tartu Botanical Garden, Lai 28		

Friday 16th June

Time	Room A: Lossi 3-328	Room B: Lossi 3- 319
09:30–11:00	Session 5A – Panel on Emotional Self-Knowledge Chair:	Session 5B – Panel on Loneliness in Psychopathology Chair: Imke von Maur
09:30–11:00	Edward Harcourt, Pilar López-Cantero, Alba Montes Sánchez, and Uku Tooming	Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger, and Lucy Osler
11:00–11:30 Break		
11:30–13:00	Session 6A – From Recalcitrancy to Stoicism Chair: Pilar Lopez-Cantero	Session 6B – Resentiment Chair: Heidi Meriste
11:30–12:15	Giulia Cantamessi - Understanding Recalcitrant Mental States: Emotions, Perceptions, and Intuitions	Mikko Salmela - “We are all victims now” -- Understanding the spread of victimhood identities through resentment and self-victimization
12:15–13:00	Matt Anderson - Francis Bacon and Stoic Emotion	Fredrik Westerlund - Philosophy and Resentiment – A Precarious Alliance
13:00–14:00 LUNCH		
14:00–16:15	Session 7A – Joy & Curiosity Chair: Alfred Archer	Session 7B – Belonging Chair:
14:00–14:45	Roisin Maeve- I Can’t be Held Down’: The Myth,	Vivian Puusepp - Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships

	Magic, and Music of Queer Joy	
14:45–15:30	Pilar Lopez-Cantero - Feminist curiosity as the aim of travel	Alba Montes Sánchez and Thomas Szanto - Two Types of Feelings of Belonging
15:30–15:40	Quick breather	Quick breather
15:40–16:25	Hin Sing Yuen - “Adjusting the lens: Compersion, Buddhism, and the four immeasurables”	Alessandra Fussi & Heidi Maibom – Vulnerable empathy: Some thoughts on Aristotle
16:25–16:45		
BREAK		
16:45–17:45		
EPSSE AGM		
CONFERENCE DINNER		
TBC		

Saturday 17th June

Time	Room A: Lossi 3-328	Room B: Lossi 3- 319
09:30–11:00	Session 8A – Humiliation and Guilt Chair: Carme Isern Mas	Session 8B – Positive Emotions Chair:
09:30–10:15	Heidy Meriste - A critique of the dualist account of guilt	Pía Valenzuela - Exploring Positive Emotions
10:15–11:00	Ruth Rebecca Tietjen - The Affective Dynamics of Humiliation, Violence, and Redemption	Margit Sutrop - How emotions matter for trust and distrust?
11:00–11:30 BREAK		
11:30–13:00	Session 9A – Emotion Theory Chair:	Session 9B – Fantasy and Desire Chair: Pilar Lopez-Cantero
11:30–12:15	Cecilea Mun - Meta-Emotions as Meta-Cognitions Versus Relations	Alžběta Dyčková - Emotional momentum of philosophical thinking: Adorno on fantasy
12:15–13:00	Dimitris Gorgogiannis - Why the Motivational Theory of Emotions cannot be a Comprehensive Theory of Emotions	Francesco Orsi - Lovers of the Good, Trackers of the Best
13:00–14:00 Lunch		
14.00–15:30	Session 10A – Addiction and Allies Chair: Heidi Maibom	Session 10B – Trust Chair: Heidy Meriste

14:00–14:45	Rachel Frenette - Drug of choice or compulsive use of drugs: on the role of emotions in addiction	Achim Stephan - Can people trust their feelings?
14:45–15:30	Michael Greer - On the Emotions of Allies	Mark Alfano - Trust from mistrust