3rd Annual Conference of

The European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions

University of Athens
13-15 June 2016

Book of Abstracts

ΕΘΝΙΚΟΝ & ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑΚΟΝ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟΝ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ
NATIONAL & KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

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THE LOGIC OF EMOTION, EVALUATION AND DESIRE

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In this essay I argue that emotions, evaluations, and desires are conceptually connected. By examining several cases of emotion, I shall attempt to show that the conceptual relation between emotions and desires is that of logical presupposition, in the sense that an emotion conceptually presupposes some type of desiderative state. However, the reverse is not the case, as it is certainly possible for one to have a desire specific to an emotion, without having the emotion. For instance, one may have the desire for revenge without being angry. Similarly, I shall contend that although some emotions are conceptually related to behavior--understood as intentional actions, when emotion-specific desires are overridden, the resulting behavioral and bodily manifestations neither logically presuppose nor are they made sufficient or quasi-sufficient by the desires.

In order to facilitate my argument, I shall utilize the terms w-desire and prima facie desire. Consequently, "w-desiring x" means a state, which in conjunction with an intentional evaluative state such as belief, perception, or mental picture, leads to a decision to do x, and it results in disappointment or discontent if x is not (successfully) performed. Likewise, a prima facie desire may be defined as follows: One has a prima facie desire to do x, if doing x would be what one w-desires, all things considered, and if it were not for competing desires.

Hence, the conceptual relations involving the emotions may be summarized as follows:

a) Emotions presuppose intentional evaluative states that are conceptually quasi-sufficient for prima facie desires, dispositional w-desires, or wishes, which, in turn, presuppose the evaluation.

b) Forward-looking emotions such as fear entail prima facie desires, which are also quasi-sufficient for the corresponding intentional action, and the action would logically presuppose the w-desire.

c) Some backward-looking emotions such as anger entail prima facie desires, which, in turn, would be conceptually quasi-sufficient for the desired actions, and the action would presuppose the prima facie desire. However, the prima facie desires may be overridden in a number of ways, and the resulting behavioral manifestations or indications neither logically presuppose, nor are they made conceptually quasi-sufficient by the prima facie desires.

d) Some backward-looking emotions such as joy and grief do not engender forward-looking w-desires and in these cases, again, the behavioral manifestations and indications are not conceptually related to the emotion. Thus, while some behaviors qua actions are conceptually linked to emotions, others are only contingently related.

DO EMOTIONS REQUIRE EVALUATION? A REPLY TO THE CHALLENGE FROM EMOTIONAL CONTAGION

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Emotional contagion is a primitive kind of emotional sharing, and can be characterised as the process according to which a subject S perceives an object O, which expresses the emotion e and S feels the emotion e as a result of the perception of O. For instance, a case of emotional contagion is the one in which Susan sees that Peter is happy, and she feels happy as a result of her perception of Peter's happiness.

The mechanism underlying emotional contagion has been proposed by Hatfield and colleagues, which elaborated the "mimicry/synchrony" model (Hatfield et al. 1994, p. 10-11). Their model is composed by three stages: (i) the mimicry of the object, (ii) the feedback received from such mimicry, and (iii) the emotional sharing. If the mechanism of emotional contagion works as the mimicry/synchrony model describes, the emotion aroused as a result of the process doesn't require necessarily the tokening of any belief, or the involvement of any evaluation of the situation. This is because in this model, the mimicry of the object's emotional state and the feedback from the behavioural changes are sufficient to generate emotional convergence. This is particularly problematic for theories of emotions that assume that emotion activation requires the tokening of a particular kind of evaluation, called "appraisals". Appraisals are evaluation of the environment in relation to the well-being of the subject (Lazarus, 1991, p. 193). In general, many theories of emotions assume that emotions require appraisals, even if they disagree on how they should be intended. This assumption is compelling, because it gives explanatory advantages: appraisals are able to explain the relationship between the situation in which the subject is in, and the activation of the emotion itself. However, emotions aroused by emotional contagion challenge this assumption.

In my talk, I will argue that this challenge can be met. My strategy will be to deny that there are cases of emotional contagion that works as the mimicry/synchrony model describes. Far from rejecting the existence of cases of emotional contagion, my criticism will regard only the mimicry/synchrony model. I will propose a refinement of it, which accounts for the existence of appraisals even in cases of emotional contagion, and I will explain the advantages of my account. In particular, my main contribution is to propose a function, which individuates appraisals that may occur in cases of emotional contagion. In this model, the existence of emotions aroused via emotional contagion does not generate the theoretical tensions discussed above: if my model is correct, emotions aroused via emotional contagion would require appraisals as emotions aroused by other means. My new model will have independent advantages, such as providing a clear explanation of how the situation in which the subject is in may influence the emotion activation in cases of emotional mimicry.

ADMIRATION AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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"Show me the man you honor, and I will know what kind of man you are." Thomas Carlyle

In March 2014, the Leader of The UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage claimed that Vladimir Putin was the world leader he admired the most (Campbell 2014). Farage was heavily criticized for this remark. Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister at the time, described Farage's admiration for "the chief sponsor and protector of one of the most brutal dictators on the face of the planet," as "utterly grotesque," (GQ 2014). But is it really appropriate to subject people to moral criticism for their feelings of admiration? Can it ever be morally wrong to admire morally reprehensible people? In this paper I will consider whether we can ever be held morally responsible for our feelings of admiration.

I will start by considering arguments against the view that we can be morally responsible for our feelings of admiration. According to Richard Taylor, we cannot be morally required to experience particular emotions for people, as emotions are simply not the kind of thing that we can be held morally responsible for because emotions are not commendable (Taylor 1970 pp. 252–253).

One way of responding to this general critique of the possibility of duties to feel particular emotions is that there are a number of ways in which we can bring about emotions indirectly. According to Matthew Liao (2006), we can make it more likely that we will experience certain emotions by using reasons to motivate ourselves to have the emotion, by reflecting on the reasons why we feel certain emotions and by putting ourselves in positions where we are more likely to experience certain emotions. I will argue that all three of the methods of bringing about emotion can be plausibly applied to admiration, giving us reason to think that admiration is commendable, at least to some extent. This, though, does not as yet give us any reason to think that we can be morally responsible for our feelings of admiration.

I will argue that there are a number of ways in which we can be morally responsible for our feelings of moral admiration. First, I will argue that feelings of admiration can be expressive of our deepest held values and so are attributable to our moral characters. Second, I will argue that we can be morally accountable for our feelings of admiration. In some situations it can be morally wrong to admire the immoral. The source of this moral requirement comes from the fact that admiration is linked with a desire to emulate. This connection may be seen to be a fundamental part of admiration (Zagzebski 2006; 2010; 2012; 2015) or it may simply be a contingent fact about our psychological make-up (Eg. Algoe and Haidt (2009); Immordino-Yang & Sylvan (2010); Schindler et al. (2013), Schindler et al. (Forthcoming). I will argue that it can be morally wrong to experience an emotion that makes us more likely to act immorally.

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EMOTION THEORY RECONSIDERED: THE „INNER CONFLICT“ IN AESTHETIC APPRECIATION AND WHY IT CAN BE USEFUL

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I will argue that Mendelssohn's emotion theory of mixed sentiments warrants a reconsideration of 'rationalistic' perfectionism. It is the structure of mixed sentiments – both constitutionally and functionally– that leads to a refined understanding of the mechanics of aesthetic pleasure in general. And this, in turn, has consequences on our understanding of the structure and nature of aesthetic perfection. It is the 'anthropological' perspective on aesthetic appreciation in Mendelssohns theory that allows to consider the inherent relationships between subjects engaged in the very process of such appreciation. These relationships are built by our particular perceiving of the aesthetic object, which ultimately leads our attention away from the object. As I will argue, Mendelssohn's version of aesthetic perfection will turn out to be anthropological, thus opening a new chapter of 'rationalism' in aesthetics and emotion theory.

THE NATURE OF ROMANTIC SHARING

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On Angelika Krebs' book, *Between I and Thou. A Dialogical Philosophy of Love* (2015)

Following (while slightly revising) Angelika Krebs' classification of philosophical models of love, we can divide these models into agent-focused and relation-focused models. Each can be further divided into two main subgroups. In the agent-focused models, the subdivision is between the other-focused model, expressed in the care model, and the self-focused model, expressed in the self-love model. In the relation-focused models the classification is between the fusion model in which the two lovers are fused together, and the dialogue model in which the two lovers are autonomous agents interacting with each other. The two major competing models are the caring and dialogue models.

In her profound and insightful book, Between I and Thou. A dialogical philosophy of love (2015), Angelika Krebs presents her dialogue model of love, in which she considers the connection between the partners to be at the center of love; she views the basic features of the connection as shared emotional states and joint activities. The connection amplifies the flourishing of each lover as well as the flourishing of their relationship. Krebs further argues that love is about what happens between the partners. The dialogue mode is indeed a very plausible (perhaps the most plausible) model of romantic love, and in particular of profound love. Krebs persuasively explains the advantages of this model.

I focus here on a disputable issue in this model (but not necessarily in Krebs' version)—the ontological status of love. There is no dispute today that the brain, rather than the heart, underlies romantic experiences. An interesting twist in this dispute is found in prevailing versions of the relation-focused models that consider the connection to be not only the focus of love but its ontological location as well. In such a view, love is not located within the individual's body, but resides within the connection between the two lovers. Does this view make sense?

The major views concerning the ontological status of love are: (1) love is a property of the agent; (2) love is a property of the relation. The first view seems to be intuitively true: Like other mental states, the emotion of love is a property of the agent, as are other affective states, such as feelings, moods, affective disorders, and affective traits. The relation-focused models of love tend to transfer the epistemic importance of the romantic connection to the ontological realm by claiming that love is a property of the connection between the two lovers; love, says Martin Buber, is between the partners. This claim is problematic, one reason being that feelings such as pain or enjoyment, which are essential to love, are not a property of a group or a social connection. An emotion is first and foremost an attitude of an agent. Accordingly, we should expect that some features of love, such as feelings, evaluations, and action tendencies, are properties of the agent, whereas others, like compatibility and harmony, are properties of the relationship. In profound love, the lovers' focus of concern is the relationship, as indeed the dialogue model suggests, but this does not mean that love is the connection.

THE ROLE OF LOVE IN A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: FROM ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY TO NUSSBAUM'S THEORY

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Intersubjective emotion par excellence, love is a theme of philosophical interest since ancient times. The aim of this paper is a focus on the history of this concept, since ancient philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, to the contemporary proposal of Martha Nussbaum. Furthermore, I will describe love from a philosophical perspective that has still resonance: Phenomenology, especially the thought of Max Scheler. Both Nussbaum and Scheler shed light on the nature of love, emotion that is central for both, especially from a cognitive point of view.

Nussbaum never fails to confront the ancient philosophers, from which she tries to extrapolate ideas, in order to modify them. The purpose of the author has an epistemological character: her main purpose is the understanding of feelings and of the way in which intersubjective feelings can help in building a democratic, liberal society – a very modern theme, if we consider the current global crisis. However, as regards love, it seems very difficult that a similar emotion could be helpful to society: the excessive condition of need, the circumscribed and partial attention that characterizes it in its many definitions, appear to be obstacles, rather than elements which may be useful to human societies.

In contrast to the Stoic thesis according to which love is a feeling to be fought, the author attempts to define a theory of love capable of eluding the dangers typical of this emotion, and, on the contrary, she tries to find a social benefit. For this reason, the author draws on the analysis of the Symposium of Plato, where she identifies the different meanings of love. Nussbaum hopes that love and his allies among emotions can lead towards a social justice, and can be the basis for a policy that takes into consideration the needs of other groups and other Nations. For this purpose, she identifies three elements which, in her opinion, should characterize a similar theory of love: compassion, mutuality, and individuality.

Interestingly, we can find these three elements in Scheler's description of love.

Although his theoretical premises are completely different, Scheler shares many thesis with Nussbaum, and his definition of love seems to satisfy the requirements of the American philosopher. For this reason, in the second part of my talk, I will try to show how this is possible, and how Scheler succeed in describing a "theory of love" that enhances the subject not as an individual, but as an essentially intersubjective person. In doing so, I will try to show how transcendental concepts- such as love, reciprocity, individuality and so on- can be applied in practical fields.

GLORIFYING IDENTIFICATION INCREASES MALICIOUS PLEASURE BECAUSE THE VICTIMS ARE BLAMED AND THEIR ACTIONS ARE SEEN TO BE ILLEGITIMATE

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The current study (N = 92) explains how mode of identification (glorification versus attachment) impacts on group-based emotions of malicious pleasure, sympathy, and guilt towards disadvantaged people through appraisals of legitimacy and blame. We defined malicious pleasure as feelings of satisfaction about the severe adversities experienced by a disadvantaged group and such dynamics go far beyond schadenfreude. Following Hobbes (1588-1679), we propose that malicious pleasure is a product of people's perceived superiority, and hostility, towards disadvantaged outgroup members and that such pleasure can be conceived as a manifestation of "everyday prejudice".

Roccas, Klar, and Liviathan (2006) distinguished between two different, but related, modes of national identification: glorification and attachment. Glorifiers perceive the ingroup as superior to other ethnic or national groups and often express prejudice and intolerance towards ethnic minorities Glorifiers prohibit any form of ingroup criticism as they are devoted to the nation (their policies, leaders, symbols) and strongly opposed to people who act against the established rules. Conversely, attached identifiers feel loyal and committed to all members of the nation. Unlike glorifiers, they take a critical stance towards immoral behaviour emanating from the ingroup which fosters attached identifiers' tendency to help the victims of the immorality.

We predicted that ingroup glorification would promote malicious pleasure. If malicious pleasure is an expression of prejudice then glorifying identifiers are more likely to express/experience it because they tend to be prejudiced towards ethnic minorities. Furthermore, as glorifying identifiers are devoted to the rules of their group, violations of those rules are seen as illegitimate. Hence we predicted that glorifying identifiers see the outgroup's adversity faced as legitimate and even blame the outgroup for that adversity.

We expected a diverging pattern for ingroup attachment, where this mode of identification should promote pro-social emotions. Appraisals of blamelessness and perceived illegitimacy are plausible antecedents to two prosocial emotions: sympathy and guilt. Sympathy is based in an appraisal of illegitimacy of harm and involves concern for the suffering of others but it does not attribute blame to the agent of the harm per se. Guilt is also based in an appraisal of perceived illegitimacy but attributes the wrong-doing to one's own group. Given that attached identifiers are more likely to see asylum seeking as legitimate, we expect that this will promote group-based sympathy for asylum seekers and group-based guilt about their adversity rather than blaming them.

The research was conducted in an Australian context where asylum seekers who want to settle in Australia are sent to Papua New Guinea or back to their country of origin.

Consistent with hypotheses, glorifying identifiers perceive asylum seekers to be blamed for their situation in detention centres and perceive asylum seeking as illegitimate, which, in turn, enhances malicious pleasure. Conversely, attached identifiers do not blame asylum seekers and judge their actions to be legitimate which, in turn, promote sympathy and guilt. The findings provide an understanding of group-based malicious pleasure which is important given the current scale of the global refugee crisis.

SELF-ESTEEM: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

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This paper aims to explore the structure of self-esteem from a phenomenological perspective. A considerable amount of research has been devoted to self-esteem in psychology and psychiatry, and the notion has had a significant influence also on the way in which certain social policy debates have been framed (e.g. Mecca et al., 1989). However, very little consideration has been given to the topic in philosophy and, surprisingly, this is the case also in the field of philosophy of emotion, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychopathology, where a number of concepts and dynamics relevant to the understanding of this predicament have been investigated. This paper aims to contribute to rectify this situation by providing a phenomenological analysis of this experience. In particular, I will aim to clarify what kind of mental states we refer to when we talk about self-esteem. Affective processes appear to be central to this predicament, but it is important to understand whether self-esteem is best characterized in terms of emotions, moods, character traits, or a combination of these, and what is its relationship with the person's beliefs, judgments, and desires.

Moving from the phenomenological claim that certain affects – often referred to as "moods" or "background feelings" – play a cardinal role in shaping our mental life (Heidegger, 1962; Ratcliffe, 2008; Strasser, 1977), this paper will suggest that self-esteem is best understood not as an affect among others, but rather as a more fundamental experience which extensively structure our mental and practical life. From a phenomenologically oriented perspective, Slaby (2012) has argued that our experience of ourselves and the world is grounded and orientated by a "sense of ability", a feeling of our capacity to cope with the circumstances we have to face, which is attributed a bodily character and considered akin to "existential feelings"(Ratcliffe, 2008). The "embodied sense of capability" described by Slaby (2012: 152) appears to be integral to the phenomenology of self-esteem, however, in this study I will argue that self-esteem is not reducible to the sense of ability. More specifically, drawing on various accounts of the relationship between affectivity and narrativity (e.g. Goldie 2002; 2012; Ratcliffe, Forthcoming), I will suggest that self-esteem is best understood as a complex but unitary affective experience, comprising not only specific bodily feelings, but also a series of other affective, cognitive, and volitional states which are narratively interwoven. I will claim that, by taking into consideration some of the processes through which intersubjectively shaped narratives mould the person's affectivity, such an account illuminates various interpersonal and cultural dynamics which deeply shape self-esteem. In addition, I will maintain that the proposed account can enhance our understanding of psychiatric illnesses such as depression and narcissistic personality disorder, highlighting various ways in which the alterations of self-esteem characteristic of these illnesses impact on the patients' view of self, others, and the world and the way in which the illness and the therapeutic relation are conceived.

How to Develop Our Sympathy? Possible Answers from the Scottish Enlightenment

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Sympathy is the common feeling of understanding others' suffering, of caring about others' trouble and grief, and of supporting others in the form of shared feelings. The origin of the word sympathy, however, is not comprised to the compassionate perception of the calamities of others. It used to convey a broader concept than the feeling of pity and sorrow for someone else's misfortune. The Greek word sympatheia (συμπάθεια) covers the general meaning of fellow-feelings, where pathos (πάθος) refers to any kind of emotion or passion, including pleasure and pain. In harmony with the etymological origins of the word, the 18th century Scottish philosophers, David Hume (1711 - 1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) applied the technical term sympathy in a more extended meaning than today's common usage of the word. Hume discusses sympathy in detail in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739, THN), where he explicates that sympathy is a complex mechanism not to be confused with the feeling of compassion. For him, it is the principle of sympathy which enables us to participate in the pleasures and pains of others. Through the sympathetic mechanism, we are capable of partaking in the emotional life of others. The operation of sympathy as a principle of communication among human beings allows us to share emotions and to be directly moved by the feelings of others. Hume's close friend and mentored student, Adam Smith also relies heavily on the working mechanism of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, TMS). Smith develops the principle of sympathy further by introducing the notion of the impartial spectator within the breast in his system. The imaginative act of the impartial spectator is responsible for the quality and intensity of the fellow-feelings aroused in us through the imaginative experiment of placing ourselves in the other person's perceived circumstances, through changing place in fancy with the other person. Since Hume carefully avoided transgressing the is-ought gap (in Singer's terminology, 2015), the nature of the entire THN is descriptive. Hume and in a similar vein Smith too kept away from being normative in their writings, for which reason their works provide us with no direct advice on how to use the sympathetic principle in a conscious manner. The present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume's THN as well as of Smith's TMS from the point of view of what the mechanism of sympathetic communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of others. Accordingly, the current study investigates to what extent and in what manner the process of sympathetic feelings can be modified as described in Hume's and Smith's systems of emotions.

IMITATION OF AFFECTS AND MIRROR NEURONS: EXPLORING EMPATHY IN SPINOZA'S THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE

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In Spinoza's philosophy human beings, as particular things, are expressions of power. A power that, during lifetime, is striving as much as possible to persevere in being and express its essence. Human affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions.

Affects express mind and body and can be described, in terms of striving, as changes, as increases or decreases of that power, which through the form of desire expresses human essence. Joyful or sad, passive or active they define moral life as well, in that everyone ex suo affectu judicat … quid bonum, quid malum, in other terms to the extent they drive to judgements about good and bad. Most human beings don't know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are, although, they are, by their definition as particular things, obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus.

Considering affects as the foundations of human life, we attempt to explore how a basic, according to Spinoza, mechanism of human psychology, that of the imitation of affects, defines interpersonal relations. Under the domination of imagination, and this is the most common situation, passive affects become the source of human rivalry that can be increased through the imitation of affects and especially the imitation of desire. However, through the same mechanism, rivalry can also be decreased, to the extent imitation produces empathy that promotes positive social emotions.

How does imitation function? Spinoza refers explicitly to a similarity of nature between human bodies, which, according to his theory, is the basis of the imitation of affects. Recent research in neurosciences has discovered mirror neurons, attributing human capacity for empathy to their function. The attempt to correlate Spinoza's psychological theory with neuroscience raises a lot of questions. Can we claim we have discovered the biological substrate of the imitation of affects, described in terms of neuroscience? Is res nobis similis defined by the power of the body? Can what a human being sees in the "other" trigger complex emotional reactions as well? How could Spinoza's remark, that the desire of a philosopher has nothing to do with the desire of an alcoholic, comply with recent research findings on mirror neurons? In which way the kind of knowledge we have is connected with the similarity criteria, if there are any?

THE TRUTHFULNESS OF BODILY-FEELINGS OR THE IRRELEVANCE OF NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY

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In his text, "Feeling, Emotions, and Truly Perceiving the Valuable" John Drummond discloses why the phenomenological method is most apt to provide an account of axiological experience. He shows how phenomenology is anti-naturalistic and how it is descriptive but not merely introspective. From this particular stance, the phenomenologist is able to describe, not explain (away), those valuative experiences just as they present themselves. Drummond grounds his axiology in the distinction between bodily-feelings and feeling-intentions (in Goldie's terminology, the feeling-toward), where the former motivates the latter. Working from this Drummondian basis, this paper is dedicated to establishing a procedure through which the truth-value of bodily-feelings can be determined. I now outline the means by which this is accomplished.

(1)I first introduce and define bodily-feelings, as they are presented in Drummond's work. The core assertion of this section is that all experiences are intentional, and thus that bodily-feelings are composed of pleasure- or pain-intentions and pleasure- or pain-objects.

(2)Concerning the truth-value of these bodily-feelings, I first ask if they can be falsified. I do so by examining how a perception can be disproven, and then apply these falsification methods to bodily-feelings. Perceptions reveal themselves as wrong either when one perception conflicts with another, as when the man I perceive is revealed in the next perception to be a mannequin, or when others inform me that I am hallucinating, for example, when I ask others to help me get the spiders off of my arm and they tell me there are none. It is then demonstrated how pain cannot be refuted by these (and other) means. When a pain transforms into pleasure or a relative lack of feeling, the pain is not falsified: There is simply a transition from one feeling to another. Concerning objections, when I tell my friend that I have a great pain in my arm and he responds, "No, what you say is untrue", I would not even understand her objection. After several other arguments, I conclude that pain is not falsifiable and demonstrate how this entails that bodily-feelings are always true when they are felt.

(3)Two implications are drawn from this conclusion. As bodily-feelings are always true, one can understand why feelings, even when unjustified, appear as requiring a certain respect. In human relationships, if one party becomes upset or angered with something another has done, the other is often required to acknowledge that emotion before proceeding to justify or apologize for her actions. Second is that the phenomenological method, in contrast to neuroscientific or psychological approaches is alone capable of accounting for the truth-value of bodily-feelings. Let us assume that when I feel a certain pain, a scientist could prove that no pain receptors are activated and that the part of the brain associated not with pain, but rather with hallucinations lights up. By no means does this prove the pain false. The truth and falsity of pain are found in the experience alone and this cannot be understood through some causal explanation.

REMEMBERING THROUGH LOVE. THE EPISTEMIC ROLE OF EMOTIONAL PERCEPTION IN *PHAEDO* AND *PHAEDRUS*

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I will propose and argue for a completely novel suggestion about the Socratic elenchus, and more generally the Socratic Dialogue methodology. It is that the effect that Socrates aims to achieve through the elenchus, namely the state of aporia of the interlocutor, is a mental state that involves feelings, which in turn play a role in the cognitive development of the interlocutor. The aporetic state is not a purely cognitive state; it is a cognitively-motivational state involving emotive elements. Furthermore, I will argue that the aporetic state is achieved in the elenchus, not only in the interlocutor's mental state; the state is the conclusion of the elenchus that is a shared cognitively-motivational state of both interlocutors. Finally I conclude that this emotional knowledge is realizable just in the shared and kathartic setting of the drama.

Approbation and the Experience of Moral Beauty

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In this paper I critically examine theories of the experience of moral beauty in the moral sense tradition, particularly in the work of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith. My primary focus is on the relationship between an experience of moral beauty – finding a representation beautiful in the right way – and the emotion of approbation of what is represented. Because of their meta-ethical concerns, moral sense theorists have good reason to tie the perception of moral beauty to approbation. To find something morally beautiful is, it seems, at the same time to approve of it. By contrast, I argue that approbation has only an extrinsic or contingent relation to the experience of moral beauty. We can find something morally beautiful without approving of it. I develop this argument through an examination of the cinematic experience of moral beauty, discussing a number of the films of Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne including The Child (2005); and Two Days, One Night (2014).

EMOTION AND PAIN

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Pain episodes and emotions, particularly 'basic' negative emotions such as fear, anxiety or anger, exhibit a relatively similar pattern of stereotypically involved features. Both are associated with a unique phenomenology since it feels in a certain way to undergo an emotional or painful experience. Both are connected to characteristic changes in the vegetative, endocrine and immunologic system including i.a. an increased heartbeat or the release of neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine. Emotions as well as pains are connected to particular behavioral tendencies. Frightened and injured persons normally try to avoid causally relevant items or performances and show remarkable bodily expressions (e.g. mimic, gesture, posture). Moreover, both phenomena are subject to higher level processing which does not apply in the same way to simple sensations (Gustafson, 2005).

Based on those facts, I agree with authors such as Bennett Helm (2002) to the extent that pains and emotions can be assigned to the same category of phenomena. Both fulfill a comparable function in an organism's overall economy as multidimensional evaluative states that provide under ideal conditions an evolutionary advantage. Emotions constitute the attitudes of an organism towards a subject-relevant external object, while pains point to the harm emanating from the disordered condition of a certain body part.

Nevertheless, I do not conclude such as A.D. Craig (2003) that pains represent a subclass of negative emotions, since they show significant deviations. Two of them shall be named here: Firstly, emotions are second-order reactions insofar as they emerge as effects of perceptions or cognitions and borrow their intentional object from such states. Conversely, pain contains a unique somatosensory system concerning nociceptive information, which specifies its intentional content and partly constitutes its phenomenology. Even though we experience pain as a unified phenomenon, it appears to be composed of at least two dissociated components: A 'sensory' pain and an 'affective' pain while only the latter resembles emotional episodes. Secondly, pain possesses a unique inhibition system that cannot merely suppress the aspect of awareness but the whole multidimensional processing. This distinguishes pain from emotions as well as from genuine perceptions.

Therefore, I believe that pains constitute complex evaluative reactions of an organism towards the own bodily condition which cannot be identified with introspective negative emotions, although they show similar features, rely in large parts on the same brain structures and exhibit strong impact on each other (e.g Ohayon & Schatzberg, 2010).

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TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE POLITICS OF SHAME

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In this paper I propose to address the relation between knowledge, thought and the emotions as a theoretical frame to think on recent events in Greece and the European continent. My discussion builds on Yiannis Stavrakakis work (The Lacanian Left), which influentially highlighted the need for an intertwinement of affect and signification in politics and political theory. Drawing on the work of Jacques Lacan, my own emphasis will be not on jouissance, but on the emotion of shame, which Lacan discusses mainly in the final session of his seventeenth Seminar L' Envers de la Psychanalyse (1967-1970), delivered in the wake of the events of May '68, and where shame is conceived of as the opposite of an immediate access to jouissance. In this seminar, Lacan considers discourse as a social bond and juxtaposes the discourse of psychoanalysis to the discourse of the University. The latter is linked to the rise of capitalism, and its logic is governed by the endless pursuit of knowledge. By contrast, shame is at the heart of the social bond that would correspond, rather, to the discourse of psychoanalysis. This implies the subversive potential of shame against the totalizing claims of knowledge and science to the detriment of other aspects of truth. It is, I suggest, interesting to bring the consequences of this discussion to bear on the issues raised by the technocratic handling of the current economic crisis and consider how a politics of emotion can modify its unqualified espousal. Playing with the French word for shame (honte), Lacan coins the neologism hontology: shame has the potential to reconfigure concepts of the subject that ontology has taken for granted, and carries the ethical potential to modify the subject's attitude to established situations and ways of thinking. Discussion of shame in the seventeenth Seminar is inspired by Heidegger's LOGOS, MOIRA, ALETHEIA, where Heidegger conceives of shame (die Scheu) as the affect distinctive of Dasein par excellence, as the main affect of the subject in connection to truth (α-λήθεια). This conceptual background will offer me the occasion to consider shame and affect in general with an emphasis to its connection to thinking rather than its bodily grounding, which currently dominates most relevant discussions in scholarship. I will discuss Lacan's statement in Television that "What affect discharges is not adrenalin but thought" and will insist on its potential to render the "affective turn" pertinent to real political circumstances and their urgency. Finally, a parallel will be proposed between Lacan's hontologie and the hauntology (hantologie) Derrida develops in his Specters of Marx. Hinted at by Adrian Johnston in Adventures in Transcendental Materialism, the comparison is worth developing further and its consequences explored in current contexts. An additional aim of my paper is to reconsider the contribution of some aspects of psychoanalytic theory to the study of affect and the emotions, where it remains rather underrepresented.

EMOTION SHARING IN THE INTERNET AGE

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Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube could be described as Internet-mediated channels for sharing intimate moments among friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Although there have been ways to share emotions over long distances (letters, phone calls, etc.), the Internet facilitates new ways to share "face-to-face" communication, not only with one, but with multiple people at the same time. Another feature of this phenomenon is that it can also be seen as a form of "technological surrogate intimacy," in which technology on the one hand facilitates and on the other hand replaces intimate human connections. Utilizing Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" among other sources, this paper will examine to what extent the sharing of emotions using the newest forms of technological communication is possible and show how this phenomenon opens completely new and different possibilities for emotional connection.

EMOTIONS, MODALS, MORALS

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Frege-Geach-style arguments indicate that moral discourse is truth-apt. Yet queerness arguments lead to doubts that moral properties give rise to truths 'out there'. One solution to this quandary is the idea that moral properties are projected onto the world. Everyday moral appraisals tend to go together with certain emotional responses. As a consequence, it seems plausible to account for projection in terms of an emotional response (e.g. abhorrence) projecting certain features (e.g. cruel) on features of the independent world (e.g. beating children). But we normally deny that, if our emotional response were suitably different, beating children would not be wrong. I explain these findings in terms of Stephen Yablo's (2002) response-enabled or grokking concepts. Their decisive difference to response-dependent concepts like tasty is that their extension is rigidly fixed for all possible situations by our present sensibilities. This accounts for the necessity of moral verdicts, but we need an explanation why moral terms are grokking.

To provide such an explanation, in a first step I use imaginative resistance to explain modal judgement. Sometimes imaginative resistance leads to constraints on the situations we can conceive as possible, impairing our ability to imagine situations (a situation where beating children is right). This inability give rise to the judgement that the situations are metaphysically impossible.

In a second step, I develop the relationship between imagination, emotion, and action. Imaginative scenarios loom large both in counterfactual thinking and deliberating agency. Counterfactual scenarios are relevant to agency as situations of potential action. Evidence from motivational psychology indicates that counterfactual thinking evolves as follows: one feels regret ('Had I only (not)…') or relief in connection with imaginatively going through certain paths not taken. Emotional patterns such as feelings of guilt and remorse that enforce moral valuation also target the imaginary (re)enactment that underlies counterfactual thinking.

In a third step, I explain how general valuations arise from basic motivational systems distinguished in neuropsychology, in particular the interaction of the 'NURTURANCE/SEXUALITY' and the 'SEPARATION DISTRESS/SOCIAL BONDING' and the 'SEEKING' system.

I start from our attributing value properties to the objects of immediate altruistic emotions, our nearest and dearest. These properties are projected into situations we imagine. Emotions mimick the property-detecting role of perception. The SEEKING system enforces tendencies of classification and generalization as crucial to learning from experience. The exploratory drive makes us classify people as being of the same kind. This tends to blur the line between the nearest and dearest and other people. Value properties tend to become generalised as well. The resulting concept of a person is attached to certain modal commitments. Since imaginative enactment of possible scenarios looms large in deliberating agency, the scope of generalization is modal. And since value properties are perceived as outstanding and irreducible to other properties, we take them as basic, modally stable marks of persons. This explains the resistance felt when trying to imagine a situation where persons lack these basic moral marks or the resulting valuations are not respected.

LE COUP DE FOUDRE: REDRESSING THE APORIAS IN THE CONTEMPORARY PARADIGM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LOVE THROUGH THE NEGATIVE ONTOLOGY OF SARTRE, LACAN AND BADIOU

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Whilst the philosophical study of love is divided into a discordant variety of outlooks on how to define, union theorists, robust concern theorists, value theorists and emotion theorists share characteristics particular to the current paradigm of the (broadly-conceived) analytic study of love: all attempt to construct a framework which adheres to ordinary language and can dismiss the ostensibly paradoxical features of love. This goal has reached aporias in a number of different forms: union theorists – such as Fischer (1990) and Scruton (1986) – struggle to explain how one can have union without jeopardising autonomy; whereas robust concern theorists – such as Frankfurt (1999) – want love to be an end in-itself but cannot explain the initial desire for love without introducing a perpetual lack which would undermine the value of love. Furthermore, this paradigm produces other peculiarities, such as Velleman (1999, 2008) and Badhwar's (2003) conviction that lovers need not desire or demonstrate concern for the welfare of their love-objects.

This paper contends that the root of these problems are the philosophers' adherence to ordinary language and that such aporias can be overcome if attention is given to the ontological status of love. This paper will advocate the consideration of the negative ontology which has been mutually developed by the assemblage of 20th Century French philosophy, and their treatment of the concept of love, as a productive alternative to the current paradigm in the analytic study of emotions such as love.

This paper will develop upon two previous papers presented at the conferences for the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions in which I argued: firstly, that Sartre's framework in Being and Nothingness presented a bilateral theory of love which stood in a paradoxical relationship to his fundamental ontology; and secondly, that whilst Sartre can be taken as representative of the initial emergence of continental expressions of the paradoxical features of love, it is in the explicitly negative ontology of Lacan where the paradoxical features of love can begin to be understood consistent with ontological necessity.
This final paper will: give a brief overview of the central and persistent problems in contemporary philosophies of love; highlight common features which indicate the existence of key aporias which derive from notions of personhood and ordinary language; summarise the arguments presented in the first two papers on Sartre and Lacan; and indicate why neither approaches provide a complete and sufficient rebuttal to contemporary philosophies of love because they fail to provide a systematic theory of subjectivity and agency. I will indicate how the mathematicised and negative ontological framework elaborated by Badiou has the potential to provide a systematic theory of subjectivity and agency such that it the paradoxical features of love can be understood as ontologically necessitated and consistent without recourse to notions of personhood, ordinary language or dogmatic empiricism. Finally, I will explicate the new philosophical problems which arise out of the negative ontological framework and demonstrate that they are more easily resolvable than the aporias specified at the outset of the paper.

IRRUPTIVE COGNITIONS

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The effects on action produced by emotions are various and flexible. An episode of fear can dispose a person to perform relatively simple behaviors, but it can also dispose a person to engage upon in complicated plans of escape that require reasoning and forethought. Tappolet (2010) has argued that in order to accommodate this variety of emotional behaviors, we must reject theories that claim that each emotion merely generates a fixed and limited number of behavioral action tendencies. Rather, emotions influence our actions by temporarily altering our desires and motivations. Griffiths, following Frank, calls these temporary conative states “irruptive motivations”.

I argue that in addition to irruptive conations, emotions produce irruptive cognitions. That is: emotions influence behavior not only by causing us to take up momentary desire-like states; they also cause us to take up momentary belief-like states. These cognitive states are not exactly beliefs themselves: they are what philosophers of mind have called ``acceptances.'' If I am scared of an onrushing dog, I will briefly accept that the dog before me is dangerous, and my acceptance will influence my future actions. Evidence for the existence of irruptive acceptances will be drawn from the literature on psychopathological delusions and affective disorders.

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MOOD, DELUSIONS AND POETRY: A COMPARISON OF FINDING WORDS FOR THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND ORIENTATION IN PSYCHOSIS AND THE EVERYDAY

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Starting from a comparison of a poem by Plath called Tulips with the words of someone in the thrall of a delusion I develop a phenomenology of the mooded articulation of the world. The sketch of the role of the emotions that I draw is based on Heidegger's concept of attunement [befindlichkeit] and his argument that deep emotions open up ways the world can seem to us for closer inspection e.g. that scientific research depends on an emotional state of cool detachment. This depiction of emotions is given weight by the work of contemporary philosophers such as Hookway (2002).

My contention is that there is an underlying structural similarity between the forms of words used in poems and those found in medically diagnosed delusions and this similarity is based on the role of mood in both arenas. The difference I argue is that although both forms of the use of words are negotiated 'as if' the subject matter was literal the person writing the poem is self-aware that their uses of language are figurative and metaphorical. This is because the emotional lens they use to describe a situation poetically can always be removed by a return to a ground-mood of trust that prevents them from becoming lost in the poetical mood. The person experiencing psychosis, on the other hand, is unable to extricate herself from the mood that underlies their delusional utterances as they have lost access to the ground-mood that the poet takes for granted. The idea of ground-mood is taken from Heidegger and developed along the lines that a ground-mood of trust is needed for a commonsense relation to the world. A further example of the mooded articulation of the world is analysed in the philosophical writings of Hume. This example helps to highlight that Heidegger's analysis of attunement is applicable in a variety of situations.

This understanding of the effects of deep emotional structures on the way we 'word the world' allows an alternative reading of the ontology of delusions from the standard false belief explanation. It also highlights the major role of affect in all forms of psychosis and signposts how an emotional disturbance can be seen to play a part in forms of mental illness that are thought to have a more cognitive basis. A comparison with a prominent cognitive theory shows that the mooded explanation is more encompassing. Finally, I explore the possible implications this phenomenology would have for treatment of psychosis looking at evidence that already highlights the importance of word-use and trust in the recovery of someone from psychosis.

NATURAL KINDS AND THE STUDY OF EMOTIONS

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In this paper I assess recent views in the philosophy of emotion which investigate whether emotions can be considered natural kinds in any sense. Some philosophers claim that emotion is a distinct mental category and, as such, should be considered a natural kind and investigated scientifically in the same way as other distinct mental phenomena such as vision (Charland 2002; Prinz 2004). The dominant, albeit implicit, view within both cognitive psychology and the neurosciences is that some subset of the discrete emotions recognised within folk-psychology i.e. fear, joy, surprise, disgust, sadness and anger (also called basic emotions) are natural kinds (Ekman 1992, Griffiths 1997). This view argues that basic emotions should be considered as separate natural kinds; for example the natural kind of Fear, the natural kind of Anger etc. One of the leading alternative views claims that only more basic psychological states such as valence, are natural kinds, with the variety of emotional states originally recognised, being constructed from these (Barrett 2006, Lindquist et al. 2013). A more radical view would hold that there are in fact no natural kinds to be found within the affective sciences. Given a popular account of the relation between natural kinds and scientific enquiry (Quine 1961), if emotions are not natural kinds in any sense, this would invite scepticism about the legitimacy of the scientific study of emotions. I clarify that the difference in these views is caused by two issues; firstly, the adoption of different theories on the nature of emotion and, secondly, the adoption of an essentialist account of natural kinds. I argue that the second issue can be addressed by adopting the account of natural kinds offered by Boyd (1991) who takes natural kinds to be just those classifications that are explanatorily and predictively successful (Beebee and Sabbarton- Leary 2010). Successful classifications reveal the causal structure of the world and, in doing so, they shed light on the nature of the object under investigation. I argue that to avoid attacks from scepticism about the scientific investigation of emotions, it is necessary to present an argument in favour of the claim that emotion as a category is a natural kind. Whether emotions are natural kinds in any sense is not exclusively a metaphysical issue. Instead, as I show in this paper, this question has epistemic implications; the way in which the architecture of emotions is structured, will determine whether any emotion categories generate successful generalisations and predictions. This paper assesses an argument raised by Charland (2002) in this respect. I conclude that we should accept Charland's conclusion that emotion as a category is a natural kind. However, I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the premises Charland provides.

INTROSPECTION AND EMOTION

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How do we acquire emotional self-knowledge? Much recent philosophical work on introspection suggests that this process is 'transparent'—that, from the first-personal point of view, we answer the question of what psychological states we have (say, whether we believe that p) in the same way that we answer the question of what the world is like (whether p). If introspection is transparent then in general we know our mental states by looking outward to the world, and not by looking inward to any psychological state. In this paper I defend a transparency account of our introspective knowledge of emotions.

According to the transparency account of emotion introspection that I consider, we have reason to believe that we have some emotion, ϕ, towards some object, x, when we judge that x is ϕ-worthy. For example, we have reason to believe that we have fear towards spiders when we judge that spiders are threatening (assuming that the property of being threatening makes something fear-worthy). Likewise, we have reason to believe that we are ashamed of some behavior when we judge that behavior to be shameful.

A transparency account of emotional introspection seems to conflict with the common sense view that we know our emotions introspectively by simply 'looking inward' to our bodily feelings. This common sense view appears to derive support from the existence of recalcitrant emotions. Imagine a person who considers his recalcitrant fear of garden snakes to be irrational in the strong sense that it conflicts with his considered judgment that garden snakes are harmless. For him, one might object, the question, "Are you afraid of garden snakes?" cannot be answered in the same way as he would answer the question, "Are garden snakes threatening?" His answers to the two questions appear to come apart: 'yes' to the first and 'no' to the second. The answers may also, in other cases, appear to come apart in the other direction: I might answer 'yes' to the outward-directed question, and 'no' to the self-ascription question (I experience no fear towards snakes but do believe that they are dangerous).

I defend the transparency account of emotional self-knowledge against the objection from recalcitrant emotions. I do so by arguing that emotions are partly constituted by commitments to make particular outward-looking judgments or to employ particular outward-looking sub-doxastic cognitive schema. Recalcitrant emotions can be explained by appeal to these conflicting cognitive states and to our ignorance of, or self-deception about, the nature of these cognitions about the world.

EMOTIONS ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS

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Emotions are feelings about things. Some emotions can be about a wide array of things. For example, we can fear things as diverse as death, dogs, murderers and microbes. We can feel pride in our looks, work, culture, possessions, and abilities. Other emotions are quite restricted in the objects they can take. For example, gratitude is felt for agents, and guilt is felt for expressions of agency.

In this paper, I discuss emotions that can take abstract objects. In doing so, I assume that abstract objects exist, and that we can identify some fairly uncontroversial examples of them, but I do not defend a particular account of what an abstract object is. Instead, I draw from a list of things commonly thought to be abstract objects (such as justice, the Navajo language, the Pythagorean Theorem, The Rite of Spring, and the game of Go), and consider which emotions can be about those objects. Relying on the conceptual and empirical work of Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, I devote special attention to awe, an interesting but under-theorized emotion that, I argue, can take an abstract object.

My position may seem to conflict with certain widely accepted views, like Martha Nussbaum's. Roughly, Nussbaum says that emotions are judgments about things that matter to the subject who feels them. One might think that such a view is at odds with mine, because one might say that only concrete objects have the causal power to create the requisite "upheavals" in our thoughts. For Nussbaum's claim is that we experience emotions only when their objects are thought to be salient to our flourishing, and one might suggest that only concrete objects can matter to our flourishing in the necessary way.

However, I aim to show that some abstract objects can be relevant to our flourishing and thus can be the objects of certain emotions. For example, contemplating abstract objects like the Pythagorean Theorem, The Rite of Spring, or the game of Go contributes to some people's flourishing in significant ways, and the awe that they can feel as a result can take as its object the theorem, score, or game itself. Similarly, a person can feel love for certain abstracts objects, like justice or the Navajo language. While these abstract objects do not contribute to our flourishing in the same ways that concrete objects do, they can be salient to our flourishing nonetheless.

However, feeling emotions about abstract objects is relatively rare. We might say that we feel grateful for justice, afraid of injustice, admiring of wisdom, and contemptuous of ignorance. However, what we generally mean is that we experience those feelings about specific instances of justice and wisdom. We feel these emotions about concrete things insofar as they are just or wise. Justice and wisdom are not, strictly speaking, the objects of our emotions in such cases. So sometimes loose talk makes it seem like our emotions about abstract objects when they are not.

ENVY AND OTHER NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN ARISTOTLE AND PLUTARCH

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In Aristotle's understanding, when we feel envious we are not suffering because we feel that the good fortune of others may threaten our well-being or our happiness (in this case we would be moved by fear). Rather, our pain is caused by our neighbor's good fortune itself. Paradoxically, an emotion that Aristotle labels as one of the most despicable seems to imply a concern for the other for his or her own sake and a movement away from selfishness.

Aristotle contrasts envy with other emotions, such as emulation and indignation, which in his view are ethically praiseworthy because of their concern with desert. We feel pity not just at the other's misfortune, but because we believe it is not deserved. Analogously, we feel indignation when we believe that the other's superior situation (his or her wealth, fame, etc.) is not deserved. Envy, on the other hand, according to Aristotle is indifferent to desert. Whether the other's superior position is due to sheer luck, to vicious actions or to his or her great skills, some of us will be inclined to act in such a way that the other may lose his or her superior position.

Envy is a competitive emotion of a special kind. It is not the painful awareness that others have something we desire, but a painful feeling that their having certain goods puts them in a better light. If we are envious, we are not moved (as with emulation) to do all we can to improve our situation. Rather, our efforts are aimed at lowering the other's status. We would rather lose the goods we possess than accept the other's good fortune.

After clarifying the main differences between the contemporary theories of envy and Aristotle's understanding of it, I will argue that Aristotle's attempt at distinguishing envy from indignation puts a strain on his theory. Envy is labeled as a bad emotion, an emotion that decent people ought not to indulge in and virtuous people are unlikely to feel. Indignation, on the contrary, is supposedly a noble emotion because the pain at another's undeserved good luck implies sensitivity to issues of justice and worth.

After examining a few examples of indignation, I will show that they are difficult to distinguish from jealousy with respect to one's privileges (one of the meanings of phthonos in Greek). I will turn to Plutarch's thesis concerning envy and secrecy to explain why I believe that Aristotle's examples of indignation turn out to be cases of disguised phthonos. By examining Plutarch's distinction between envy and hatred I will highlight the reasons why envy is an emotion that nobody wishes to acknowledge. This will lead me to focus on Plutarch's examples concerning envy towards one's friends, and hence to concentrate on the ambivalence and conflicting desires entailed by friendship and envy, when they are present at the same time in someone's mind.

MORAL REGRET AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE KANTIAN AGENT

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Kantian moral theories are often criticized for their inability to make sense of the phenomenology and moral significance of regret, remorse, and guilt in the face of difficult moral choices. As Williams famously put it, these emotions seem like the "moral residue" of obligations left unfulfilled in the face of impossible moral choices and thereby count as evidence for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas[1].Should I stay home to care for my ailing parent or continue working long hours at the demanding job that my family financially relies on? Should I move my family to a region of the world with more opportunity, or stay to fight for progress in the fatherland I know and love? Should I divert government resources from social welfare programs to failing public education, or continue to protect those in greatest need? Whichever option we choose, pangs of regret remind us that there was a competing, morally significant option. Because most Kantian theories deny the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, they cannot explain the phenomenology or propriety of these emotions, or so it is traditionally argued.

Focusing on regret in particular, I argue that Kant's faculty psychology offers resources to account for the phenomenology of moral emotion in these difficult cases, while maintaining the rationalist precepts that a) there is only one correct course of action in a given context (and so difficult choices aren't genuinely dilemmical) and b) "inclinations," or emotions, cannot be proper objects of moral legislation. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant describes certain psychological conditions on being affected and thereby obligated by the moral law. These conditions include moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect (6:399)[2].Regret, I argue, is a kind of moral residue, but not the residue of an undischarged obligation in the context of a dilemma. Rather regret is evidence of the moral feelings that psychologically dispose us to be affected by the moral law. It is a lived reminder that, in the absence of competing moral factors, we would have had and been motivated to fulfill another obligation. Regret reminds me that had I been, for example, independently wealthy, I would have stayed home with my ailing parent in a heartbeat.

This account, I argue, not only accommodates but better captures the phenomenology of moral experience. A subject who feels nothing at all – no pangs of regret, no twinges of remorse – in working long hours while his parent lies sick in bed, being cared for by a complete stranger, isn't committing a moral wrong – "wrong" doesn't seem to apply in this case – rather he seems to suffer a much deeper moral deficiency. Kant often identifies our humanity with the "moral law within us." Absence of regret suggests that a subject lacks the psychological constitution required to have been moved by the moral law in the first place.

[1] Williams, B. "Ethical Consistency," *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge, 1973.
[2] Kant, I. Metaphysics of Morals, (1797), *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1999.

EMOTIONS AND POLITICS. THE AMBIVALENCE IN HANNAH ARENDT'S THOUGHT

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Hannah Arendt was constantly alert to the distortion of rationality by incitement of collective emotions. Her leading example is the corruption of solidarity and interpersonal compassion by pity. In the second chapter of her essay On Revolution, The Social Question, Hannah Arendt takes up the idea that, in contrast with the American Revolution, the French Revolution neglected the question of liberty and the form of government able to guarantee it. They developed, instead, a politics of pity. The traditional emotion of compassion has been transformed into the emotion of pity: "Pity may be the perversion of compassion" (On revolution, p.84).

Compassion is an emotion that arises from the immediacy of the encounter between people in need of help and people willing to provide it. Compassion for individuals, said Arendt, is admirable but unpolitical: it is not talkative and cannot be assumed as the basis for organized politics. By contrast, pity is the product of public speeches and public images that describe the misfortune of a great number of people. Pity leads those who profess it to commit violence in a vain attempt to demonstrate their own sincerity. In short, emotions may be important as subjective motives for individual action, Arendt granted, but they should neither be exposed in public nor be made the basis for collective action. Emotions corrupt politics; political movements should be based on rational argument, not passion. Public affairs cannot be truly democratic if governed by "sentiment, however, noble it may be. Instead, politics must be committed to ideas—to greatness, to honor, or dignity".

While Arendt's analysis of revolutionary pity suggests that her wish is a radical "de-emotionalization" of the public sphere, other writings express a different message. In her Report from Germany, a few years after the end of the war, she pointed out the "general lack of emotion" and the "apparent heartlessness" of many Germans she met. She noticed a link between the lack of emotion and the widespread "escape from reality" among Germans after the war. The inability not only to feel guilty but also to suffer the catastrophic destruction which came over Europe as a result of their action or inaction, promoted "deep moral confusion".

My aim is to develop the ambivalent position of Hannah Arendt about the entry of the sphere of emotions into politics. How can this contradiction be solved? The difference between individual action and public action can be the answer to this contradiction.

DESIRE AND BELIEF: THE AFFECT MECHANISM IN GABRIEL TARDE

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In recent time the politics of ontology has taken an affective turn in the framing of the political subject. This affective turn has been fuelled by a growing interest in the work of a series of forgotten thinkers among them Gabriel Tarde. Tarde was a contemporary of Emile Durkheim and one of the founding fathers of French sociology. His work was neglected because it did not conform to the predominant scientific paradigm but over the past decade his thought has experienced a growing influence and is frequently used as a reference in social and cultural theory. Tarde's project was neither strictly a sociological, psychological, or economical one, but a complex manifold entanglement of forces which operated according to certain general principles. These principles were crystallised in the concepts of imitation and invention which produced a theory, interpsychology. The recent revival of his distinctive approach to the study of human interaction centers on his notions of belief and desire as the cornerstones of society. In his thought, the diverse currents of faith and passion are the materials that configure and transform institutions, groups and individuals. Already in his first philosophical αarticle, La croyance et le désir (1880), he writes: "At the bottom of internal phenomena, whatever they are, the analysis pushed to the limit will never discover more than three irreducible notions: belief, desire, and their point of application, pure sense."

His work vividly demonstrates why for him modernity is understood in and through the role of belief and desire as he argues that modernization as process of material and immaterial transformation of living conditions relies upon the affective forces of imitations. We believe, we desire, therefore we imitate. Emotions are taken as a social phenomenon. The key is not only the differentiation between individual and collective emotions but the fact that society as a collective is driven by emotions.

Considering that emotions are the driving force of society we could point out their eminent political role. The whole political process is driven by emotions. His work offers valuable tools for conceiving the social field as inevitably open and dynamic because what are important to Tarde are not the finished social structures but their generative networks.

In this paper I will discuss how he poses the problem of the constitution of values and norms departing from the government of affects, of passions transforming political economy into economical psychology. In his Psycholgie Economique he examines economy as the circulation of fluxes of desire and belief. Moreover I will attempt to highlight how this foregrounding of affect is currently used not only as a way to reanimating social and political theory but also as an answer to the pressing problem of grasping the real passions and energies that run through the modern day crowds and harnessing them into social and political action.

CRITIQUE OF PLATO'S ARGUMENT AGAINST POETRY IN *REPUBLIC* BOOK III

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In Book II of the Republic (376e – end), Plato examines (through the mouthpiece of Socrates) the role of poetry in the education of the young, especially of the future "guardians" of the ideal State which it is the Republic's task to describe. In addition to physical training for the body, he says there must be training in music and poetry for the soul. However, not all forms of poetry can be taught. Only hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people will be admitted into the "good city" (kallipolis); all other forms of poetry must be excluded. This includes tragic poetry.

One of the arguments Socrates develops for this emerges in Republic Bk III. We enjoy both viewing and engaging in imitations, but that enjoyment can lead to habits which distort the thought even of good people. By indulging our appetite for pity, S claims, the poet nourishes and strengthens the inferior, non-rational part of the soul, which hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and wailing, because it desires these things by nature. Yet it is this part of soul that should be controlled by the superior, rational part of the soul, in our private misfortunes. By receiving satisfaction and enjoyment from poets, however, the pitying part will no longer be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer a misfortune. The emotions that are stirred up from indulging in tragic art will spill into real life.

My essay will be devoted to developing this argument more fully, as it emerges in the Republic, and then critiquing it. I will try to show that, far from hampering the development of the kallipolis, tragic poetry can facilitate it.

EMOTION AND MENTAL CONTENT

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Most philosophy of emotion is not in line with the new orthodoxy of emotion psychology, which holds that a folk emotion concept, such as “fear”, does not refer to a singular mental representation. It is rather the case that emotional experiences are constituted by a sequence of representations, which may even include perception and belief. If one accepts this, it becomes difficult to make philosophical claims about “emotional content” as if it were the content of a singular mental state. Therefore, I suggest that philosophy of emotion should focus on low-level affective representation, namely the representation of positivity and negativity, which is known in psychology as “valence”. The experiential representation of valence, which I will call “affective experience”, is essential to emotion and to human psychology in general, despite being underexplored. The aim of this paper is to explain what it means to experientially represent “positivity” or “negativity”.

DESIROUS POLITICS. DESIRE AS POLITICAL DRIVING FORCE IN LATE-CAPITALIST EUROPE

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In my lecture I pursue the question, how to think desire as a political driving force.

The first part is dedicated to analysing different models that bare the potential to grasp desire out of individualist mind frames. In a canonical psychoanalytical perspective, desire is defined as lack, and caught in subject/object dialectics. The lack, which animates desire, is understood as a lack of reality, thus, desire is being reduced to a mere mental space. This deficient definition encapsulates the subject in a solipsistic state, while designing the object as phantasmagorical. This strand risks digressing in the phantasm of a sovereign subject that reigns his or her passions (cif. Braidotti 2005/06). Whereas Deleuze claims that one doesn't desire something or someone, on the contrary, desire always produces assemblages. In his model of desire as production that he develops in intellectual complicity with Guattari it is a pre- and transpersonal force that enables assemblages, thus, generates heterogeneous social fields (cif. 1977; 1975; 1980). Hence, I argue that desire operates as a condition of possibility for affective and emotional dynamics, because it constitutes the spaces where social life can occur. In the course of the affect theoretical hype Deleuze and Guattari are mostly perceived as thinkers of affect (cif. Angerer 2014), while it remains forgotten that their key term is désir. Striving to reestablish desire as epistemic category in political philosophy, I consider desire not as simply subversive or purely conservative force. Regarding the false alternatives to grasp desire either lack or as productivity, I propose that the logic of desire is a non-linear, and contingent, and hence contradicts the idea of either/or. For this purpose I combine Deleuze and Gutattari's notion of assemblage with the concept of fantasy by Laplanche and Pontalis (1986; Laplanche 1986; cif. Lauretis 2010). Their notion of fantasy exceeds individualist restrictions, and fantasy appears as a social space, where subjectivization proceeds, while it is simultaneously destabilized. As a provisory conclusion it can be said that desire works as fantasy production. Moreover, societal realities can be coined as dominant fictions (cif. Silverman 1992), hence, as hegemonic fantasies in the collective imaginary.

In the third part I elaborate my notion of desire as socially mobilizing driving force. Furthermore, the subgoal is to present analytical tools for the study of political dynamics. Desire - snared in endless oscillations - can be grasped in polar modi operandi: the modus of opening and transgressing regulative restrictions is being juxtaposed by the modus of closing and sedimenting normative orders as well as subjective, national, and cultural identities.

These desirous modi operate in different political fantasies that will be analysed in the third part. Distinguishing between politics of contingency and politics of ressentiment, I take a closer look at current political events and movements as for example the Movement of Places in 2011, and right-wings demonstrations that proceed in Germany since 2014. In these exemplary insights I seek to highlight the importance of desire as analytical category in exploring political processes in their affective dimensions.

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COLLECTIVE ACTION, AUTONOMY AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF DIALOGICAL LOVE

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On Angelika Krebs' Zwischen Ich und Du. Eine dialogische Philosophie der Liebe (Suhrkamp, Berlin 2015)

In the paper, I intend to discuss the meaning and role of personal autonomy in Krebs' dialogical account of love. Personal autonomy, I argue, is not something that lovers simply build upon, celebrate or respect; rather, it is built up and developed, at least partially, within the love relationship itself. If, on the one hand, individual agency results from and depends on the relationship conceived as collective action and emotion, it can, on the other, challenge such a we-mode, break with it or transform it. Such an "agonistic" reading of the dialogical model of love does not explicitly appear in Krebs' book; it does not contradict her arguments either. An agonistic interpretation of dialogical love presents the following advantages: First, it accounts for a certain degree of ambivalence, suffering and fragility that belong to the particular kind of collectivity that love is. Second, it reinforces the argument that love has not simply to be regarded as private emotion or feeling, but it is embedded in a complex network of social, political, cultural, economic practices and institutions in ways that might challenge them. Third, an agonistic reading might expand the dialogic model of love beyond the dyadic structure, in order to include polyamorous forms of love.

SENECA AND SPINOZA IN AN IMPLICIT DIALOGUE ON THE QUESTION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

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Self-awareness in Seneca is the corollary of natural constitution at every stage of its development, but also in Spinoza self-consciousness is contingent on the degree of development and complexity of the body.

Seneca in his Letter 121 to Lucillius examines the question of how consciousness is possible not only for human beings but also for animals. According to Seneca, each one of us understands that there is something that stirs our impulses and we know that we have a tendency of striving [conatum], though we do not know what it is or where it comes from. We should stress that Seneca employs the word conatus, which is also used by Spinoza later. For Seneca, every living thing may have an idea of itself, and more particularly, of its striving [conatus]. It is implied that in each being there is an innate power to striving, which is inscribed in its constitution: A striving of each living thing to persevere in its own being, as Spinoza will later say. And it is accompanied by a capacity to perceive, to form an idea of the self, in so far as it strives to protect its being, or to persevere in its own being. Self-awareness is contingent on the composition, or particular structure, of a living thing. Because self-awareness is innate, every living thing, in whatever condition or whatever stage of development it may find itself, will act to protect itself.

In Spinoza, "conatus" expresses the striving of each thing to persevere in its own being (: "each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persist in its own being", Ethics III, 6) - and this striving is defined as "the actual essence of the thing itself". The essence of a thing contains power, intellectual and corporeal, with which it exerts itself, and strives to persist in its own being. The mind is conscious of this striving (conatus) and also desire is defined as "appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof" (Ethics III, 9).

It has been argued that consciousness in Spinoza foreshadows theories of "embodied mind", given that consciousness is linked to the human body and indeed is the mental counterpart of the superlative complexity of the human body. This could also be said of sense of self in Seneca, which is a corollary of a creature's natural self-constitution, a code in which its physical composition is inscribed, enabling it to accomplish its movements with admirable competence, precision and in an organized fashion. I will focus on the question concerning the relationship between mind and self-consciousness in Seneca and Spinoza and I will argue that self-consciousness in Spinoza is a more complicated story, since it does not only accompany the striving of a being, but it refers to ideas of its affections and it is developed along with its emotions.

LOVE AND ENMITY

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The demand to love one's enemies (Matthew 5) refers to a gap between religious attitudes, as grounded in the ideal of charity and altruism, and social conflicts. As far as the term "enemy" is concerned, anthropological and sociological explanations parallel.

For a theory of emotion (1) the love of an enemy implies the incommensurateness of love and hate, linked with the attitudes (2) of care and rejection. In psychological reading (3), the problem is transferred as to be willing to forgive without being able to. These three aspects have to be considered in concerning the contemporary use of language, where the term "enemy" is to be avoided, and replaced in euphemistic moods, actually without solving the problem (4). Furthermore, the ambiguity of the religious claim (5) becomes precarious, (a) when it results in aiming at the love to someone, who can't be loved; (b) or concerning the self-deception, when someone fails to love, which he nonetheless considers to be a religious obligation.

The sociality of emotions explains these aspects in intersubjective constellations as well as in political contexts.

SENTIMENT AND SYMPATHY IN ADAM SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE

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While there is much discussion and agreement regarding Adam Smith's normative moral theory, and the role that sympathy plays in it, there is less discussion (and far less agreement) regarding Smith's account of justice, and the role that sympathy might play in it. The literature regarding Smith's account of justice can be split into two camps.

In one camp are those who maintain that Smith provides a rights-based account of justice that is wholly separate from his account of moral judgment – one that is not grounded in natural sentiments, but rather in (something like) rights generated by positive law or historical utility. Vivienne Brown, for instance, argues that Smith's account of justice is entirely concerned with the generation and observance of rules, and is independent of our (or any) moral judgments. James Otteson, in similar fashion, argues that justice for Smith involves conformity with rules that have tended to the benefit of the society in which the rules arose. Such interpretations nicely capture the importance of conformity with (certain) rules for Smith's account of justice, but they seem to rely for their justification on appeals to judgments of utility, which Smith himself rejects.

In the other camp are those who maintain that Smith attempts to offer a coherent account of justice that is grounded in sentiment, but that the account offered is incoherent. Samuel Fleischacker, for instance, argues that Smith cannot reconcile his claim that of all the virtues justice is uniquely precise, with his claim that there are general principles of justice according to which the positive laws of all societies can (and should) conform. Lisa Herzog, in similar fashion, argues that Smith's failure to articulate ahistorical, general principles of justice is a result of his inability to transcend the historically situated nature of his own account. Such interpretations are right to recognize that Smith grounds justice in sentiment, but their charges of incoherence depend on inconsistencies in actual, rather than appropriate, sentiments – a distinction that Smith recognizes as necessary for his account's success.

In opposition to both of these camps, I argue that Smith offers a sentimentalist account of justice that is grounded in our natural sentiments, and is coherently tied to moral judgment. According to Smith's sentimentalist account of justice, a person is just when their actions do not elicit appropriate resentment. Conversely, a person is unjust when their actions do elicit appropriate resentment, and the natural consequence of appropriate resentment is punishment. From this seemingly minimal account of justice, Smith believes that general principles of justice can be generated. In this paper I demonstrate how his account of justice depends for its coherence on its connection to the process of sympathy and the standard of our moral judgments, and suggest how his account is robust to meet the demands placed on contemporary accounts of justice.

CONTEMPT FOR POVERTY. SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY GULFS

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After the massive rise in philosophical investigations about the phenomenon of empathy and many enthusiastic studies on the subject some voices were to be heard that began to cast doubt on empathy's central role for processes of understanding others or for morality and sociality in general. Thus, Shaun Gallaghers "Simulation Trouble" and Peter Goldie's "Anti-Empathy" emphasized the many difficulties real-life empathy faces. My presentation will follow their lead but add an explicitly political and sociological twist to their conceptual, psychological and philosophy of mind perspectives. I will be interested in levels of socio-economic inequality that prevent privileged and non-privileged groups from empathizing with each other. I will particularly focus on the role imagination plays in empathetic perspective shifting (or its impossibility). Though imagination's role in empathy is often mentioned it is rarely discussed as a separate issue. It seems to be clear, however, that our capacity to empathize with others, certainly with respect to what has been labeled "high level simulational mindreading" (Goldman), largely depends on our capacity to imagine what it is like to be them or to live in their situation (Goldie's "empathetic perspective-shifting"). If it is impossible to shift perspectives in imagination a central condition for empathy seems to be blocked. Following Ian Shapiro I will claim that socio-economic inequalities of a certain shape and intensity provoke what he labels "empathy gulfs". If the argument is valid, it is necessary to discuss possible or actual consequences of such empathy gulfs. One conjecture is that incapacity to shift perspectives prevents justified criticism of social inequalities from being articulated.

Lastly, it is highly illuminating that David Hume and Adam Smith, often taken as precursors of contemporary empathy discourse, have explicitly contextualized their account of sympathy in terms of economic inequality. This is Hume: "Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness." Going back to Smith's and Hume's rich accounts of sympathy will cast a new light on present debates and allow opening them to political and economic aspects.

FREEDOM THROUGH FEAR, FREEDOM AGAINST FEAR. HOBBES AND ARENDT ON FEAR AND POLITICS

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Since Machiavelli, modern political philosophy deals, explicitly or implicitly, with the question of fear in politics. In this paper, I propose to focus on two major thinkers who both insist on the necessity for a new science of politics while also grappling with the "sad passion" of fear: Thomas Hobbes and Hannah Arendt. Against ancient political philosophy, Hobbes claims that he elaborates the true science of politics. After the political and moral breakdown marked by the unprecedented experience of totalitarianism, Arendt argues that "the necessity for a new political philosophy from which could come a new science of politics, is once more on the agenda" (The promise of politics).

I begin by focusing on the place of fear in Hobbesian anthropology and in the construction of Leviathan. I afterwards turn to Arendt, in order to shed light on a deep-seated critique of Hobbes's understanding of politics. I raise the three-fold claim that the question of fear plays an eminent role in this critique; that from an Arendtian point of view, the idea of "freedom through fear" (as I. D. Evrigenis encapsulates Hobbes's politics in Fear of enemies and collective action) is a contradiction in terms; and that, as a consequence, the assertion according to which in the fear generated by totalitarian horrors lies "the instrument of a new moral and political consensus" (C. Robin, Fear. The history of a political idea) offers a reductive understanding of Arendt's theorization.

By confronting Arendt with Hobbes, my aim is to bring out what can be considered as two opposing ways of articulating the relationship between fear and politics.

DISCUSSING WHETHER EMPATHY IS NECESSARY FOR MORALITY

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The role of empathy within morality has largely been discussed. Some authors consider empathy an essential dimension of morality (e.g. De Waal or Hoffman, following the traditional school of "moral sense"), while some others claim that its role has been somehow overvalued (e.g. Bloom or Maibom). In this paper we are going to focus on Prinz's Kantian arguments in "Is Empathy for Morality?" (2011), where he contends that empathy is not a necessary condition for morality because it is not part of the capacities that make up basic moral competence. According to him, one can hold moral values, make moral judgments, and act morally -the essential dimensions of morality- without empathy. In addition, empathy is supposed to have some negative effects that can interfere and even distort morality proper and which should be avoided.

While the empathic processes that Prinz mentions might not be necessary for his view of moral competence, there are reasons to doubt both his characterization of empathy and his view of how a proper morally competent subject is structured. We are going criticize Prinz's views along the following sequence. First, we will try to highlight the role of empathy, as defined by Prinz, in Prinz's characterization of moral competence. At this point, we will focus on the analysis of the negative effects of empathy and we will try to enhance the bright side of each of the features that Prinz devalues. Secondly, we will tackle the concept of moral competence, arguing that morality does not reduces than making moral judgments, acquiring moral values and acting morally. A full morally competent subject, we will argue, should also have a sense of normativity -understood as feeling bonded by norms, and by other's demands- and a set of prosocial preferences -which are elicited as spontaneous affective reactions-. Given this extended characterization of moral competence, Prinz's notion of empathy turns to have a role. However, third, we will further criticize that notion of empathy (defined by Prinz as a vicarious emotion that is similar to the one of the perceived subject and that do not necessarily involve imagination), because it is oversimplified. We will consider the notions of empathy offered by Batson (2009), Darwall (1998), Masto (2015), Wispé (1986) or Preston & De Waal (2002) and we will try to come out with a list of some of the most common features that are mentioned along the literature, and try to clarify its relationship with sympathy. Our point here will be that Prinz's description applies to some empathic processes but not all of them.

To sum up, a proper understanding of the structure of morality needs to take into account not just the level of rational judgment and action, but also the level of social preferences and of social demands. Once morality is understood properly, empathy's role is vindicated.

Flexibility of the Aristotelian Division in Dispositions, Emotions and Virtues. The Case of the Emotional Means

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In Nicomachean Ethics II.5 Aristotle divides the "things in the soul" into dispositions, emotions and virtues and explains the reasons why they are exclusive categories. However, the discussion of the virtues in the chapters that follow reveals that there might be some flexibility to this division. In this paper I explore the case of those emotions that have some of the features of virtue and analyze the reasons that Aristotle has to allow some emotions to function as proto-virtues.

The Aristotelian list of the praiseworthy means between excesses and defects includes not only virtues but also certain non-virtuous means concerning pathē (emotions). The list of these proto-virtuous differs between his two main ethical treatises: in Eudemian Ethics III.7, the list includes shame (aidōs), righteous indignation (nemesis), friendship (philia), dignity (semnotēs), truthfulness (i.e. the quality of the "truthful person" (ho alethēs)) and wittiness (eutrapelia), while in Nicomachean Ethics II.7 only shame and righteous indignation remain in the list, and shame is the only one discussed in detail. The inclusion of emotions on the list of means is puzzling because Aristotle claims that emotions are not praiseworthy, while also claiming that means are. I argue that Aristotle makes it possible for these proto-virtuous emotions to be simultaneously emotions and praiseworthy means precisely because he needs to maintain their intermediate status in the phase of moral development. In this way, these emotions can belong to learners, who do not yet have virtue.

IN FAVOUR OF A FEELING THEORY

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I argue that an embodied appraisal view of emotion along Jesse Prinz's lines does offers a reconciliation between a feeling theory and cognitivism by favouring the latter. A feeling theory that accepts naiveté about sensation while not being committed to epiphenomenalism is preferable.

JUSTIFIABILITY AND THICK EVALUATIVE CONTENT: TWO CHALLENGES FOR A NON-CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTUAL ACCOUNT OF EMOTIONS

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According to many perceptualist theories of emotions, emotions have non-conceptual content. Non-conceptual content is supposedly a much needed amendment to the over-intellectualization of a belief-based account of emotional content. It has been argued that one apparent advantage that non-conceptuality gives perceptualists is evident with respect to the emotions of children and animals. While judgmentalists require beliefs and concepts (that children and animals lack) as necessary conditions for emotions, non-conceptual perceptualist accounts do not. Furthermore, non-conceptuality plays a role in furthering perceptualists motivation to account for emotions' epistemic role: given that emotions have non-conceptual content, they can (non-inferentially) justify beliefs rather than be justified by them.

In this paper I challenge non-conceptuality and thereby the apparent sub-personal advantage. The challenge arises from another central element in many perceptualist accounts – formal objects. Formal objects are supposed to make sense of emotions: individuate one emotion from another (shame from hope, for example), render an emotional occurrence intelligible, and figure in the correctness conditions of an emotion. Formal objects have an essential role in a perceptual theory of emotions, especially if emotions are to have an epistemic role.

When discussing emotions' formal objects most perceptualists use locutions such as: "X is perceived as dangerous" or "X is perceived dangerously" while offering no substantive answer to how it is that something is perceived as dangerous in a non-conceptual manner (an exception is Prinz). What does it mean for something to appear thus without invoking the concept of danger? I argue that unless a reply to these questions is offered, formal objects in general and especially those invoked when it comes to emotions – axiological properties – are best understood as conceptual in nature.

Conceding the conceptual nature of formal objects has detrimental effects for perceptualist accounts. First and foremost, it reveals an inconsistency within such accounts. It is inconsistent to both argue for emotions having non-conceptual content and to invoke conceptual formal objects that figure in the content and in its correctness conditions. Secondly, if formal objects are conceptual, perceptualists lose their apparent advantage vis-à-vis children and animal emotions as well.

To conclude the paper I consider two apparently viable ways for perceptualists to respond to my argument: 1) do away with formal objects while retaining emotions as non-conceptual representations. 2) Provide an account of non-conceptual formal objects. I consider one such possible response that refers to an analogy with pain and recent accounts of pain as evaluatively representational while being non-conceptual. I argue that the analogy fails and that the implications that arise from considering it show that both ways to respond to my argument are not promising. If I am right, completing the details of a perceptualist account of emotions is not as plausible as has thus far been suggested.

Envy and the Ugly Side of Creativity

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Envy is often endemic in the creatively ambitious. The biographies of the aspiring and great are strewn with enviousness directed toward bitter rivals and friends. How should we identify, appraise and respond to enviousness? Is envy susceptibility a cost that must or should be paid for creative ambition?

Addressing these questions requires us to consider the nature of envy. One type of account holds that envy constitutively involves an S's (subject's) judging that she is inferior with respect to E's (the envied) possessing certain goods, that S is more or less E's equal, that S desires that which E has, that S feels (or is disposed to feel) the unpleasant emotional state and S seeks to emulate or sabotage E. By contrast a different type of account holds that a state or disposition to the state cannot be envy unless S desires that E not have the relevant good. Moreover, as is common in the psychological literature, distinctions are often made between different kinds of envy (e.g. benign and malicious envy are commonly distinguished in terms of either or both the nature of S's desire and associated behavioural dispositions).

The paper presents arguments to show that standard versions of both types of account are inadequate. The paper then goes on to develop a new account of envy that is not liable to these objections and captures distinct kinds of envy. The originality of the new account lies in two primary features. First, the paper develops an account of the nature and role of self-sorrow (including associated feelings and behaviours) in enviousness. Second, envy, at least paradigmatically, involves something more than weakly desiring that which another has. Enviousness involves yearning for and coveting the desired good of the other (whether allied to resentment or self-sorrow). In elaborating how and why this is so the paper goes on to elaborate the nature of covetousness and its associated psychological phenomena (involving imaginings, intrusive thoughts and idealization). The resulting original account of envy holds that S is envious to the extent that i). S is covetous for the (appraised as) comparative good fortune (or indirectly associated quality, feature or relation) of E and ii). is either a) self-sorrowful at S's comparative lack or b) begrudges E's good fortune or c) both ii). a and ii). c.

The paper then goes on to show that, morality aside, enviousness brings mixed benefits with respect to spurring on and directing creative activity. Moreover, it is shown why creatively ambitious people often tend to be more envy susceptible (in part because creative ambitions are often tied up with or driven by seeking self-validation via esteem). Various psychological strategies that tend to ameliorate enviousness are then articulated. The paper goes on to evaluate them in terms of whether or not the strategies also thereby tend to diminish or promote creative ambition and performance. In doing so it will be argued that envy susceptibility is not a cost that must or should be paid for creative ambition.

LOVE AND TIME: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

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If we want to talk about time and love, we have to first deal with the following questions: What do we understand by love? What is time? Is time objective or subjective? Why is time important for understanding love? There are countless ways to understand the phenomenon of love, but the condition for love is the existence of myself and other(s), unless this love is narcissistic. This existential condition of love necessarily relates to the understanding of time, because the fact that we exist means that we are in time. Is this time objective? The time, in which we exist, is the time of existence; each individual existence that belongs to each individual entity. In this sense, time can only be subjective. Existence itself manifests the subjective time of each individual person. Therefore, love presupposes the existence of I and not-I (others), and the existence of these two different entities relates to the time of these two individuals. Each individual person has their own timing process, which moves between two endpoints. One endpoint is the present moment, here and now, and the other endpoint lies in the future. The ultimate endpoint in the future for each person is the point of death, which is, for the living, always there as the most authentic possibility of being in the whole structure of existence. We exist in the way that we understand our own being, which means, in the fundamental way, we understand our possibility of not-being. We understand our own being and the possibility of not-being through constantly running towards the possibilities of being in the future from the present moment and coming back to the present moment. This process is the very structure of our existence. And this process of existence is the structure of time. But this process of time is a completely private individual process, as my death is my own-most, i.e. the most authentic possibility of my existence. However, there exists more than one movement of time, because there is more than one person in the world. Then how does one movement of time associate with another, especially in love? When two people are in love, their present moments are shared. And as their relationship lasts, they share memories of the past and think of the possibilities of the future together. Through this, the two different processes of time, which were completely separate before, create a completely new movement of time together. In this sense, love means a connection of two different individuals with different time processes, creating a whole new dimension of understanding of time and existence.

HAPPINESS AS EMOTIONAL PERCEPTION OF THE PRUDENTIAL VALUE OF ONE'S LIFE

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In this paper, I develop a new emotional state account of happiness. I argue that one's happiness in the descriptive or psychological sense is the overall emotional condition that reflects or evaluates the prudential value of one's life. My account improves on Sumner's life satisfaction account of happiness and Haybron's emotional state account – the two most influential accounts of happiness in the literature – exploiting the strengths of each while avoiding their weaknesses. So I explicate my view and its virtues by comparing it with the cognitive component of Sumner's account (section 1), with the affective component of Sumner's account (section 2), and with Haybron's account (section 3). More specifically, the paper runs as follows: In section 1, I argue that happiness consists in the emotions that are reflective of, rather than the cognitive or propositional judgment about, the prudential value of one's life. Unlike Sumner's life satisfaction theory, my emotional state account implies that those creatures whose mental capacities are not conceptually sophisticated can, in principle, be happy, and is free from the problem of attitude scarcity. In section 2, I argue that happiness-constituting emotions are composed not only of positive experiences, but also of non-experiential dispositions that produce them. In my view, happiness consists in the feelings, emotions, moods, and affective dispositions that would be appropriate to have if one were to appreciate the prudential value of one's life. In section 3, I contrast my emotional state account with Haybron's, by arguing that the emotional states Haybron describes are not happiness itself, but what happiness-constituting emotions are evaluative of. Unlike Haybron's emotional state theory, my view makes good sense of unreasonable or inappropriate (un)happiness. In section 4, I summarize and conclude.

OBJECTIVE EMOTIONS? WHY NATURALIST REPLIES TO EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS OF MORAL OBJECTIVITY FAIL

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Robust moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts, serves the goal of "internal accommodation" (Finlay 2007:822) well; it does justice to a common-sense understanding of morality and affords a strong notion of moral objectivity. When Angela Merkel decided to admit asylum-seekers to Germany in great numbers, and Victor Orbán decided to do the opposite in Hungary, then realists hold that there is a moral fact of the matter: one of them was morally right, and the other was morally wrong.

However, proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) or 'debunkers' like Sharon Street purport to limit our conception of moral objectivity and moral knowledge by invoking our evolutionary history. Our moral beliefs were influenced by evolutionary forces, debunkers plausibly claim, so even if there were mind-independent moral truths as envisioned by the realist, moral knowledge would be beyond us because they moral truths were evolutionary irrelevant and beliefs about those truths would not be selected for. EDAs, it seems, bear the potential to confine the scope of what David Wiggins has called our "philosophical imagination", that is, our thinking about our abilities to perceive and assess the world and ourselves objectively (Wiggins 2002). As a result, diverging evaluations of Merkel's and Orbán's courses of action would resemble mere opinions or expressions of taste, rather than factual disagreements.

Attempts to salvage the apparent objectivity of morality on non-naturalist realist terms are problematic. Third-factor accounts (Enoch 2010), pleas to sheer epistemic luck (Dworkin 1996), and scientifically questionable by-product hypotheses (Parfit 2011) are problematic because they remain committed to a non-naturalistic metaphysics. The problem of explaining the import of non-natural entities on evolutionary forces remains unsolved.

I argue that advocates of moral objectivity should take a different, more natural route against EDAs. First, I sketch the desiderata for an account of naturalistic moral realism that does justice both to the epistemic pressure exerted by EDAs and to the common-sense understanding of moral objectivity. Explaining morality in reference to emotions is an obvious choice: evolutionary behavioural ecology has long revealed the tremendous functional importance of emotions for human life. Emotions are thought to be essential for cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), altruism (Kitcher 1998), and linked to the origins of (moral) norms (Roeser & Todd 2014). Thus, naturalist realists could provide a straightforward answer to the evolutionary challenge.
However, in the second part I show that the naturalist's answer to EDAs harbours a notorious problem itself, which is to account for the apparent normativity of morality. Following Prinz's (2007) proposal to explicate morality as emotional disposition, for example, gives rise to the following issue: humans have several evident and stable emotional dispositions that we commonly deem immoral, for example to favour members of our in-group over the out-group (cf. Wielenberg 2014). As a result, naturalists might be at pains to admit that, say, Orbán's decision to keep out the asylum-seekers was indeed morally right, given his emotional preferences for members of his in-group.

BASIC EMOTIONS AS EVOLVED STRATEGIC COMMITMENT DEVICES

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Though Adam Smith (1759) highlighted the role of emotions in economic processes, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Elster, 1995, 1998, 2000; Hirschleifer, 1987, 2001; Loewenstein 1996, 2000), research examining affects in the field of economic literature is scant. In recent years, considerations of emotions and their effects on decision making have emerged again with most of the existing work focusing on Frank's game-theoretic framework (Frank, 1987; 1988; 2004; 2006). Frank argues that emotions serve as commitment devices that facilitate agents to make beneficial decisions beyond their narrow self-interest by signaling an individual's behavioral type and by helping to discern these signals in others. He advances a broad evolutionary thesis where emotional responses are inherent to the biological nature of interactants, and thus, they are completely, or to a great extent, resistant to cultural influences.

My goal is to outline the ways emotions influence economic action and to demonstrate how Frank's arguments would have benefited from a link to the burgeoning literature in Basic Emotion Theory (e.g. Ekman, 1992, 1999, 1994; Izard, 1977, 1992; Griffiths, 1997) and cultural evolutionary process. l argue that while Frank has emphasized that emotions are universal products of biological evolution he has paid insufficient attention to local cultural aspects that are driven by collective group interest. Many of the complex emotions that are important for Frank's arguments are intrinsically linked to culturally evolved norms and strategic action is crucially influenced by the cultural environment in which agents are embedded. I propose a novel direction of inquiry that invokes gene-culture co-evolution theory (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) where cultural norms and convention influence emotional predispositions in strategic decision. The result would be a more precise description of emotions as commitment devices in game theoretic and a framework that unifies disconnected fields of research like psychology, biology and economics.

For gene-culture co-evolution theory emotions reflect the influence of both innate and learned processes. An affect program as a whole has an innate hardwired part that specifies the conditions under which it is appropriate to have an emotion and is common in all the members of different cultural groups and a social learning component that is different in each cultural group and creates modifications to the innate program. Both of them are utilized to certain stimuli and constantly interact in order to produce an emotional response. Thus, cultural evolution is tightly linked to the antecedents of emotion episodes and is part of the psychological affect processes that elicit emotions. However, these subtle cultural differences do not necessarily have a specific strategic direction and differ from display and decoding rules that refer to manipulation techniques for strategic purposes. This idea complements both Frank's arguments since both the cultural affect system and the display/decode rules are the loci of cultural influences.

First- and Third-Person Perspective of Ascribing Emotions

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The aim of this paper is to analyze situations in which the self-ascription of an emotional state (e.g. 'I am sad') is incompatible with the corresponding third-person ascription (e.g. 'She is not sad'). I will argue that despite the superficial contradiction in such utterances, it is possible that both the subject and the third-person ascriber are right at the same time.

My central claim is that many cases of incompatibility between first- and third-person ascriptions of emotions are not the result of any epistemological error. I rather believe that such situations arise from the fact that 1) because of their different conversational goals, the speaker and the third-person ascriber may not refer to the same thing while using the same emotive term 2) our linguistic means of grasping emotions are highly deficient, making it impossible to determine which object is a 'proper' referent of a given emotive word.

First I will show the problem and impose restrictions on potential solutions. I will present some important differences between first- and third-person ascriptions of emotions, basing on the neo-expressivist model of self-knowledge developed by Dorit Bar-On. I will give special attention to the difference between the goals of the subject and those of the third-person ascriber. I will also claim that, due to some specific features, emotional states are not fully grasped by the language of folk psychology.

I will show how we implicitly negotiate the truth conditions of emotive words and explain why explicit conflicts between first- and third-person perspectives are relatively rare. I will also analyze how the concept of 'second-person perspective' may be useful for understanding this type of communication situations.

WAS CALLICLES REFUTED?

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My purpose of this essay is to justify Socrates' two refutations of Callicles' hedonism which are displayed in the Gorgias 495e-499b3.

To justify the rarely supported refutations, at first, this essay shall investigate two infrequently inquired analogies invited by Socrates which illustrate the relationship between appetite and pleasure to clarify the main characters of Calliclean hedonism. To explain, based on Callicles' agreements on the analogies in part, it will be argued that the following two arguments mainly consist of his hedonism: (a) pleasure as a constant and immediate filling-up of appetites which coexists with pain, (b) this coexistence is supported by the simultaneity of pre-filling of each container of each appetite in soul and its filling-up.

Next, I shall verify that first Socratic rebuttal, which attacks the statement that pleasure is the good by pointing out the difference of good and evil from pleasure and pain with the respect of coexistence, is powerful enough to nullify Calliclean hedonism. This verification will be performed by both scrutinizing Socrates' rebuttal itself and objecting other commentators' refutations of Socrates. To be specific, by taking into consideration that Socrates' rebuttal reveals that the statement is not compatible with other constituents of Calliclean hedonism, I will advocate Socrates but rebut other scholars who interpret the rebuttal as an attack on hedonism as a whole.

Finally, the second Socratic rebuttal will be investigated. The rebuttal apparently seems to examine whether pleasure and good are the same; however, a careful reading will vindicate that what Socrates examines in this rebuttal is whether Calliclean hedonism, not hedonism as a whole, is compensate with his admiration of traditional virtue which is caused by his love of the public. Thus, I will first clarify his original intention and then verify that the rebuttal is valid considering the intention.

PRÉCIS OF
BETWEEN I AND THOU. A DIALOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE
(FRANKFURT: SUHRKAMP 2015)

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Love, says Martin Buber, is not about each partner having the other as his or her object, love is between the partners. It is dialogical. Lovers share what is important in their emotional and practical life. They live their life in the We-mode.

In the book Zwischen Ich und Du, I distinguish this model of romantic love from two other more popular models, the fusion model and the care model. I defend and develop the dialogue model, working, among other things, with literary material from the late novels of Henry James.

The dialogue model takes up what is most plausible in the other two models: firstly, that love aims at a kind of union (as the fusion model has it), but one that builds upon and celebrates the autonomy of the other; secondly and relatedly, that love includes care for the other's good (as the curative model has it), but mainly to safeguard the other's autonomy as a prerequisite for sharing.

Dialogical lovers share activities like playing music, hiking, or traveling, and affective experiences like being angry or in flow. They share them intrinsically or for their own sake. Sharing is, as Max Scheler explains, to be contrasted with acting and feeling in parallel, mutual contagion (with its extreme form of fusion), and sympathy with or caring for each other. Acting and feeling in parallel is doing or experiencing the same side by side, in the I-mode. Contagion is being causally infected or swayed by what the other feels or does. Sympathy differs from contagion in being directed at the other, but like contagion it is in the I-mode, even when it is reciprocal.

In sharing, the participants follow practical and affective schemes that are essentially schemes for two or more people. Think of waltzing, having a philosophical discussion, or grieving together. In contributing, the participants are directed both to the schemes (of how to waltz, etc.) and to each other, constantly attuning their respective inputs. Each participant understands her inputs as contributions to something we do or feel; accordingly, each feels responsible not only for her own inputs but also for the joint venture. Sharing is in the We-mode.

Sharing has an internal normative fabric. Every participant is required to contribute his share and to respect the autonomy of the other(s). If he does not, he can be reproached for freeriding and domination and thus for undermining "true" sharing. The rules of sharing are "internal" and not "moral." You are bound by the rules of sharing because you are involved in a joint practice. If, for example, you play chess together, you are bound by the rules of chess. The "oughts" of your moves on the chess board are first and foremost not moral oughts. Needless to say, moral rules apply also in chess and in romantic love, as they apply everywhere.

The internal rules of romantic love are maximal compared to the rules of other less intrinsic, less personal, less comprehensive forms of sharing. If a lover in a mature love relationship violates the rules of love not once, by mistake, but again and again, he harms the other and the love that is between them. Even if he professes the best intentions and claims that his inattentive behavior does not express his inner loving attitude, he is not living up to the rules of love and therefore is unloving.

Mature dialogical love has a kind of objectivity that young dialogical love lacks. In young dialogical love, much of the sharing is as yet only intended and thus subjective, not yet fully manifest in actual sharing behavior. This behavior depends also on the willingness of

the other lover and on the success of their common venture. Therefore it is problematic to attribute a “desire” to share without evidence of actual sharing behavior. Dialogical love is complete only where there is this behavior. In this sense, it is, as Martin Buber says, between the lovers and not just in the individuals themselves.

ATONEMENT, REMORSE AND IMPOSSIBLE ETHICAL DEMANDS

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What kind of atonement or forms of atonement can contribute to restoring an ethical political community after political violence or oppression? This paper considers the impossible ethical demands of atonement, in relation to the experience of remorse as described in searing terms by Vladimir Jankélévitch in The Bad Conscience. Jankélévitch argues that remorse is a response to the irreversibility of our temporal experience, and the irrevocability of being unable to undo what we have done. He distinguishes between the action and the act whereby the actions is located in the self, and the act is the deed. Using this distinction, he claims that we can repair the consequences of what we have done, but not undo the action: the action is the imperishable and incurable element of remorse' (2015, 56) I criticise Jankélévitch's view, arguing that even this gloomy prognosis for remorse may be too optimistic, for there are three fundamental problems preventing the overcoming of remorse and repairing the consequences of our acts. One problem is that there may not be subjects who are able to or who wish to receive atonement. Survivors of the atrocity may be few and unwilling to accept any gestures to make up for the past. Second, the wrong may be so extreme that no form of atonement is commensurable. Moreover, there may not be offenders willing to offer atonement, since they may lack remorse or even be triumphant.

SECOND-PERSONAL RELATIONS AS EMOTIONAL CONNECTIONS

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Relating to others second-personally is a fundamental feature of our social lives. According to Stephen Darwall, for instance, these relations are the foundations of our moral duties. Darwall (2006, p. 3) defines the second-person standpoint as the perspective you and I take up from which "we make and acknowledge claims on one another's conduct and will". In this paper, I will argue that relating to another second-personally is not reducible to merely taking up this mutually practical stance with regards to the other. Rather, I will contend that alongside this practical and deontic orientation towards the other, second-person relations also establish a particular kind of emotional sensitivity between parties. This emotional sensitivity has two distinct components: it creates the possibility of sympathy with the other, and makes appropriate a range of reactive attitudes, both in response to the experiences and deeds of the other.

The argument proceeds as follows. I will first give an overview of Stephen Darwall's account of second-personal reasons, emphasising the dependence of this theory on the role of moral reactive attitudes like blame, guilt and indignation of the sort outlined by Strawson (2008).

Second I will make clear that the conception of reactive attitudes that is at play must be a full-blooded conception of reactive attitudes as emotions. If they were to be reduced to propositional form, where, for example, blaming someone would be identical with taking them to be blameworthy – i.e. if the visceral, experiential quality of feeling blame is removed from the notion – then the system of reactive attitudes would be ineffective as a regulatory system on a social body's moral behaviour. Another person merely believing that we are blameworthy (say) would not itself function as even a mild sanction.

This leads to my third claim which is that the efficacy of reactive attitudes as a regulatory system on a social body's moral behaviour requires at least some minimal degree of sympathy between interacting individuals. That is, it is only by being alive to the emotional experience of the other, that one feels the force of their blaming you, or indeed their feeling grateful to, or proud of, you.

I conclude that relating to another person second-personally entails not only taking up a practical stance towards them from which you might give them reasons for action and take reasons for action from them, but that such a practical stance must coincide with an emotional connection in which you sympathise to the other and are prone to respond to their deeds and experiences with appropriate reactive attitudes. This emotional quality of second-person relations has implications for theories of moral obligation. Some theorists, including Darwall himself, think it possible to relate hypothetically to a postulated second-person. However, the emotional interpersonal connection established here will preclude this possibility.

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ON THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS IN REMBRANDT'S ART

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Rembrandt has been characterized as "the Master of the Passions of the Soul". His painting production has always elicited the viewers' strong emotional responses. According to one of his most important patrons, Constantijn Huygens, "Rembrandt aspired to surpass the artists of antiquity and the Italians through the portrayal of the passions to arouse the strongest possible empathy in the viewer". Responses such as the above raise the question regarding why Rembrandt's work has been singled out as the quintessential example of the expression of emotions both during the seventeenth century, as well as in recent times. I will try to approach the issue through two different yet interconnected points of view. First, I will explore the tools and terms through which the question of the expression of emotions in Rembrandt's oeuvre can be approached. Ancient rhetorical topoi, such as by Horace, Quintilian and Cicero, regarding the viewer's empathy were exploited repeatedly by Rembrandt's contemporaries, sometimes close acquaintances, fellow artists, art critics and theorists. In this context, the idea of lifelikeness and of affectuum vivacitas, systematically articulated in the 17th century Netherlands, offers a meaningful tool in order to understand the responses to Rembrandt's depicted emotions. Alongside, ideas stemming from Dutch theater writers and drama theorists regarding the different manners of rendering the emotions, i.e. the representation of strong movement vs. the representation of inner agitations, or the notion of innate talent vs. learnedness provide useful points of view to Rembrandt's representation of emotions. Ekphrases written by Rembrandt's contemporaries, in line with Descartes's and Le Brun's ideas on the "passions of the soul", also shed light on the issue. Secondly, I will approach the question by addressing certain stylistic and compositional solutions that Rembrandt suggested which can also be tied to current notions about lifelikeness and the beholder's empathy. In this respect, I will discuss especially scenes of sudden apparition, revelation, miracles and shock, as well as different versions of the same subject which Rembrandt produced, in which he strove for certain narrative results and for certain emotive responses on the beholder's part. Foremost among Rembrandt's aesthetic choices is his handling of light and of paint which accounts for a great deal of unfavorable criticism to his work during the 17th century. I would like to suggest that this handling of light and paint serves as Rembrandt's most important emotive vehicle and furthermore introduces us to the idea of wonder and the concept of the sublime in terms of which his depiction of emotions may be understood. Although there is no systematic discourse on the sublime in the 17th-century Netherlandish artistic or literary theory, I will trace certain responses to Rembrandt's work and certain ideas from his milieu that evidence some familiarity with the Longinian sublime, notably by Franciscus Junius. In this respect, I will discuss Rembrandt's most typical aesthetic idioms, not as symptoms of lifelikeness, but as means that carry away the beholder with astonishment, exaltation, awe, the effects of the sublime.

STRAWSON, P.F. 2008. FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS. LONDON: ROUTLEDGETHE BREAK-UP CHECK: TESTING THEORIES OF ROMANTIC LOVE IN RELATIONSHIP TERMINATIONS

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Romantic love is considered part of a good life. Most people studying the subject agree on this, and even the most reductionist neuropsychologist would admit that being part of a loving couple at some point of one's life is a chased element in a life worth living and a potential source of happiness. However, few philosophers pay attention to what happens during relationships break-ups (frequently experienced as the opposite to the good life). Undesired terminations can be among the most distressing emotional experiences in a human life, and are usually experienced as a grieving process. I will look at this process after a break-up and answer the crucial question: what does it mean to get over someone?

Starting with a general definition and a taxonomy of terminations, I will focus on undesired break-ups in order to find which is the main loss that is grieved after they occur. There are three main losses that are grieved after a break-up: the loss of well-being, the loss of an imagined future and a shared past and the loss of part of one's identity. These three 'big losses' are the ones I consider can be generalised to most healthy loving partnerships. Not surprisingly, they match with three different theoretical possibilities on the nature of romantic love, which define it exclusively in one of those terms. The debate currently turns around pinning down precisely which one of these is the essential core of romantic love, while the other ones are mere occurrences. I will argue that when we look at relationships from the perspective of the ending, the first two theories are found wanting in different ways. I will conclude that it is the loss of a part of one's identity and subsequent redefinition of the self, and it is this unwelcome redefinition of one's own identity against one's wishes, which articulates the grieving process. I will then respond briefly to the question on the rationality of this grief and answer to some objections, to finish by arguing that in the light of my conclusions the shaping of the identity within a loving relationship -something that is purely self-regarding- has to be explored as one of the main features of romantic love. Hence, my aim in this paper is two-fold. On one hand, it is a rare exploration of the phenomenology and nature of terminations, and on the other it offers a further argument of support for philosophers that define love in terms of identity building.

AFFECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Some philosophers argue that moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? In _Consciousness and Moral Responsibility_ (2014), Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is not necessary for moral responsibility. He appeals to philosophical zombies, who are functionally identical to "normal" human beings but lack phenomenal consciousness. He argues that:

since zombies are functional duplicates of us, there is nothing we can do that they can't. They are able to perform morally significant actions just as we are. They are able to do so after due deliberation. They are able to exercise control over their actions. Indeed, they seem capable of fulfilling almost any proposed sufficient conditions of moral responsibility. Since this seems… to be the case, it also seems as though it cannot be phenomenal consciousness that is required for moral responsibility. (2014, 28)

Levy concludes that access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is the only type of consciousness necessary for moral responsibility.

Levy's argument, however, is question-begging. Specifically, it begs the question against the broad class of views inspired by Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (1962), according to which being a morally responsible agent essentially involves the capacity to feel a range of moral emotions—the "reactive attitudes"—and to be concerned with the qualitative, moral-emotional experiences of others. Phenomenal consciousness includes these *affect-laden* experiences: what it's like to feel, for example, smoldering resentment when someone expresses ill will toward you, or to suffer the sting of another's blame.

Thus, if you are a Strawsonian of any stripe (as I am), then you are likely committed to a) affirming that phenomenal consciousness is essential to moral responsibility and therefore b) denying that zombies, despite their capacities for deliberation and self-control, are capable of being morally responsible agents. Zombies can have perfect cognitive access to what they are doing, and why they are doing it, but ex hypothesi they cannot actually *feel* good will, gratitude, resentment, etc. There is therefore something "we can do that they can't," which makes it the case that they cannot, strictly speaking, "perform morally significant actions"—or so a Strawsonian would argue.

Of course, if actually faced with individuals functionally identical to "normal" human beings, it would be extremely difficult to withhold our normal reactions toward them. It would, in fact, be extremely difficult to believe that they were zombies. They would seem in all outer respects to be ordinary participants in the moral community. But if we did learn that certain individuals were zombies, we would likely shift from the "participant" to the "objective" stance, and think of them more as "objects of social policy… to be managed" (Strawson 1962), but not to be (wholeheartedly) resented. We might even be obliged to do so.

EMOTIONAL DEPTH AND SELF WITHIN A SITUATED APPROACH TO EMOTIONS

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The paper explores how the Situated Approach to Emotions can foster a better understanding of emotional depth. Reflection about emotional depth is rarely the focus of philosophical reflection. In 1993 in her book Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A study of Sensitive Space, Cataldi would write, that, 'Despite our implicit understanding of the phenomenon of emotional depth, there is next to no philosophical literature devoted to the topic' (Cataldi 1993, 1) pointing out two exceptions: Max Scheler's discussion of the stratification of emotional life in Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values and John Dewey's discussion of the deepening of emotional feeling in his 1887 volume on Psychology. More than twenty years later we can add to this short list Cataldi's own book and Pugmire's 2005 book entitled Sound Sentiments.

The first part puts forward what has been said about emotional depth pointing out different ways to grasp the notion of emotional depth. The connection established by Pugmire (2005) about depth of emotion and excellence of character indicates that the crucial connection of emotional depth to self-identity relies on the ability of emotional depth to be transformative and maintain transformation. In the second part, the paper examines the way depth can better be understood within a narrative, because it provides a structure to describe how persons distinguish deep and shallow in various situations both in the events as in the selves within the situated whole. The paper puts forward some of the insightful gain of holding a situated approach to emotions, identifying some of the various ways in which emotional depth is present in a situation. Finally, the paper explores how emotional depth provides a further understanding of emotional norms and insights into shared emotions.

EMOTION, REASON-RESPONSIVENESS, AND AUTONOMY

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Recent philosophical attempts at showing that emotions are importantly related to personal autonomy have mostly focused on their role in autonomous agency (cf. e.g. Shoemaker 2003; Tappolet 2006; 2014). In this paper, I argue for a much tighter connection between emotion and autonomy. I take as my starting point the fact, which has only recently been acknowledged in the literature (cf. e.g. Mulligan 2010; Deonna & Teroni 2012, ch. 6), that emotions are had for reasons, which can be normative reasons to have them. Elaborating on the idea of emotional reason-responsiveness I develop a view according to which emotions themselves, rather than actions based on them, can be expressions of personal autonomy in the (very broadly) Kantian sense of governing our lives in conformity with normative constraints of which we are themselves the source. More specifically, I argue that emotions are, by conceptual necessity, responses to purported exemplifications of particular value properties (known as their 'formal objects'), where this notion is understood disjunctively: either an emotion responds to the actual exemplification of its formal object, in which case it is had for a normative reason to have that emotion, or to its mere purported exemplification, in which case it is had for what merely purports to be a normative reason to have it. As I explicate the notion of responsiveness, in line with von Hildebrand (1916; 1953, ch. 17), emotions constitute a form of non-voluntary comportment, which, when conforming to the first disjunct, constitutes a way of subjecting oneself to the authority of a normative reason. As I understand subjection to the authority of a normative reason in these cases, it does not require the intellectual approval of normative reasons as such but a non-intellectual de re awareness of value, which may conflict with one's judgment as to what one has reason to feel. Considering whether such emotional responses to value are intelligible as expressions of autonomy, I argue that emotional value response are properly intelligible as instances of subjection to a normative constraint imposed by ourselves only when responsive to a particular type of value. Analyzing formal objects as relational properties which embody the significance of objects and events with respect to an individual's relatively stable cares and concerns, I suggest that the notion of self-governance only gets a proper grip in cases the care(s) in question are constitutive of what is frequently called an individual's 'practical identity' (cf. Korsgaard 1996) or her normative self-conception. It is only when responsive to significance relative to aspects of our practical identity that we ourselves are intelligible as the source of the normative authority to which we emotionally subject ourselves. I finally defend my account against the objection that emotions cannot be expressions of autonomy since autonomy requires voluntary control, but emotions cannot be voluntarily guided, by drawing a distinction between voluntary control and autonomy and situate my account with respect to the distinction between reason-responsive and care-based accounts of autonomy as well as Tappolet's (2014) specific attempt at reconciling the two.

SOLIDARITY IN DIALOGUE?

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In her seminal book *Between I and Thou*, Angelika Krebs argues for a rather demanding dialogical model of love. In dialogical love, partners negotiate a tension between an experience of joint action and the orientation towards the autonomy of the loved partner; and they do so by not only caring for one another, but by caring for one another's autonomy as a prerequisite for continuous sharing. Dialogical love aims not at merely retaining the internal normative fabric of a loving relation, but at *developing* the sharing of experiences and activities. Mere continuous joint action is not enough; it may even, unbeknownst to the participants, account for harmful, demeaning, restrictive ways of life. In contrast, dialogical love contains a normative orientation towards goodness: A dialogically shared life better facilitates the lovers' happiness because it conforms to their autonomy.

Although solidarity is not central to Krebs's account – it appears as a member of a family of emotions of affinity in groups larger than typical 'bipolar' loving relationships – I want to suggest that the understanding of "solidarity", seen as a prime example of a political emotion associated with strong normative claims and a complicated history of charged usages, may benefit from Krebs's analysis of love. Solidarity, I propose, denotes an emotional affinity that differs from mere loyalty on the one hand, and from universalist moral obligation on the other hand. Solidarity and loyalty seem both "partial", "local" and "reflective": they are directed at a fellow member of a We-group, that is: a group sharing a common, intrinsic good, typically (but not necessarily!) in a situation where that fellow member is in need (of help or assistance). But while a motivation to behave loyal may be oriented merely by the group's *internal* normative fabric (e.g. there is, in a sense, loyalty among thugs), without taking the rationality and validity of the idea of the shared good into account, "solidarity" seems to contain precisely this normatively reflective component. In solidary affinity, the internal normative fabric of the group is itself object of the group member's interactions.

Solidarity, on the other hand, does not directly equate to morality. Like fraternity, solidarity has been used to try and ground moral obligation's universality, as in the trope of a "solidarity towards mankind" to account for the seemingly lacking motivational force of morality. But solidarity is partial, and even partisan; it requires, as an emotion, a concrete addressee; it is a reactive attitude. But, again unlike loyalty, solidarity is oriented vicariously, or by mediation, towards an impersonal or general good. You need not consider morality in loyal action, for it may be oriented solely towards a We-group's internal good. But you cannot be solidary independent of moral considerations. Solidarity is partial, but in the light of universalist considerations. This accounts for the tension present in many acts and attitudes of solidarity: they consider their partisan association with one group (against another) as instrumental for the well-being not only of the associate group's members, but the well-being of all; and where this orientation towards overcoming partiality is missing, solidarity *towards* and loyalty *within* a We-group become indistinguishable.

Precisely this distinction is at work in Angelika Krebs's account of dialogue as a shared activity between equal partners, which is oriented towards not merely conserving the internal normative fabric of the participant's shared activity, but to develop this fabric in the light of rational intercourse; it is central, too, to her distinction between a misplaced loyalty towards one's lover, and a form of loyalty that cherishes her as autonomous participant in our shared life project (consider the parallel between misplaced loyalty to one's partner, and misplaced loyalty to one's party, for example when one feels compelled

to oblige their needs even when one judges them to be detrimental to their, and thus our shared, well-being). There is, it seems to me, solidarity active in dialogical love, because solidarity does play a role in dialogue's norm of goodness. This helps to understand why it became tempting to liken emotional affinity in political groups to "brotherly love", and why they should be kept apart: For in political solidarity, the orientation towards my comrades' well-being ultimately terminates in a justificatory universal picture of a just society; in ("profound") love, solidary dialogue is, ultimately, only the vehicle for the partners' shared happiness.

Is It Possible to Reject a Distinction between Cognition and Emotion?

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Philosophical discussions about the nature of emotion were for long time characterized by a dichotomy between reason and emotion, where emotions are understood as a disruptive element of mind. In past few decades, this view has been attacked by new approaches in both cognitive sciences and philosophy which suggest that it is no longer possible to separate these two aspects of human mind and see emotion in that way. Although it seems that these approaches take very strong place in scientific apprehension of relationship between reason and emotion, we can observe that a legacy of the dichotomy between reason and emotion still persists in the contemporary science of mind. In my opinion, this legacy is hidden in conceptual dichotomy between "affective" and "cognitive"

However, there is remarkable evidence from recent work in cognitive science, neuroscience and philosophy, which suggests that emotion and therefore affective part of human mind, plays various roles in cognition, or at least in some cognitive abilities. In my presentation I will introduce the role of emotion in two abilities, which are allegedly acknowledged as cognitive: selective attention and facial recognition. Recently, it has been shown that in both abilities, emotions play a crucial role for agent's cognitive performance and its efficiency (Megill, 2014; Attar and Muller, 2012; Lang, 2007; Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998; etc.). These two abilities demonstrate that strict distinction between concept of emotion and cognition could be misleading for contemporary science of mind.

Thus it seems plausible to ask the question: Is it still possible to hold the dichotomy between affective and cognitive part of human mind or should we abandon this separation because it is based on false assumptions? Drawing on recent work concerning the role of emotion in cognition, I would like to sketch that if we move beyond this dichotomy both cognitive science and philosophy (as well as AI or political science) could probably make remarkable progress in their field.

In particular, I will argue that prejudices about differentiation between cognition and emotion bring about a failure to formulate satisfying theory of human mind. This failure is caused by misapprehension of human phenomenal coupling to environment (Slaby,, 2014). Agent's phenomenal coupling to environment give rise to agent's sense-making of his own "lifeworld" (Husserl, 1936) which is dependent on both cognition and emotion. Because of this emotional-cognitive continual sense-making it is no longer possible to hold the distinction between cognition and emotion. Distinction of this sort is nothing more than legacy of effort to objectify lifeworld. Misapprehension of this matter have caused that distinction between emotion and cognition still plays a role in contemporary science of mind.

GRATITUDE

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In "Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology", Wittgenstein writes: "Neither is the newborn child capable of being malicious, friendly, or thankful. Thankfulness is only possible if there is already a complicated pattern of behaviour." Wittgenstein's examples open up the wide field of virtues and vices. They can be seen as complicated behaviour, or as learned, shaped emotions.

The connection of virtues and emotions was very clearly present in Aquinas. According to an old tradition (Aristotle, Plutarch), the passions are the material out of which (some) virtues are made. More generally Aquinas holds: the more perfect a virtue is, the greater passion it causes. The complicated sequence of behaviour – or emotion – in the case of gratitude is the following: you are in need, you ask someone for help, she has fulfilled your request, you know it, and now you are expected to give an – at least emotional – answer. It is important to see that for Aquinas (quoting Seneca), the link between the giver and the receiver is not so much the material benefit, but the affectus with which the benefit was given; consequently the recompensation (the thankfulness) lies also in the corresponding affectus of the receiver. There is a somehow democratic aspect in this: even a poor person who has only little to give can do this in an obliging manner, and the poor who receives a great benefit can be really thankful even without the possibility of material recompensation.

The lack of gratitude is ingratitude. There is no better way of illustrating ingratitude than with the fairy tale of "The Fisherman and his Wife". This story also sheds some light on the structure of an action. An action can be seen as having come to an end when the acting person is satisfied with the outcome. A very old echo of this may be found in the Bible "and He saw that it was good" after every single act of creation – see e.g. Gen 1,21: "And God created whales, and every living creature … and God saw that it was good." Let us presume God had seen that it was not good: in this case, his action of creating wouldn't really have come to an end and it wouldn't be a completed action. Yet, to say "it is good" is a sort of emotional statement: an action is finished when the actor is pleased with it. This could be shown with everyday examples as well as with the work of the artist: only with the emotional-creative act of saying "now it is finished", her work is really finished.

I am afraid that this substantial part of an action is overlooked in the current theories of action (also in the theory of "basic actions" by Arthur C. Danto). The best illustration of an "action-without-end-because-lacking-of-emotional-assent", and also an example of ingratitude, is the fairy tale mentioned above. The analysis of gratitude and ingratitude is not a mere exercise of study of emotions: without gratitude, there will never be happiness.

EMERGENT EMOTION

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I argue that emotion is an ontologically emergent sui generis faculty. I argue that emotion meets both of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ontological emergence. These are, (i) that emotion necessarily has constituent parts to which it cannot be reduced, and (ii) that emotion has a causal effect on its constituent parts (i.e. emotion demonstrates downward causation).

I argue that emotion meets the first necessary condition for ontological emergence. I argue that emotion is partly cognitive, partly constituted by feelings and partly perceptual. 1) I argue that both the type and the intensity of an emotion supervene on cognitive factors. But emotion cannot be reduced to cognition because emotion has at least one property not held by cognition; emotions are valenced and cognitions are not. Thus emotion is partly cognitive, but it cannot be reduced to cognition. 2) I argue that the phenomenal properties of emotion are determined by bodily feelings, thus emotion necessarily requires feelings. But emotion cannot be reduced to feelings because emotion has rational properties not held by bodily feelings. Thus emotion has feeling parts, but it cannot be reduced to feelings. 3) I argue that the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects, and hence emotion necessarily requires perception. But emotion cannot be reduced to perception because emotion has second orders (as evidenced by metaemotion) and perception does not. Emotion is partly perceptual, but it cannot be reduced to its perceptual parts. Thus emotion meets the first necessary condition for ontological emergence; emotion has constituent parts to which it cannot be reduced.

I go on to argue that emotion has a causal effect on its cognitive, feeling and perceptual parts. 4) Emotion has a causal effect on cognition; emotion causally affects decision-making, cognitive bias, and self-deception. 5) Emotion has a causal effect on feelings, broadly construed; emotion is a causal factor in long term health. Finally, 6) emotion has a causal effect on perception; the selectivity of perception is causally affected by emotion. Thus emotion meets the second necessary condition for ontological emergence. Emotion has a causal effect on its constituent parts; i.e. emotion demonstrates downward causation.

Emotion meets the two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ontological emergence: (i) emotion has composite parts to which it cannot be reduced, and (ii) emotion has a causal effect on its composite parts. Thus emotion is ontologically emergent. Being ontologically emergent, emotion is sui generis. As ontologically emergent and sui generis, emotion is best characterised as a faculty rather than merely as a response to objects and events. Thus emotion is an ontologically emergent sui generis faculty.

UNDERSTANDING DUALISM THROUGH EMOTION. DESCARTES, SPINOZA, SARTRE.

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This paper will show that a proper understanding of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents (Descartes), opponents (Spinoza), or had a somewhat ambiguous status (Sartre), were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday lives; dualism is a theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms––one of nature and one of consciousness––that are always already entwined in experiences like emotion.

First of all, it is well-known that Descartes was a dualist. Also well-known is Princess Elisabeth's challenge on this issue and how Descartes responded––completely insufficiently for most––with his Les passions de l'âme. I will show that this book as been at best undervalued, at worst completely misunderstand; it was never intended to dispel the supposed "problem" of dualism when it comes to everyday life. Indeed, Descartes never found this to be a problem. The book, on the contrary, is a scientific investigation into our emotions (i.e. passions), and demonstrates our dual––but not "dualistic"–– nature.

Such an account remained unsatisfactory for Spinoza. Indeed, Spinoza's focus on passion this time explains our monistic being––a "monistic" being however, that contains two essential "attributes", namely Descartes's extension and thought. In this manner, it is questionable how antagonistic Spinoza's thought ultimately is to Descartes's; perhaps the former pushed the latter's logic to its full limits, where an essential dual nature between matter and thought, bound through our emotions, is prevalent once again.

Sartre opens L'être et le néant with a discussion of dualism, claiming that philosophy has been "embarrassed" by the issue for centuries. Such embarrassment can be resolved through a "monism of the phenomenon", where emotion, once again, has a central place. Such a "monism" threatens to lead to another dualism however, between brute nature (being-in-itself) and spontaneous consciousness (being-for-itself). A proper situation of Sartre's earlier account of emotion will here show that this is another formulation of the dual nature of human reality, which is also largely in line with the main thrust of Descartes's and Spinoza's thought.

In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday level. Dualism is, however, an essential tool that must be used if one is to give a thoroughgoing account of human nature from a theoretical standpoint, where avoiding conflations between immediate and reflective experiences, as well as first-person and third-person standpoints, is crucial. In this manner, one needs to be aware not only of our dual nature, but also of our dual (i.e. scientific and phenomenological) ways of tackling theoretical problems. Hereby, one may give a proper, dynamic account of human emotion, one that escapes the mechanisation that so often results through a conflation of such categories and methods.

AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN DEPRESSION AND SCHIZOPHRENIA

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It has been argued that interpersonal relationships play an essential role for the formation of beliefs and emotion regulation and it has been suggested that a disruption of a basic attitude of trust by traumatic experiences is associated with delusional thought in schizophrenia (Ratcliffe 2015). What is experienced in psychosis is usually described as an alienation from the common and shared world, which can trigger feelings of loneliness and disconnectedness and tendencies towards withdrawal and isolation from social interactions. Moreover, individuals suffering from schizophrenia report of diminishment of affective experience in general. A similar trend towards a failure to participate in social interactions and share a common affective atmosphere has been observed in Moebius syndrome as well (Krueger and Henriksen forthcoming) where reports indicate a diminishment in the intensity and variety of affective experiences and a felt alienation from the social domain. Thus, it can be argued that interpersonal relationships play an essential role in affective experience and the experience of shared reality by providing it with a background of sharing a common world and with a regulatory mechanism for affective states and processes.

A further condition, which is most notably associated with changes in affective experience and a disruption of social interactions, is depression. First-person testimonies describe experiences of alienation and loneliness and tendencies towards avoidance of social interactions. In some cases, these are accompanied by a lack of affective experience usually felt as emptiness or nothingness. In the current paper, I will examine the relationship between affective experience and interpersonal relationships in depression and compare and contrast it to the case of schizophrenia. Ratcliffe (2015) has argued that trauma grounds a loss of trust in others, which culminates in an alienation from a common world and reality and is associated with delusional thought in schizophrenia. Depression, similarly, is frequently related to traumatic experiences but is rarely accompanied by delusions and hallucinations. It is categorized as an affective disorder and is characterized by feelings of guilt and diminished self-worth, lack of interest and motivation, and anxiety among others. By deploying first-person reports by depressed individuals, I will focus on the mutual impact of interpersonal relations and alienation in depression and suggest that even though the disruptions in it are similar to cases of schizophrenia, these might differ in significant respects as exemplified by the symptoms accompanying it. My aim is to identify such differences and explicate how they relate to changes in reflective experience associated with the two conditions. The commonalities and differences in underlying disturbances and characteristic experiences in depression and schizophrenia might, moreover, suggest a reconsideration of their categorization as a disorder, respectively, of affect and of the self.

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THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER OF EMOTION

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It seems obvious that different types of emotion such as anger, fear, happiness, etc., have distinctive phenomenal feels or qualitative characters (EQCs). This qualitative character appears to be part of the reason we care so much about our emotions, and seems at least sometimes to serve as the basis of our discrimination among emotion types. William James's (1884) account of emotions seems to have been right in claiming that emotions have a special experienced quality that perception lacks. However, the Schacter-Singer (1962) results, and others like them, seem to show that emotion types could not have EQCs that track them. In this paper I argue that although the Schacter-Singer results do suggest that EQC does not track types of bodily profile, this not enough to show that emotion types do not have EQC. I will then sketch an account of EQC that is not vulnerable to the Schacter-Singer findings.

The Schacter-Singer findings seem to show that the bodily profile for emotion types is largely the same. So, one might suppose, (1) the EQC could not track bodily profile types, and so could never be the basis of our discrimination among emotion types. However, (1) assumes that (2) the only way qualitative character could track emotion types is by tracking types of bodily profile. By drawing an analogy with the discriminative role of qualitative character in perception and interoception in David Rosenthal's (2005) quality-space theory, I argue that (2) depends in turn on the assumption (3) that differences among bodily profiles are crucial to the overall function of an emotion. Since the Schacter-Singer findings are incompatible with (3), they cannot be used to suggest that EQCs couldn't track differences among types of emotion.

I argue that the distinctive qualitative character of an emotion type tracks something that is importantly different than the kind of thing tracked by the qualitative character of a perceptual or interoceptive state. When I am angry, the qualitative character of my emotional state is not tracking a property out in the world such as the perceptible property of blue or the interoceptive property of an empty stomach, but rather a property of my mental state, which is crucial to the function of emotion. So, I propose that the EQC of an emotion type tracks the responses (actions and thoughts) I am inclined to have in this kind of situation. I argue that this mental state property came to be tracked by qualitative character because of the special motivational power qualitative character has in our mental economy.

This proposal avoids the problems posed by the Schacter-Singer findings, while preserving our intuition that types of emotion have distinct qualitative character. I will suggest that it also explanatorily powerful when it comes to explaining our judgments of emotion in art, by appealing to isomorphisms between the qualitative characters of emotion and that of aesthetic experience.

STIRRING EMOTION: THE PLACE OF ENTHUSIASM IN HATRED FOR DEMOCRACY

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This paper explores the competing hatreds diagnosed in Ranciere's "Hatred for Democracy," contrasting the existentialist difference between hatred "of" and hatred "for" democracy. I read Ranciere as attempting to develop a hatred that works for democratic rule, holding open a space of rule that fights against any other justified (natural or inherited) basis for rule, including the "rule of the old," the "rule of the wise," the "rule of the wealthy," etc. I argue that this "holding open" results from an enthusiasm for the anarchic, which itself begins as a sort of hatred. I contrast such enthusiasm, which resolves the "hatred for" democracy, with the self-preserving "hatred of" democracy, through a critical analysis of the islamophobia revealed in events following the Charlie Hebdo shooting on January 7th, 2015 in Paris, France.

EMOTIONS AND RATIONALITY REVISITED: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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One of the perennial disputes in the theory of emotions is about how we should characterize the relation between emotion and rationality. The standard view today is that emotions constitute intelligent appraisals of the world and contribute positively to human rationality; they are not obstacles to reason but reason's allies. Many emotions have some basis in biology and have adaptive functions. They contain useful information, they affect salience and memory, they facilitate fast decisions and appropriate action. Reason tells us the facts of the situation, but it takes emotion to turn the cold facts into something that really matters to us and moves us. Emotions are the stuff of life.

This new 'pro-emotion consensus' (Jones 2006) argues in favour of a close interconnection between practical rationality and emotion. It is replacing a long tradition in philosophy, ranging from the ancient Stoics to Paul Ricoeur, that regards the passions as distractions from the task of conforming our wills to moral principle. The central objective of moral philosophers like Seneca for example was to understand the many ways in which the passions can be 'outlaw emotions' that result in moral mistakes, cognitive conflicts, and unhappiness.

In my paper I argue that there are good reasons to support today's 'pro-emotion position', but that there is a danger that the new consensus will obscure the fact that in daily life experience quite some emotions ARE irrational, self-deceptive, distorting our view, engaging us in wishful thinking, leading to behavior that is not just dysfunctional but immoral and self-destructive. An adequate philosophy of emotion should provide an account of how this emotionally motivated irrationality is possible.

I will show that recent theories that identify emotions with judgments or evaluations fail to explain the real nature of emotional irrationality and self-deception. Perceptual views are not satisfying either. Both views fall short of explaining the main characteristics of emotionally motivated irrationality and self-deception: the specific role of the self and of the 'lived body' in emotion experience, the intimate connection with desire, action and agency. I will demonstrate that a more phenomenological approach is needed to account for these characteristics.

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ECONOMY/AFFECT
AFFECT ECONOMY AND ITS LIMITS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF MICHEL FOUCAULT

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Neoliberalism is a current form of governmentality – i.e. the art of government referring both to the governing of others as well as also to self-government – which expands the subject status of 'homo economicus' to include all areas of life. It implies a 'project of normalization' and the domestication of passions. "Neoliberalism, according to Foucault, extends the process of making economic activity a general matrix of social and political relations, but it takes as its focus not exchange but competition (Foucault, 2008: 12). What the two forms of liberalism, the "classical" and "neo" share, according to Foucault, is a general idea of "homo economicus", that is, the way in which they place a particular "anthropology" of man as an economic subject at the basis of politics." (Binkley/Capetillo 2009: 4) This also, to an equal extent, relates to control of our own affects. Foucault's fundamental understanding of affectivity should be viewed as being based upon the supposition that it is constituted, without, however, the individual's exertion of influence being underestimated. Within the context of specific affects and emotions Foucault explores rage, anger, sensibility and intolerance in more detail; all of which are particularly subject to rational control. It becomes apparent that Foucault presupposes the possibility of discursive and dispositive shaping of these affects, while simultaneously seeing in them – similarly to desire – a potential for obduracy. He accentuates the freedom of self-creation in order to make social changes conceivable, thus siting issues of physicality, emotionality and desire in a societal/political dimension. Rational explanations can lose their power to convince and the appeasement of affects may fail. Rationality, according to Foucault, also means placation; irrationality thus facilitates transgressions and transformations. In Foucault's work rationality and affects are of critical significance in the formation of the self and society as well as in their reshaping. It is here in particular, for Foucault, that literature, as a counter-discourse and means of self-shaping within the scope of its aesthetic or the ethics of the self, plays a major role. Philosophy in an altered form can, and should, also influence the shaping of life as defined by the philosophical life form 'ethos'. Foucault's referencing of Bataille, de Sade, Artaud, Roussel, Baudelaire, etc. should, in this context, be examined with regard to its specific significance, its function and its position within the general context. What role does the link between affect and economy play in this and which limits of affect economy become apparent?

FEELING NOTHING: THE EXPERIENCE OF EMOTIONAL ABSENCE

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Philosophers of perception have attempted to catalogue varieties of experiences of absence – arguing, for instance, that subjects are able to see privations such as holes and shadows; hear episodes of silence; and smell odour-free air. The aim is to show that conscious experiences need not always be of 'positives', but can instead sometimes be objectless. Moreover, instances of absence perception are to be distinguished from episodes in which there is no experience at all; or where the agent simply comes to believe that some feature is absent.

In this paper, I argue that emotional experience need not always be of 'positives', but can be of absences. That is, an emotional experience is not always one of fear, anxiety, surprise, joy, and so forth: sometimes, it is of the absence of one or all of these.

As in the perceptual case, to show this we need to establish that putative examples of emotional absence experience can be demarcated, firstly, from episodes in which the agent simply has no emotional experience at all and, secondly, from cases where the subject simply comes to judge that she lacks an emotion. If either of these alternatives were the case, then they wouldn't be genuine examples of the conscious experience of absence.

To validate the claim that there are conscious experiences during which we are aware of emotional-absences, then, I identify a class of psychological states that share many of the features that define emotional experience – functional, epistemic, and phenomenological – but which do not involve the presence of any particular emotion type. Experiences of the absence of emotion, I suggest, can have a distinctive qualitative character; can drive behaviour and attention in distinctive ways; and play a distinctive epistemic role in teaching us about ourselves and our place in the world.

PROCESSING EMOTIONS

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This paper addresses questions that arise when considering what sort of approach to take to inquiries about the ontology of emotions, and draws a distinction between emotions as episodic entities and emotions as processes. In responding to questions about what emotions are, the prevailing methodology in philosophy is to consider emotions as reducible mental entities, such as perceptions, feelings, judgements, evaluations, and so on. This is quite satisfactory as a scientific approach to gaining an increased understanding of the mental and physiological complexities and experiences we call “emotion”. An “entity”-centered approach picks out investigable states such as the perceptions that may be associated with emotions, for example. But a reductionistic empirical convenience that suits the practical demands of the cognitive sciences is ill-conceived as a philosophical approach, all the more so when it delivers the metaphysical claims that emotions *are* these entities – that emotions are perceptions, or that they are merely feelings, and so on. The entity accounts too often fail to adequately individuate emotions from other mental states or they have very limited success in capturing the many dimensions of emotional experience, notably unconscious states.

In response to various philosophical troubles and to the difficulties that entity-based accounts face in capturing anomalous emotional experiences, this paper offers a model of emotions as processes individuated by their component affects and construed in terms of a narrativized causal history. It gives a rationale for how, in methodological terms, emotions can be most informatively examined if their putatively central role in human functioning is to be taken seriously. To argue this case, the process account is compared to other prominent theories of the emotions, and the oft-conflated terms "emotion", "feeling" and "affect" are disambiguated. An emphasis on the processual, and sometimes voluntary, character of emotion has particular implications for self-knowledge and for how we evaluate emotions, and the paper concludes with reflections on the role emotional processes play in the narrativized construction of a self and in our understanding of others.

THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE

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Surprise occupies a rather odd place in emotion-theory, currently and perhaps even more so historically. It makes the list of "basic", pancultural "affect program" emotions for Paul Ekman, for empirical reasons. It is viewed as a, if not the, fundamental emotion by Descartes, on largely conceptual grounds, while occupying a more contested place in Spinoza's map of the emotions, in the form of "admiratio" (wonder).

It has been linked with – and taxonomically grouped with – "primitive" non-cognitive phenomena such as the startle response, and on the other hand connected with highly abstract intellectual and aesthetic emotions (wonder, interest, curiosity) whose physical manifestations are more elusive. It has little to no presence in the emotion-theory of ancient philosophy and a contestable one in medieval philosophy, but its current place as a basic emotion goes back at least to works on the physiology of emotion such as Duchennes'.

What should we make of these inconsistencies, and what do they mean for surprise itself and for emotion-theory? What could we learn about emotions in general, and our ways of understanding them, from the question of whether surprise is an emotion?

An initial explanation of why surprise is not always included among the emotions is that it is anomalous along two key dimensions we usually apply to emotions, intensity on the one hand, and a pro- to con-attitude scale on the other. Surprise can be pleasant or unpleasant, or a mix of the two, but it need not be either, and is often at its most intense before we begin to determine whether the surprising phenomenon is a good or bad thing.

In this way, treatments of surprise may serve as an indicator of how far a particular emotion-theory is beholden to an analysis of valence as a "boo-hooray" phenomenon. The inclusion of surprise may (if otherwise warranted) not just give us a better understanding of emotions, and of surprise as an emotion, but also help allow a focus on aspects of emotional experience that go beyond the pro/con-attitude framework, allowing a greater richness of understanding.

Another dimension along which surprise is anomalous is that while most other types of emotion tend to feature more heavily as "standing" emotions, surprise is typically of shorter duration and less likely to be re-evoked by the same phenomena – memory and a width of experience and understanding will tend, over time, to limit the kinds of things that will surprise us. But in this respect, too, the inclusion of surprise as an emotion (if warranted in itself) may help to broaden our understanding of the historicity of emotions. The connection between surprise and attention also serves to highlight the role of emotions in orienting ourselves in the world beyond "boo-hooraying" at it.

THE EPISTEMIC RELEVANCE OF EMOTIONS IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

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Emotional reactions to a political issue, event, or character may convey a certain kind of information to the subject experiencing those emotions; more specifically, emotions may inform on the evaluative properties of those political objects. The present paper intends to discuss whether the apprehension of these properties in a political context may be relevant from an epistemological perspective. The central question is: can emotions experienced in relation to political objects contribute to the justification, knowledge and understanding of the evaluative properties of those objects?

Experimental studies will be taken into account in order to fuel and frame a solid philosophical account. Empirical results about the effects of emotional reactions on the formation of political opinions will be considered first, since they appear to confirm the presence of emotions in the epistemic landscape: emotions seem to interact with other mental states and to influence the content and the strength of individual beliefs.

In order to sustain that emotions have the epistemic capacity to generate and justify evaluative beliefs, a perceptual account of emotions has been advanced, conceiving them in the same way as perceptions, that is, as perceptual experiences of value. Against this account, it has been objected that emotional experiences cannot actually provide reasons to justify beliefs on the evaluative properties of their objects, since they are themselves responses to reasons. The present paper will extend this debate to the political framework, by investigating the epistemic features of those emotions, whose intentional object has political significance.

Further empirical studies will be examined, which assess the decisive contribution of emotional reactions to political sophistication, as well as to the formation, recognition and application of political values. A positive epistemic intervention of emotions in the political discourse will be identified among contemporary political circumstances, such as the refugee crisis. In this case, for example, the occurrence of empathetic reactions towards the victims may provide information on the profound suffering of these human beings; these emotional reactions may consequently bring about a more thorough understating of their condition and may foster the appeal to values such as solidarity. This, in turn, may shape beliefs on the appropriate political evaluations and interventions, therefore contributing to the achievement of political epistemic goals.

In light of the empirical results and the contemporary issues analyzed, the paper will argue that, in the political context, emotions may indeed represent experiences of values, despite not necessarily perceptual in nature. By disclosing evaluative properties, emotions offer a kind of information, which cannot be accessed otherwise: emotions are not responses to reasons, as they provide knowledge the subject lacks reasons for. Since this kind of knowledge is crucial for achieving the epistemic goals typical of the political context, the paper will conclude that political emotions are not only relevant, but also fundamental from an epistemological perspective.

EMPATHY: CAN IT GROUND MORAL JUDGMENT?

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Whether empathy can play a foundational role in moral judgment is currently disputed (Prinz 2011). Even classic sentimentalists (Hume, Smith), fathers to the idea that moral judgment is grounded in sympathy, noted that sympathy (roughly referring to the same phenomenon as "empathy") is naturally biased, motivating more empathic concern for people close to us than for strangers. They stressed that sympathy needs correcting, if it is to ground moral judgment. But can it really ground it?

I here address empathy's ability to provide a foundation for moral judgment. I adopt a distinction between three constructs within empathy: emotional sharing, empathic concern and perspective taking (Decety & Cowell 2014). I argue that the foundational contribution, that which accounts for a distinct sentimentalist meta-ethical option, is provided by empathic concern.

Perspective taking provides the spectator with "cold" understanding of what the target is feeling. The spectator does not need to feel the emotion herself; understanding refers here to the role the emotion plays in the mental life and particularly in the behavioral dispositions of the target. It provides predictive insight into the target's behavior. This insight is detachable from any concern for, and from any willingness to attach value to the target.

In emotional sharing, the spectator has the same feeling as the target. But still, sharing does not necessarily include an evaluation of what it means for the target to have that emotion. This is what happens in "emotional contagion".

Empathic concern involves knowing the positive or negative value that a given feeling or emotion has for the target. It also involves a willingness to share this evaluation: if the target suffers and evaluates her suffering and its cause as bad, empathic concern makes the spectator share this evaluation.

Empathic concern introduces an important transition: from judging that a given event is bad for someone else, to judging that it is bad from my viewpoint as well. This transition constitutes a natural move away from the – also natural and basic – bias towards concern with one's own welfare. It grounds the judgment that others have a value that matches the value we naturally bestow upon ourselves. Empathic concern, in other words, is what originally introduces the intuition expressed in Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative: Treat other persons never only as means to your ends, but always at the same time as ends in themselves. Empathy explains our belief in the categorical nature of the demands that persons claim on each other, regarding how they ought to treat each other. These demands are an essential and natural component of how we understand and of how we regard each other in social interaction. They need not be further grounded in some existential basis independent of empathy itself.

ON THE FITTINGNESS OF REACTIVE ATTITUDES: A DEFENSE OF STRAWSONIAN COMPATIBILISM

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P. F. Strawson offers a compatibilist view of moral responsibility that rejects the need for an external justification for our concept of moral responsibility and our relevant practices, such as praising and blaming. For Strawson, what it means to be morally responsible is just to be the kind of agent that is the suitable target of reactive attitudes, or emotions such as resentment and gratitude – a condition that does not rely on our being the ultimate sources of our decisions and actions in the agent-causal sense. Under this conception, we can ask individuals to justify particular instances of reactive attitudes in accordance with some conditions for moral responsibility internal to its practice. However, we cannot ask if our everyday practice of holding people morally responsible is, as a whole, justified. Derk Pereboom, an incompatibilist about moral responsibility, argues that certain reactive attitudes, such as resentment, necessarily involve the belief that an agent deserves to be the target of reactive attitudes because of what she's done or failed to do, what he calls a basic desert-involving belief. In so far as our best physical theories provide evidence that we are not likely to possess the agent causal powers necessary for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense, Pereboom claims that we are not justified in having certain reactive attitudes. This paper draws on recent sentimentalist literature to reject Pereboom's claim that certain reactive attitudes necessarily involve a belief about basic desert. A distinction is made between the "fittingness" of our reactive attitudes, or how well an emotion accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features, and the "moral propriety" of holding certain beliefs, particularly in relation to punishment. This distinction is used to explain and defend the sense in which Strawson believes we cannot ask if our everyday practice of holding people morally responsibility is justified. While Pereboom may be correct in asserting that agents are not responsible in the basic desert sense, and that basic desert is required to justify certain beliefs and retributivist behaviors, it is not required to justify reactive attitudes themselves.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SHAME: PLATO'S REFLECTIONS ON LOVING WELL

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Recently, scholars have observed Plato's reflections on shame in the context of his political works, the Gorgias and the Republic. In these works, we are told by Plato that shame is a key part of the relations between men and women and is best overcome with philosophical love. However, surprisingly little has been written on the role of shame in Plato's erotic dialogues. In the Symposium, which is a reflection on Socratic teaching and learning, Plato examines what it is to love well. This work is littered with references to shame, such as the importance of shame in guiding and instructing a beloved, but also the shame that Alcibiades claims Socrates makes him feel and which compels him to run from Socrates. In the Phaedrus, Socrates famously gives a speech about love with his head covered to hide his shame, and the white horse in the charioteer speech is constrained by shame. In these two works, Plato builds a fascinating relation between shame and honour, and my paper will examine this relation. Principally, I will inquire into the role of shame in loving well and the ethics that arises from this. I will argue that we should follow Plato who writes positively and negatively about shame, and not regard the emotion as inherently good or bad. It is our moral responsibility to study emotions, such as shame, and to become alert to them when we experience them so that we may understand ourselves better.

THE SENSITIVE PROSECUTOR

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The prevailing portrayal of prosecutors as un-emotional is questionable. In order to examine this issue, a study involving in-depth interviews of 14 public prosecutors handling criminal cases in Israeli courts throughout Israel was done.

The qualitative, phenomenological analysis of the documented interviews revealed three exposure levels in which interviewees discussed the emotional aspects of their work. The tension between resisting emotions and accepting them was lurking upon each one of the subjects. Although on the external level the interviewees expressed mainly resistance to emotions, on a deeper level, getting in touch with the emotional aspects of their work made them rethink about professional identity and consider them through a different, deeper and enriching light. Their description of specific raw emotions was the deepest and most sincere level of exposure, and in that level anger was the most prominent emotion.

The exposure of the hidden level of emotions and of the continuous tension between acceptance and rejection of emotions provides an explanation for the prosecutors' difficulty in acknowledging, and even recognizing, their emotions in full. As a result, these fragments of emotional information wander aimlessly in space, without realizing themselves into an open discussion. This hinders the development of a "knowledge base" of emotional experiences of prosecutors that could enable the creation of models for regulating emotions. On the personal level, this tension negatively impacts the interviewees' personal and professional lives in ways that resemble psychological symptoms that are characteristic to anxiety, burnout, and secondary trauma.

These findings raise some skepticism regarding the prosecutor image as completely rational and non-emotional, and support the claim that the dichotomy between emotion and rationality is false. Consequently, a constructive debate on the involvement of emotions in the prosecutors' work is essential. Others have argued that lawyers ignoring the emotional needs of their clients will leave behind "volcanos that could erupt any minute". Our findings provide a similar insight about the prosecutors. Their emotional world is boiling underneath the surface and, considering its magnitude and impact, granting it a proper "seat at the table" is warranted.

HOPE

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A neglected emotion by some, a non-existent emotion for others, the word hope has been visited by a great number of philosophers as well as many philosophically inclined authors. Hope has had a protean meaning, both historically from its Greek origins of ἐλπίς, but also in the later attempts to define it and give it a more operational use. This in itself could alert people to its nature as emotion bridging the well-defined and the undefined. I will introduce my presentation with mainly two takes on hope, one from the Christian tradition and another from the American pragmatist tradition, both of which will comport with my discussion on hope. I will also offer some distinctive contrary perspectives, for illustration of the themes I wish to tackle.

I wish to focus on the relationships that hope has with time but also the self. Much interpretation around hope revolves around a conditioned futurity, a boundedness, a binding in fact of the future to a state of the past, which is even seen to some extent in authors from the Christian and pragmatist traditions, but certainly it is seen in much of the general exposition of hope. There are though some strong currents of thought resisting this type of explication which offer instead an open take of what it is to hope. Such a move, such an emotional move, is not a consequent of past knowing, but of future unknowing, of how there may be an unfolding, through creative imaginings, or perhaps principles of active imagination, which allow for the known-unknown of a future-past to come to be. As such, hope may have some relationship to an endurance of the unknown, a patience with good hope as said, but one which is different from faith, and whether active or passive, remains openly hopeful in the sense above rather than hopeless or despairing, or worse still conditioned with false hope. This hope is however grounded in the world and can only take place through the action of a collective will, requiring faith and trust in the now, in those partaking in this collective hope together.

Given the latter point, I will see if the discussion will allow me a short foray unto the more mystical aspects of presencing, with hope as detailed by some of the Christian writers, which paradoxically may offer practical pointers as to how a political will may take shape with respect, for, and of, both ourselves, but also our unknown future selves yet to unfold.

SCAFFOLDED AFFECTIVITY

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Affective processes that essentially involve the physical and social environment are often characterized as 'situated', or more specifically, as 'embedded', 'extended', or 'distributed'. To shed some further light on these processes, we will focus on how and in what ways emotions and moods can be externally scaffolded. In situated cognition, the notion of 'scaffolding' refers to the active structuring of an environment with the goal of reducing cognitive load (e.g. when setting up an automatic reminder system for important deadlines). Examples where we actively structure the environment as an affective scaffold to reduce affective load are not hard to find: We remove everything that reminds us of an ex-partner to alleviate the pain of separation and we deliberately undergo psychotherapy in order to get over anxieties. Other scaffolds for our affective life are deeper entrenched in our culture. The construction of sacred buildings, e.g., is aimed at providing specific atmospheres that support religious feelings of sublimity or humility.

Such examples are treated as cases of embedded affectivity. They do not address, however, the question of whether some affective processes are extended in the sense that they literally cross an individual's boundary. We will critically discuss a suggestion made by Colombetti and Roberts, according to whom a cognitive system is best regarded as an extended system when it "is coupled to an environmental item through which the system loops some kind of self-stimulating activity, and this self-stimulating activity in particular has been set in place and maintained over time to achieve a certain cognitive feat" (Colombetti/Roberts 2015, 1248). Applied to affective processes they refer to examples where couplings are selected and maintained for the function they perform, and view the activity of the whole loop as responsible for the episode's overall affective character (as, e.g., in the case of a grieving jazz saxophonist whose playing sets up a mutually constraining cycle of affective responding and expression).

We will take up their idea and extend it to affective episodes in which an individual instantiates self-stimulating loops with other persons, instead of with non-living objects. Systems composed of interacting individuals seem to be best candidates for affective phenomena that cross an individual's boundaries. The latter are not just the aggregate of individual affective states; rather, they are emergent in the sense that the affective states and actions of each individual member continuously and reciprocally influence each other and are themselves shaped and amplified by the overall dynamics of the group as a whole—a well-documented feature of emotional episodes in groups, in which otherwise sensible and peaceful people can sometimes get carried away by the contagious nature of euphoria or panic. Strictly speaking, emotions of this kind are not extended, but distributed.

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ART INDUCES OR EXPRESSES EMOTIONS: LINKING EXPRESSIVE/PHYSIOGNOMIC PERCEPTION AND SENSORY AFFECT TO EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLISM AND ART'S POWER TO EXPRESS EMOTIONS

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Werner and Wapner (1952) observed that theories which separate sensory, semantic, motivational and emotional processes, and view perception as a construction of abstract forms out of meaningless features (merely morphological constructs attaining meaning after identification, and signaling their affective impact afterwards), face insurmountable paradoxes. If morphological and semantic processes are incommensurable, how can they be brought to cooperate without recourse to yet another, higher-order process? Invoking such a process would contradict the claim of their independence. Accordingly, many studies suggest the inevitable link of emotions and art. Among them, some assume a direct communicative mapping of perception on to emotion space (art induces emotion), whereas others pertain to an indirect link between emotions and art, postulating that art expresses emotions via representation and conceptual metaphor rather than induces emotions (Stamatopoulou, 2004, 2007). Instead of dichotomizing them, this presentation aims to offer a stand for a dialogue between them by introducing evidence of the multileveled linkages of emotion and art. In this effort we re-introduce the old idea of physiognomic perception which focuses on fine-grained temporal dynamics of psychological processes postulating that perceptual experience is directly meaning-laden and intrinsically affective—forms are inherently semantic; meaning and value go hand-in-hand with perceptual or cognitive organization. Equally, we will revisit the theoretical assumptions regarding tertiary qualities and the idea that aesthetic properties could be represented as tertiary qualities will be further explored. Tertiary qualities (the attitude of the human body according to Arnheim, 1971) are the (motor-affective but also moral) implications of an event as experienced by this event's actor or experiencing subject/perceiver—they represent the junction of the inner with the outer and as Werner claimed they do not belong as clearly to the self or the phenomenal object even though they may seem to originate from the object. They have the characteristic of states—the tone does not reside in the object but fills the space around becoming a spatial tone—an interocesptive state and a physical property at the same time. Mostly, then when we use affective terms to describe art's experience—it is that such tertiary qualities are attributed to the art-object while experienced by us. In support of this discourse a series of related cross-cultural and intra-cultural studies will be presented and further discussions will focus on the primary metaphorization of experienced affect, expressive symbolism, art (cross-cultural) perception and their relevance to recent evidence of the "circuitry for seeing with feeling" that joins sensory representations from outside and inside the body while experienced affect can be either at the background or foreground of consciousness.

EXPLORING THE HUMAN PASSIONS

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What constitutes a passion? Ever since the dawn of philosophy, from the ancient Greek to contemporary philosophers, passion has been treated as the reflection of the body on the soul, suggesting the nature of the soul as one bound to limitations. Throughout the centuries, "passion" has evolved as a term; originally viewed as a malignant state which was gradually attributed significant value as a means of approaching the processes of the soul.

Descartes in his final work "Passions of the Soul" (1649), attempts to establish the connection between body and soul through the unexamined manifestations of the human emotions. In his theory, the nature and external stimuli serve the purpose of a "guide" of the soul. This is accomplished by an elaborate process of, initially, differentiating the identity of "good" and "evil" based on the perceptive functions of the individual, and, secondly, generating the passions, based on the perceptive input received and accumulated in the brain (pineal gland), where the soul resides. The generated passions that, in turn, give rise to several and complex emotions rule the bodily reactions and become transmuted into self-preservation actions. Descartes delineates five primary passions (gladness, sadness, love, hatred and desire) which constitute the "basic colors" in a palette of countless combinations. It is imperative to note that passions are derivatives of the psychological processes occurring in the context of the dynamic and perpetual interaction of the body and the soul, and are, thus, interpreted as physical manifestations of the soul. Passions are good by nature. However, people ought to be careful in their management and avoid misuse.

At this point a major distinction from the Aristotelian but also the Stoic beliefs is observed. While Aristotle claimed that the movements of the body originated from the soul and the Stoics treated passions as an illness and suffering of the soul, the Cartesian philosophy doesn't support the deliberation of the man from his passions but rather the acknowledgment of their role in the human well-being and the perfecting of the human body.

This continuous controversy over the "passions" has led to a more intense review and examination of the very nature of the emotions and their connection to cognitive functioning in regards to emotional representations. Resulting underlying questions -such as whether emotions are required in order to interpret the human thoughts and behaviors or whether emotions are socially inherent constructs aimed at one's social or political integration- are inevitably creating the framework within which a contemporary researcher can approach the delicate yet multifarious issue of the human "passions" through the lens of the philosophy of emotions.

ENJOYMENT AND BELIEF OF THE MELANCHOLIC EXTREMIST: A LACANIAN APPROACH

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One of the subjects that deny the continuous offers of the contemporary consumptive discourse is the melancholic one. Taking into account some presuppositions of a Lacanian – oriented political theory of affect, and the diagnosis of a prevalent cultural 'command to enjoy' as a forced 'freedom of (consumptive) choice', I argue for: 1. emotions as actively assumed passivity, 2. Interpassivity as an emotional state of feeling and suffering through others, 3. the existence of misrecognized, 'misfelt' feelings.

The extremist subject encloses signifiers in a 'totalitarian' discursive closure, attached to seductive images of omnipotence, trying to name everything in his psychosocial reality, to dominate it, denying ambiguity and doubt. But for the lacanian analyst –among others- passing through doubt is the certain way to reach faith, and his conceptualization of ambiguity is opposed to the dichotomous (friend-enemy) thinking of the extremist. For the lacanian theory, I exist where I feel divided, where I contradict myself, consciously or not (lapsi, symptoms, dreams), in a way that makes me doubt if this stance is mine or not.

In my paper, I explore the distinction between faith and belief of the lacanian analyst Octave Manoni and Robert Pfaller, sketching a typology that might be useful in analyzing the extremist's relation to doubt and its melancholic consequences. I distinguish between:
1. Believing in the existence of something without having faith on it (holding a distance that the extremists connote with 'tolerance', disregarding it),
2 having faith in somebody, I performatively engage with him, following rules, law or ethical duties (from the universality of which, the extremist excludes himself),
2.a. I have faith but I hold an imaginary relation to it (I believe that I have faith),
2.b. I have faith, and I hold a symbolic relation to it
3. I have faith in something, without consciously to believe in it (I believe through some of my acts and not my speculations)

The extremists, instead of doubting, are often interpellated either by believing in an absolute way, or believing in nothing. Through their acting outs, they try to secure a certainty, to identify with a supposedly 'lost' eternal, absolute, mythical object, they of course never had. Subsequently, they face the absence of the above mentioned loved object (e.g. the mythical idealization of Ancient Greece) as a loss (a fulfilling enjoyment stolen from an 'intruder'). They confuse a constitutive for every subject -of speech and social interaction- lack with a loss (that 'must be taken back'). This is the ideological and emotional 'benefit' of the melancholic stance of the extremists: they can hold the illusory belief that 'they will never lose the object that they never had', because it is fantasized and not empirically documented and rationally debated. They establish 'here and now' a relation with a non existent past. For the psyche of the extremist, sadness and omnipotence are two sides of the same coin.

THE TEMPORALITY OF NEGATIVE COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS

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Emotions are not spotlight affairs but rather develop, intensify or decrease or change over time. Some also argue that emotions are 'fast-tracking' cognitions (Kahneman 2011) or short-lived concerns (Ben-Ze'ev 2010). Temporality is built into the very nature of emotions and a key to understanding their function. There is hardly anyone, be it an affective scientist, a philosopher of emotion or a layperson who would contest this. And yet, although there is a huge body of empirical and theoretical work on various dynamics of emotions (e.g., cognitive feedback-effects, appraisal changes, evolutionary adaptation; Kuppens 2015), the very nature of the temporality of emotions has hardly been studied (see, however, Frijda 2007). This desideratum is all the more salient when it comes to the collective, political, or inter-group emotions—to wit, notwithstanding a rapidly increasing interest on such social forms (Goodwin et al. 2001; Flam 2005; von Scheve & Salmela 2012; Goodwin et al. 2001; Sullivan 2015), and with very few recent exceptions from social-psychology exploring the temporal dynamics of emotions in social (Mesquita & Boiger 2014) or inter-group interactions (Smith & Mackie 2015).

Against this background, I shall address the issue of the temporal dynamics distinctive of collective emotions. Specifically, I will focus on inter-group and political emotions in which the role of social identification with one's own group or in-group/out-group divides play a key role.

The guiding research question I shall pursue concerns a certain asymmetry in the temporal structure when it comes to positively charged or group-cohesive affective collective phenomena (e.g., collective cheering, feelings of solidarity, sympathetic concern, pride, or patriotisms), on the one hand, and negative, out-group directed emotions (nationalism, political or ethnic hatred, etc.). Thus, it seems that whereas those positive collective emotions are typically highly object- or situation-focused fast-changing and share their short-livedness with their individual counterparts, negative collective emotions are, to the detriment of many inter-group divides, intentionally diffuse, relatively stable, little dynamic and diachronically robust in nature. But why are certain collective emotions more or less malleable, and which, when and why do they solidify? Drawing on the ingenious phenomenological analysis of Aurel Kolnai of the specific intentionality of negative emotions and in particular of hatred (Kolnai 1935/2007) as well as the phenomenological concepts of 'habitualization' and 'sedimentation' (e.g., Walther 1932, Husserl 1975), I will argue that collective negative emotions display a habitual form intentional 'position-taking' that may explain their inflexibility and diachronic robustness.

SOME REMARKS ON TRUST. THE BOND OF TRUST IN THE GLOBAL RECESSION.

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This paper is intended to propose some thoughts about trust and what role it could play in the current European society that has been troubled by economic, political, and social issues.
First, I will discuss the present situation in Europe, then I will consider Fukuyama's studies on trust, and finally I would express my opinion.

The 2008 global recession has caused a profound state of tension throughout the world. Talking about Europe, economic crisis, harsh measures, imposed to some countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, terrorism and mass immigration, have engendered four effects: a) a poverty income limit; b) a weakening of societal fabric; c) a public unrest against the Establishment; d) a radicalisation of nationalism and separatism movements.

Therefore, this climate of exasperation has brought back to our attention the key role of trust as a crucial attribute of social order and interactions among individuals, groups and institutions.

In reference to Fukuyama's work, he has argued [1995] that high trust among citizens brings about two results in a society: a) the superior performance of all institutions; b) a tendency of people to cooperate produces socially efficient outcomes: business success, widespread economic prosperity, and social harmony. This framework of well-being requires: a) a network of relationships based on trust; b) a capacity to promote what Fukuyama has called "spontaneous sociability".

To summarize, according to Fukuyama, trust is determined by a culture of shared values, that is shared language of good and evil. In a few words, no shared values, no trust; no trust, no business; no business, no concordance.
Finally, I will structure my point of view around three basic key questions about trust: 1) What is trust?; 2) Why is distrust counterproductive?; 3) Is it possible to convert a natural attitude as trust into a habit?
In my opinion, the importance and benefits of trust collides against an increasingly global and multicultural society and a nationalistic isolation. Therefore, it is necessary to pinpoint the trust-building process and how it could be completely develop. Trust is traditionally defined as "confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct, and distrust as confident negative expectations regarding another's conduct" [Lewicki, J. McAllister, J. Bies 1998].
However, G. A. Bigley and J. L. Pearce [1998] have suggested that the question "Which trust and when?" may be better than the other one "What is trust?". I think Bingley and Peirce's suggestion could be a more pragmatic approach than a lengthy debate about the essence of what trust is. In fact, people involved in a trust relationship may establish the criteria for developing a useful collaboration step by step. In this case, every well-selected person could make their own expertise available to others. Hence, trustworthy behavior is more profitable than a suspicious one.

To conclude, one of the hardest problems to solve is how to encourage the bond of trust in our time and place.

EMOTION, ATTENTION, AND TEMPORAL PERCEPTION

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This paper examines, on the one hand, some implications of recent work on temporal experience for how we should conceive of our emotional experiences both within and of time. On the other hand, it uses an account of emotional experience to illuminate how we should conceive of our perception of, and attention to time.

Emotions seem to present familiar examples of distortions in our perception of duration (e.g. time seems to slow down in cases of traumatic emotional experiences; it may seem to speed up in other cases). Such distortions seem to undermine what has been labeled the 'naive' idea that we perceive durations absolutely. Ian Phillips has recently argued, however, that such distortions can be explained in terms of our attention to the stream of nonperceptual conscious mental activity. Phillips himself does not discuss emotions, but I will argue in the first part of the paper that his account of time is i) on the right track, and ii) can accommodate emotions.

However, I will then argue, first, that if Phillips is right, his view poses a problem for neo-Jamesian accounts (such as Prinz's) that conceive of emotions as in part bodily perceptions. Second, however, drawing on the ubiquity of affect in conscious experience, I contend that emotion-based experiences of time are (contra Phillips) incompatible with the naive conception of the experience of duration. This is because emotions present a counterexample to the claim that for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. I demonstrate this is part by examining the role of attention in emotion. I conclude by showing how emotional 'distortions' of temporal experiences of duration pose a problem for any perceptual account of emotions.

BOREDOM AND VALUE

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Being bored can be a miserable, almost painful experience. In one psychological study, many subjects preferred pain over boredom: rather than do nothing for fifteen minutes they elected to administer one or more electric shocks to themselves. The experience of suffering through a boring lecture, sermon, or staff meeting is familiar to most. It seems at first glance as though we would be better off if we never had to experience boredom. But in this paper I will argue that the susceptibility to boredom as well as the experience of boredom can be involved in a good human life in important ways. The susceptibility to boredom can facilitate growth and progress for an agent and in the world. Boredom is often a part of valued experiences and achievements—sometimes incidental to that value but sometimes integral. Boredom can also inform an agent about herself and about the world. If this is right then we need not avoid boredom at all costs or see it as necessarily indicative of a defect in ourselves or the world around us.

I will begin with a word about why this inquiry is worth pursuing and then define what it is to be bored and what it is for an object or experience to be boring. I will then discuss three ways boredom is involved with positively valued projects or experiences. First I outline some features I take to be an essential part of living a good life that often include boredom. Then I argue that the ability to grow and change seems to be facilitated by the susceptibility to boredom. Finally, I will discuss how the experience of pain can be a constituent part of certain kinds of valuable experiences and suggest there are analogous ways that the experience of boredom is also constitutive element of some valuable experiences.

DYNAMICS OF EMOTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MUSIC

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Dynamics of Emotions in the Experience of Music Experiencing music is essentially a process not just because any experience is temporal but because music consists of elements that organise time aesthetically. In the introduction, I want to shortly defend this claim against Platonic ontologies of musical works. My main concern, however, will be addressed in the first part of my paper. I will ask how music's ability to arouse, elicit or express emotions is closely connected to its temporal structure. What is phenomenologically undoubted in contemporary the competitive theories of music's relation to emotions is that experiencing music is very often connected to experiencing emotions. I want to discuss Jenefer Robinson's (2005) account of emotions and music as processes and connect it with some additional observations from embodiment theory and phenomenology. My aim is to defend her idea of emotions as, at first, visceral, bodily processes or "streams" that are felt, i. e. experienced in our phenomenal consciousness, and that not always but sometimes can be distinguished cognitively and named as specific emotions such as shame or pride. The description of emotional streams lacks the key properties of emotions, their evaluative, volitional and cognitive or intentional dimensions. Though, these properties are not necessarily part of emotions experienced through listening to music. I want to argue that experiencing music in fact allows for a process of emotional experience which, in some cases, would likely be regarded as pathological in everyday life. For the emotions in music may change quickly, lose their distinct interpretation as emotions of a certain kind remaining ambiguous or even turn suddenly into their opposites, e. g. joy into sadness and vice versa. Normally, rational listeners have no problem to experience these sometimes quite dramatic changes whereas they would not easily change an emotion which is adequate to its intentional object and evaluates it in a certain way unless there is a relevant change in the object or in the reasons for its evaluation. In the third part of my paper, I want to draw some conclusions from this theoretical description. As I will argue, the connections between the processes of music and the processes of emotions speak for a theory that understands emotional concepts as interpretations of visceral and mental processes. The interpretations may, on a first level, lack intentional objects, evaluations and a readiness to act, but still be felt as emotions of a certain kind – this is what emotions in music seem to show. On a second level of interpretation (which may happen at the same time or even earlier than level one, the order of levels is purely heuristic), the emotions will be understood as directed towards objects, as evaluating them and as creating a readiness to act with respect to them. In music, at least purely instrumental music, the second level of interpretation is open for imagination depending on the readiness to imagine of the listener. I want to provide reasons for this claim in may paper and confront it with objections.

Fear, Uncertainty, and the Citizens' Income

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In this talk, I will examine the emotion of fear and how it has been used in appeals for political reform. In particular, I will look at the welfare reform mechanism of a Universal Basic Income, or Citizen's Income: an unconditional, automatic, non-means-tested income paid to all members of a political community regardless of other income earned, which is intended to replace a score of means-tested welfare payments, such as unemployment benefits. Arguments in support of a Citizens' Income often focus on the freedom from fear, anxiety, and uncertainty such an initiative would offer. The idea is that this would not simply be better for well-being, but further could actually increase productivity via the capacity for creative problem-solving and innovation fear impedes. These arguments, however, are made seemingly without consideration of the empirical or theoretical research we have on fear. Here, I draw on the philosophy and cognitive science of fear to evaluate whether the "freedom from fear" argument can deliver what its proponents want.

THE MYTH OF DISPOSITIONAL EMOTIONS

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It is sometimes held that we can distinguish between episodic or occurrent emotions and dispositional emotions. So, on this view there are the episodic emotions – pangs of fear or anxiety, say – which are commonly taken to be mental states that have a short duration and a characteristic phenomenology. And on this view there are the dispositional emotions – a fear of spiders or love for one's partner, say – which are the dispositions to undergo certain episodic emotions when particular circumstances obtain and which are commonly taken to be mental states that are enduring properties of a person and do not have a distinctive phenomenology of their own. And yet this distinction between episodic and dispositional emotion can seem very puzzling. This is because it is natural to suppose that all emotions belong to a common metaphysical or psychological kind. After all, if it were not the case that all emotions belonged to a common kind, then there would seem to be no good reason for our wanting to group them together as if they belonged to a common kind. In that case emotions belonging to different kinds would have as much in common as the properties of being green and being large have in common, the only shared feature in the case of the emotions being the word ("emotion") that we might occasionally use to denote them. But the idea that every emotion belongs to a common metaphysical or psychological kind seems to be entirely ruled out if some emotions are episodic mental states and other emotions are merely the dispositions to such mental states. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine there being a starker metaphysical divide than that between the dispositional and the episodic or occurrent. The point of this paper, then, is to develop a solution to the puzzle posed by the distinction sometimes made between episodic and dispositional emotion which respects the intuition that all emotions belong to a common kind. Ultimately my strategy will be to argue that the idea there are dispositional emotions is a myth. Hence all emotions are episodic emotions. But I will argue that to say there are no dispositional emotions is not to say that those mental states sometimes thought to be dispositional emotions – for example, a fear of spiders, or love for one's partner, or jealousy of my neighbour's garden – are not genuine emotions. Rather I will argue that the mental states in question are emotions, but they are emotions only because it turns out that they are also episodic emotional states.

THE COGNITIVE COMPONENTS OF COMPASSION: SEEING NEEDS AS A REASON FOR ACTION

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The Cognitive Components of Compassion: Seeing Needs As Reasons

Martha Nussbaum has argued that the notion of 'misfortune' plays a central role in characterising the notion of compassion.1 I shall argue for an alternative account, on which it is constitutive of compassion that it involves taking another individual's need to be a reason for action.

Nussbaum identifies three 'cognitive elements' – beliefs or appraisals - in Aristotle's account of eleos or pity: that the suffering involved is serious; that it is undeserved; and that the person who is suffering the misfortune has similar possibilities to the person who is suffering.2 Her own account of compassion incorporates the first of these elements in a qualified form; modifies the second; and replaces the third: she argues that our assessment of the 'seriousness' or 'size' of the sort of misfortune which is the proper object of compassion, depends our own conception of what a good or flourishing life includes 3 (although she notes in passing the possibility of what she calls 'evaluative deference).4 She also argues, against Aristotle that we may feel compassion for someone whose plight is at least in part something of their own making Finally she replaces the judgment of similar possibilities with a judgment that the suffering of the individual involved is significant when assessed from the point of view of my plans and projects.5

Against Nussbaum, I argue that in characterising the proper objects of compassion, we should focus on the notion of need, rather than that of misfortune. Here I draw on an account of non-instrumental needs developed by Soran Reader, and in particular her account of what she calls 'secondary substance needs': needs which I might have as a parent, as a teacher, or an occupant of a similar social role so on. This view explains our judgments about Nick; makes better sense of the appropriateness of epistemic deference better than Nussbaum's account can; and makes better sense of a case Nussbaum discusses in detail: that of a parent's compassion for an adolescent child.

I also argue against Nussbaum's view that eudaimonistic judgment is an important component of compassion. Nussbaum's view is counter-intuitive: it makes it doubtful whether the dying or the deeply depressed can experience compassion. It also makes it seem puzzling that we can feel compassion for the very distant, or for the long dead, or for fictional characters. Finally, it seems possible to describe cases where I act out of compassion without making any eudaimonistic judgment: I shall describe one such case in detail. I argue that we can eliminate the eudaimonistic judgment if we take compassion to involve seeing another person's need as a reason to act. This account.

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EMOTION AND INVERSE-AKRASIA: THE POSSIBILITY OF INVERSE-AKRASIA IN HUME'S SYMPATHY-BASED MORALITY

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In this paper I shall argue that akrasia caused by emotions involve a conflict between a value perception and an evaluative judgment. According to Davidson, an agent ought to judge, and hence act, on the basis of all available reasons. (Davidson 1970, 41) This is what the so-called principle of continence requires. Thus, the akratic agent makes an error in his reasoning; he fails to comply with the principle of continence. In the light of this, de Sousa argues that it is an emotion which is responsible for the reasoning error that characterizes akrasia on the Davidsonian picture. The reason why the agent erroneously concludes that the akratic action is better than the other one is that he does not base his conclusion on the relational evaluative judgment, which involves all available reasons, but on partial judgment, that is, a judgment which only consider a limited number of reasons. According to de Sousa, this error is derived from emotion.

The reason why some akratic action involves emotions, as de Sousa says, is that emotions direct our attention, in that they involve what he calls 'species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies' (de Sousa 1987, 196). According to de Sousa, 'emotions limit the range of information that the organism will take into account, the inferences actually drawn from a potential infinity, and the set of live option among which it will choose'(de Sousa 1987, 195). In this way, emotions can be seen to have an important practical function. Furthermore, the pattern of attention that comes with an emotion could have an important role to play in akrasia. In the case of a passionate gambling, for example, his attention is focused on certain aspects of his situation – a way to earn a large sum of money, the expected pleasure of winning the gambling, and so on. We can say that he fails to abide by the principle of continence; thoughts about danger or duty are surely not salient in his mind.

The akratic act can be compared to perceptual illusion such as the Mueller-Lyre illusion, in which one sees the lines as being of a different length even though one judges or even knows that they are of the same length. Perceptual illusion like the Mueller-Lyre illusion shows that there is no contradiction involved in having a perception that rationally conflicts with judgment. As many point out, it is not paradoxical to say, for example, 'The two lines are the same length, but I do not see it. I see one line as longer than the other'. If we take emotions to be perceptions of values, we can see that they have the capacity to make akratic action intelligible, as distinct from merely causally explainable.

Having considered akratic action in this way, challenging the traditional picture of agency, I shall defend the claim that akrasia can be rational if caused by emotion. Recently Nomy Arpaly (2003) argues that there are cases of so-called 'inverse akrasia', according to which the agent acts rationally and even morally but does so against his better judgment. In defense of this argument Arpaly and others (de Sousa 1987; McIntyre 1990; Jones 2003; Tappolet 2003) take the famous example of Huckleberry Finn. Following Arpaly and others, I shall finally take into account whether the inverse-akrasia is possible in Hume's sympathy-based morality by utilizing Mark Twain's character Huckleberry Finn. If the inverse-akrasia is possible in Hume's sympathy-based morality, I shall argue that virtue is better than rules and principles, concerning practicality and decision making.

ON ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY OF EMOTIONS

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Commonly and traditionally, affectivity is considered to be a realm of passivity and as such is opposed to activity. So, for example, in F. Nietzsche advise (Human, All Too Human, 58: What one can promise) to rely in human relationships on loving actions rather than loving feelings. For him a promise of actions is more realistic than a promise of feelings because the latter are involuntary while the former are a matter of choice. This view is supported, some will say with Gordon (1986), by the argument from the language where affective states are often denoted by passive forms of verbs: amused (from amuse), annoyed (from annoy), astonished (from astonish) and so on (Gordon's examples, his other examples are similar: troubled, upset, vexed). As it has been objected all the examples are of the same kind, i.e. being passive forms of causative (or factitive) verbs which are not affective states themselves. If one looks for a different category, he will easily find verbs that denote affective states both in their active as well as passive forms. Such are love and to be loved, hate and to be hated, and several others.

If Gordon is wrong in limiting himself to a special category of grammatical forms, he may still be right in saying that the linguistic structure informs us about the nature of things. If it is so, examples of verbs relating to feelings in their both active and passive forms would be a sufficient argument for showing that affectivity has both facets, active and passive. Finally, there are verbs that denote affective state in their active form but not in their passive form. More precisely there are two categories here: some, like longing for or fear, possess passive forms but their passive forms are devoid of conceivable affective meaning. For example, if you fear me or long for me what a feeling, especially a passive one, I can feel, even if it is correct to say I am feared, I am longed for (a further distinction is that, in that first case, I am feared, though passive, amounts to a causative sense, while in the latter, I am longed for, there is no causative sense: I am the object of another's feeling but surely not its cause). In other cases - call them deponent forms, there is no active form at all (the form is grammatically middle voice yet without reciprocate or reflexive action) while their meaning is active (they exist in Greek (but not only), e.g. aidomai, sebomai, &c.).

The paper will explore first intricacy of the above threefold linguistic division and then its relevance for activity and passivity of affectivity with a special focus on the 2nd category (love/to be loved, hate/to be hated, &c.).