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THE POWER OF GREEK ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY IN STUDYING WORKPLACE EMOTIONS:
A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION BASED ON SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM CYPRUS

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Ancient Greek philosophy has been a fertile source of inspiration for researchers working in a number of fields, such as critical social theory, psychoanalysis and feminist thinking, but there has been little explicit engagement by management and organisation theorists. However, when we search for new meanings and explore new phenomena in organisational theory, the ancient Greek heritage can contribute much to our understanding of organisational issues. This paper demonstrates how Aristotle pioneered the analysis of human emotion, an area that has become an important part of organisational research. It also discusses the implications of phenomenological research, a philosophical science that employs various ancient Greek concepts, including noesis, noêma and essence.

Aristotle in *Rhetoric* II, argued that all emotions are expressions of one's moral stance towards an event and that no emotion is inherently either 'good' or 'bad'. He saw both complete absence and excessive experience of an emotion as equally problematic, because any emotion experienced appropriately, contributes to a person's virtue. This is based on the argument that simplistically labelling emotions 'positive' or 'negative', assuming wholly symmetrical positive and negative consequences, inadequately accounts for human experience, as it diminishes the extent to which an emotion is distinctive in relation to its subjective experience, antecedents and outcomes. From a phenomenological standpoint, emotion does not simply comprise of either a positive or a negative valence, but is constituted and influenced by the meanings that workers assign to their experience of each emotion in relation to their environment (and thus, organisationally, their job). A phenomenological study is used as an example to demonstrate one such exploration of organisational emotions. Sixteen narrative interviews helped explore the ways in which academics who live and work in Cyprus make sense of workplace emotions. From the study, three essential themes emerged, namely: (a) emotions as monothetic interpretations, when specific emotions were mentioned as experienced and expressed spontaneously, without any attempt to bracket the emotion or dealt with another time (such as, sudden anger after students' disruptiveness, fear after inability to respond to questions, pride after hearing students' successes), (b) emotions as polythetic interpretations, when academics expressed experienced emotions after careful, detailed thought aiming to avoid socially inappropriate emotional attitudes (such, as guilt, shame, embarrassment), and (c) emotions as embodied experiences, when emotions were articulated through the kinesics of the body.

Phenomenological analysis helped to reveal considerable beneficial consequences of the so-called negative emotions, like anger and fear, when they were expressed, giving support to Aristotelian arguments that all emotions are essential to good life, and experiencing them to a certain extent is what characterises ethical people. The study's findings, then, may encourage organisations to consider increasing the amount of emotional expression tolerated at work. The paper contributes theoretically and methodologically to emotionality by supporting phenomenological research and Aristotelian accounts as a fruitful avenue for examining workplace emotions due to their focus on explaining and illustrating the complex, dynamic and functionalist nature of human experiences.

IN DEFENSE OF THE HEDONIC THEORY OF EMOTIONAL VALENCE

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There are positive emotions and negative emotions. Emotions are classified in this way in virtue of the positive or negative character of its valence. Recently, Prinz (2010) has offered an account of the nature of valence that manages to explain the intuitive plausibility of competing theories, while avoiding their typical problems. According to Prinz's view, valence amounts to what he calls inner reinforcers. The latter can be seen as imperatives that, regarding a certain emotion, say something like "More of this!" (positive valence) or "Less of this!" (negative valence).

An intuitive alternative answer to the question of what makes positive emotions positive and negative emotions negative is that positive emotions feel pleasant, while negative emotions feel unpleasant. Identifying positive valence and negative valence with pleasure and displeasure, respectively, amounts to holding what might be called a hedonic theory of valence (HTV).

Now, the following conditional holds: if HTV is true, it is explanatorily more fundamental than the inner reinforcers view (IRV), in the sense that the former explains the latter but not vice versa. Accordingly, given that HTV is explanatorily more fundamental than IRV, if true, it should be deemed as a better account of the nature of valence than IRV. Nonetheless, as Prinz (2004, 2010) and others have argued, HTV faces several problems. It has been argued that negative (positive) valence cannot be identical to displeasure (pleasure), given that (1) not all negative (positive) emotions are unpleasant (pleasant); (2) not all negative (positive) emotions feel the same; (3) pleasure (displeasure) is necessarily conscious, but positive (negative) emotions can occur outside consciousness.

In this talk I will defend HTV from such criticism, and also show that IRV is implausible on its own. Very roughly, the above arguments fail, respectively, given that (1) HTV does not need to commit to the claim that all emotion types have a distinctive hedonic tone; it only needs to be committed to the weaker claim that every emotion episode has a hedonic tone; (2) contrary to what it is usually assumed, HTV does not need to hold that (a) the phenomenology of an emotion is exhausted by its valence component, and that (b) displeasure (pleasure) is a uniform, narrowly circumscribed experience. On the contrary, emotional experience and pleasure/displeasure are complex experiences; (3) according to the emerging scientific picture of affect, pleasure and displeasure can occur outside consciousness. HTV seems to hold. On the other hand, IRV assumes a rather implausible dissociation between bodily changes (i.e., interoception) and inner reinforcers. Bodily changes are represented by the interoceptive modality, while inner reinforcers are separate, independent components, which are supposed to play a certain motivational role. However, evidence suggests that such motivational role is played by the interoceptive system. Hedonic tones are also constituted by the interoceptive system (Craig, 2002). Accordingly, contrary to what IRV assumes, hedonicity and motivation are two aspects of interoception.

Considering that HTV is explanatorily more fundamental than IRV, and it holds true, the explanatory advantages of IRV are easily assimilated by HTV. Therefore, and also considering that IRV seems not to hold, HTV is the better explanation of what makes positive emotions positive and negative emotions negative.

Admiration and Emulation

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What is the nature of admiration? In recent years there has been a surge in philosophical interest in the nature of appraising emotions such as shame, guilt and anger. There has, though, been relatively little research into admiration. This paper aims to go some small way to addressing this issue by asking whether there is a connection between admiration and emulation.

The claim that admiration is linked to emulation can be found in the work of a number of philosophers. For example, in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments,* Adam Smith claims that, "the love and admiration that we naturally conceive for those whose character and conduct we approve of, naturally disposes us to desire to become ourselves the objects of like agreeable sentiments" (1759/ 2007 p.114). Similarly, Linda Zagzebski claims that, "the feeling of admiration is a kind of attraction that carries with it the impetus to imitate," (2010 p.54). While both Smith and Zagzebski claim that admiration and emulation are linked neither provides an argument in defence of this claim nor a precise formulation of the view.

In my paper I will look at two key questions we have to ask about the nature of this proposed connection. We might think that the connection between the two is such that whenever one feels admiration one will always have a desire to emulate the object of admiration. I will argue that this view is implausible for three reasons.

First, empirical research into admiration suggests that admiration is not as motivationally powerful as this connection would suggest. A study by Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters (2011) found that admiration is significantly less likely to result in a desire to emulate than an emotion of benign envy. Instead, they claimed (2011 p.792) that Kierkegaard was right to claim that admiration is a, "happy, self-surrender" (1849 p.86) as admiration tends to lead to a feeling that one can only appreciate how good the other is rather than attempt to emulate them. The other reason to reject this connection is conceptual. Not all feelings of admiration have people as their object. It is also possible to admire sunsets, artworks and fine wines. For at least some of these objects of admiration there does not appear to be any means of emulation available. Finally, even when we are admiring a person and so means of emulation are available, it seems perfectly coherent to admire someone and yet not feel an overriding motivation to emulate them. I will argue that a more plausible and interesting connection is the following:

Indirect Connection: Admiration focusses ones attention on what is valuable about the object of admiration. This focussing of attention on what is valuable can often lead to a desire to emulate.

EMOTIONAL ACCESS IN AUTISM

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My goal in this presentation is to argue that people with autism access their emotions using cognitive rather than phenomenal access. I analyze the nature of this emotional particularity and assess its impact on the pathology.

The "emotional deficit" is one of the main cognitive deficits characterizing Autism spectrum disorders (ASD), a diagnostic criterion manifesting itself through "reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect" (DSM-V). Studies in psychology have shown the existence of a deficit in emotional "identification and description" of one's "own emotions" (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith 2004) in autism, or in emotional awareness (Silani et al. 2008).

I suggest that these studies indicate problems of emotional access. This notion designates the process through which the subject relates to her emotional states. I show why this notion of access is preferable to that of consciousness when it comes to emotional processes. I then use Block's (2011) terminology to distinguish between phenomenal access and cognitive access. The first refers to the phenomenology, accompanied by a subjective feeling. It is an automatic and intuitive process, which consists of a "subjective occurrence of qualitative content" (Rosenthal 2002). In contrast, Cognitive access is a kind of objective understanding, that Rosenthal calls "higher order thought". It is comparable to a third person access that enables cognitive processing about emotions.

I explain how people with autism are characterized by problems of phenomenal access to their emotional experience, while conserving a cognitive access to it. I then analyze the roles and functions of these two forms of access in our emotional lives.

EMOTIONAL NONCONCEPTUALISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF VALUATION

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My talk will discuss the possibility of nonconceptual evaluative content. This stipulation can be found in some recent defenders of the so-called 'perceptual theory of emotion', the claim that emotion is the perceptual representation of value (cf. e.g. Döring 2009; Faucher and Tappolet 2008; Johnston 2001). I shall argue that there is no nonconceptual evaluative content. More precisely, I will argue that the latter is impossible even if some plausible version of nonconceptualism is correct—as a growing number of philosophers claim (cf. e.g. Crane 1992; Peacocke 1992, 2004; Stalnaker 1998; Tye 2005; Van Cleve 2012). The way I will do this is by distinguishing three plausible versions of nonconceptualism and then provide reasons why within the first two frameworks the existential claim for nonconceptual evaluation will be false and why it will not be false on all interpretations but useless—as it does not help with the theoretical objectives behind the proposal—in the third framework.

According to the first version of nonconceptualism, nonconceptual content is what I call basic content, i.e. a layer of representation that does not presuppose or depend on any other representational capabilities (cf. Peacocke 1992, 2004). The postulation of basic content in perceptual experience captures the idea that infants like non-human animals need a pretheoretical level of representation for the acquisition of concepts and language. It can however be shown that evaluative representations cannot be basic in this sense because this would conflict with the supervenience of the evaluative on the non-evaluative, as well as with the hypothetical generalizations, and systems of values in which these representations must be embedded.

Another notion of the nonconceptual is given by the idea that the respective perceptual contents correspond to innate representational capabilities, hence representations thinkers can enjoy qua nature (cf. Tye 2005). My most important point here is that even if sufficient proof for the nativist hypothesis is provided, it will not warrant the nonconceptualist thesis as for evaluation. The reason why this is so is that innate capabilities obviously might also be conceptual capabilities and I will show that for reasons of symmetry this must be the case. Even if nativism for (parts of) evaluation was true it still has to be a nativism of concepts.

The third version of nonconceptualism, I will consider, is state nonconceptualism (cf. Van Cleve 2012). I argue that state nonconceptualism for valuation is plausible but as it is not a thesis about content cannot support the initial existential claim. Furthermore, if nonconceptualism about valuation is reformulated as a state view its theoretical purpose will be undermined as it does not help to discriminate between perceptual and doxastic state as emotional perceptualists desire. As nonconceptualism of valuation is false, I will sketch a conceptualist alternative to solve the emotional perceptualist's main problem, i.e. to explain what makes an emotional content perceptual.

WAYS OF EMOTIONAL APPROPRIATENESS
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Emotions can be appropriate in many ways. It is the aim of this presentation to offer a map of different normative criteria that are used to attribute appropriateness to emotions. Among these criteria are whether an emotion is justified, correct (or fitting), morally apt, prudentially recommended, a member of a coherent pattern of emotions. In addition, the appropriateness of an emotion can be calibrated according to intensity, duration and expressiveness. Furthermore, most, if not all of these ways of being appropriate seem to have a basis in culture. This fact raises problems when strong disagreements about the appropriateness of an emotion occur—synchronically or diachronically. Examples would be disagreements about the appropriateness of indignation about cartoons or guilt about one's nation's misdeeds. We try to shed some light on these interrelated issues.

EMOTIONS AND NARRATIVES

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The aim of this paper is to explore from a phenomenological perspective some aspects of the relationship between affectivity and autobiographical narrativity. Although each of these areas has been the object of extensive philosophical research, comparatively few approaches have engaged in the analysis of how the two dimensions are connected. In this study I contribute to extend the existing positions by providing an account of two fundamental ways in which affective experience and life narratives are related and I do so by relying on a phenomenological analysis of both ordinary and psychopathological forms of experience. In the first place, I consider the role played by emotions in the determination of the contents of life narratives. In this regard it has been claimed that emotions mark certain events and experiences as significant in specific ways and these are the ones which are selected to be included in the stories we craft (Hardcastle 2008). However, on phenomenological grounds, it is possible to suggest that affectivity contributes to the determination of narrative contents also in a more fundamental way, one which has been overlooked so far because of a predominant focus in the literature on emotions conceived as intentional affective states. While these states certainly have an impact on what we choose to narrate, I will argue that much more significant is the role played in this context by non-intentional affects and, in particular, by what have been called "existential feelings" (Ratcliffe 2005; 2008). According to Ratcliffe, these are particular bodily feelings which constitute the subject's sense of belonging to a world where things can "matter" in various respects, along with a sense of the theoretical and practical possibilities that are available. By relying also on a phenomenological analysis of the disruptions of affectivity and narrativity typical of depression, I will argue that existential feelings, by virtue of their ability to determine the set of cognitive and emotional states that we can undergo, determine also the range of stories that it is possible for us tell, that is they constitutively shape our "narrative repertoire". I will then move to consider another aspect of the relationship between affectivity and narrativity, namely the role played by life stories in shaping the experiential structure of emotions. In this regard, various insights have been developed in support of the idea that autobiographical story-telling is cardinal to our ability to confer meaningfulness to our affective experience (e.g. Goldie 2000; 2012) and to regulate our emotions (e.g. Angus, Greenberg 2011). In addition to this, I argue that life narratives are also central to the constitution of "affective depth", a distinct dimension of emotional experience. In particular, I claim that it is by virtue of their being adequately positioned within our life stories that emotions can acquire some of the features which are considered to be constitutive of depth, namely they can become hierarchically ordered (De Monticelli 2003) and embedded to various degrees in the person's life (Pugmire 2005). Disturbances of narrative abilities can thus be expected to disrupt in various ways the experiential structure of emotions and I conclude by suggesting that these dynamics are exemplified by the alterations of narrative self-understanding and affective experience characteristic of borderline personality disorder.

Distinguishing Two Types of Motivation to Explain Fictional Emotion

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The Paradox of Fiction, in broad strokes, asks how we can have emotional responses to things we know to be fictional. Part of answering that question involves figuring out whether or not we genuinely believe the content of the fictions. Recently, some have argued that we do not believe the content of fiction because, if we did, then we would be motivated to act in response to the fictional events. So, a bear on screen ought to motivate us to run away in the same way a bear in the real world would. Since such a fictional bear does not motivate us to run, they argue, we do not genuinely believe the content of fictions, and so the paradox has been dissolved. Let's call this the Argument from Motivation.

In this paper I argue that the Argument from Motivation rests on the conflation of two distinct species of motivation, what I call Cognitive and Visceral motivation. Visceral motivation, on the one hand, is bodily preparation to perform some action. Cognitive motivation, on the other hand, is the formation of a desire to bring about some end in the world. I argue that real life cases of emotional motivation involve both Cognitive and Visceral motivation, and this conjunction explains not only why the bear causes us to run (Visceral motivation) but to run in a direction opposite the bear so as to get away (Cognitive motivation). The Visceral motivation to run, I argue, triggers the Cognitive motivation to run away.

In the fictional case, however, agents do not run, though they often feel the Visceral motivation to perform some action. So, when watching a horror movie, an agent often feels frightened and tense; their heart beat races from fear. These autonomic responses all count as Visceral motivation on my view. However, as I argue, engagement with the fictional events happens in the agent's imagination. More broadly, I claim that Visceral motivation only leads to the performance of an action if there is some intermediate Cognitive motivation, and that in the fiction case, the imaginative engagement stops the formation of any such Cognitive motivation. If this is the case, then we have good reason to not only reject the Argument from Motivation, but also to reject claims against the necessity of imaginative involvement during our engagement with fiction.

Cognition and Expression of Emotional Experience from a Phenomenological Perspective

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The goal of this paper is to briefly introduce one phenomenological perspective on the knowledge of emotions. Through an examination of Edmund Husserl's comments on emotions in his Logical Investigations, a contrasting opinion may be added to the discussion at the Philosophy of Emotions Conference in Edinburgh. This paper will be executed in three phases. (1) The primary problem Husserl had with emotional experience in the Investigations concerned how one can make statements and think about them. We accordingly first introduce this difficulty. By (2) examining

Husserl's unusual solution to this dilemma, we can (3) discover his conclusions concerning the knowledge of emotions.

(1) Problem: Being and Meaning
While it may sound strange to contemporary and analytic ears, Husserl's struggle is a result of his conclusion that one can only think or state (these being near equivalents for him) something about objects which are experienced as existing. When we perceive an object, for example, we can make a statement about it because that object is seen as existing. The crucial turn comes when Husserl claimed that an emotional characteristic replaces the trait of simple existence. If I were to experience an object as desirable, that trait supplants the characteristic of 'simple existence'. As thoughts or expressions can only be about simply existing objects, this switch from 'existing' to 'desirable' precludes the possibility of thought or expression about the emotional experience.

(2) Solution: Inner Perception
Husserl's peculiar introduction of this problem calls for an equally strange conclusion. He stated that in order to talk about emotions we have to direct an 'inner perception' (which is similar to reflection) to the emotional experience itself. This emotional act, Husserl concluded in a Cartesian style, is then internally perceived as certainly existing. As this emotional experience is seen with the characteristic of existence, it can and must be this experience which we express when we seemingly talk about our emotions or the object of our emotions.

(3) Implications: Infallibility
With the above in mind, we will be able to demonstrate how Husserl believed that it is impossible to be incorrect with regards to our knowledge of emotions. The only way in which such a statement or thought could be untrue is if we were being "insincere" to our interlocutor. It is our belief that by reframing this argument, which is teeming with jargon, in everyday language, Husserl's atypical conclusion will inspire fruitful dialogue.

APORETIC STATE: THE SHAMEFUL RECOGNITION OF CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOCRATIC ELENCHUS

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I will propose and argue for a completely novel suggestion about the Socratic elenchus, and more generally the Socratic Dialogue methodology. It is that the effect that Socrates aims to achieve through the elenchus, namely the state of aporia of the interlocutor, is a mental state that involves feelings, which in turn play a role in the cognitive development of the interlocutor. The aporetic state is not a purely cognitive state; it is a cognitively-motivational state involving emotive elements.

Plato argued that emotions are necessary to reach the truth. For instance, Plato's *Sophist* 230b-230e5 (the "Noble sophistry" passage) clearly shows the necessary bond between the logical and the emotional level, to be found in the Socratic elenchus. Confutation brings the interlocutor to the aporetic state, understandable as an embodied and embedded experience of mistakes, the first step to grasp the truth. Aporetic state is a good example of the collaboration of emotions and reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of contradictions. It is a cognitive and emotional

acknowledgement of errors that pushes the subject to transform his/her behaviour. The use of emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy for argumentation; emotions are the elements that embody knowledge into a practice capable of transforming life into a good life thereby determining the rational way of living for flourishing.

The recognition of mistakes does not happen just "in the head" but is "extended" in the public environment that permits the generation of shame. Not only because shame is a "public emotion" but because the public and dialogical context is a necessary component of the katharsis, through what I call "outreach elenchus", i.e. the public act of purification.

Shame is in Plato's *Sophist* a therapeutic tool for healing the illness of one's soul and style of life; nevertheless it is not happen just in the "head" of one subject but it is generated and have effects in the "society of dialogue" (Vidal-Nacquet). I will argue that the aporetic state is achieved in the elenchus, not only in the interlocutor's mental state; the state is the conclusion of the elenchus that is a shared cognitively-motivational state of both interlocutors. Finally I conclude that this emotional knowledge is realizable just in the shared and kathartic setting of the drama.

The theory I will employ for explaining the shared state achieved through the elenchus is the theory of the extended mind of Andy Clark & David Chalmers and of the extended emotions of Jan Slaby.

BRIDGING THE EMOTIONAL GAP:
THE ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF EMOTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION

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A recent addition to the battery of philosophical accounts of emotions is Deonna and Teroni's (2012a) 'attitudinal theory' (AT). Deonna and Teroni reject views according to which emotions have evaluative content or are attitudes directed towards evaluative contents. Instead, they argue that emotions are best understood as evaluative attitudes towards objects, where the attitude is appropriate when the object 'exemplifies a given evaluative property' (2012a, 76). Both Döring and Lutz (2014) and Smith (2014) have criticised the AT for being incompatible with the additional claim that emotions can justify evaluative judgements, a claim central to many accounts of emotions including the AT. The objectors argue that, if the content of an emotion is not evaluative, Deonna and Teroni's story for the justification of emotions creates a problematic 'gap' between an evaluative property and an emotional judgement.

I am sympathetic to the AT and believe that it provides a cogent criticism of other dominant theories, such as perceptual theories. I agree with the objectors, however, that it gives the wrong story for emotional content, thereby creating a problem for emotional justification. In this paper, I aim to draw out the insights of the AT while rejecting that the content of an emotion is not evaluative. I take a similar starting point to Deonna and Teroni by examining the concept of the 'formal object' of an emotion. I argue, however, that the subject's cares and concerns in part constitute the evaluative property which is the formal object of an emotion. (It is important to note that my proposal is not subject to Deonna and Teroni's rejection of a similar claim in (2012b).) With this basis, I conclude that the emotional content is evaluative.

Two consequences of my proposal are that (1) like the AT, it fleshes out how emotions cannot be perceptions of value, but (2) while the 'gap' is filled, it becomes apparent that emotions do not provide non-inferential justification for an evaluative judgement. I thus propose a modification of the AT which demystifies justification but in so doing, fleshes out what the limits to justification are, and why.

Fitting Love

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This paper examines the norms governing love and their relationship to moral norms. First I argue that love is, if not an emotion, at least subject to norms like those that govern emotion. In particular, love can be fitting or not, depending on whether the object of love is such as to render the evaluative assessment involved in love accurate. With these preliminaries established, the bulk of the paper defends the quality theory of love—the view that features of the loved person determine whether love is fitting. This contrasts with the relationship theory, defended by Niko Kolodny (2003), according to which love is fitting just in case it occurs within the context of a valuable relationship. I argue for two main claims, which jointly support the quality theory over the relationship theory: (1) resistance to the quality theory stems from an instance of what D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) call the moralistic fallacy, which involves treating norms that are extrinsic to an emotion—e.g. moral or prudential norms—as though they were intrinsic to it. (2) The relationship theory offers an impoverished account of love as compared to the quality theory: making love normatively dependent on valuable relationships diminishes both and underestimates the human capacity to balance love against duties of loyalty.

The paper has three main parts. The first explains the competing theories and offers some methodological considerations. I suggest that we ought to favor the account that best captures the richness of human experience, and best clarifies situations in which fittingness reasons for love seem to compete with other kinds of reasons. The second part motivates the quality theory by arguing that loving someone and valuing a relationship are best conceived as distinct psychological phenomena. I present a case that the relationship theory cannot capture, because it involves a situation in which love is appropriate even in the absence of any valuable relationship. I consider the possible responses to this case—that the emotion described in the case is not appropriate or not love, and that there is a valuable relationship in the case—and show how they fail. The third part defends the quality theory against each of the five objections presented in Kolodny (2003). One of these is the non-substitutability objection: if love is fitting because of qualities of the beloved, there should be no problem, from the perspective of a lover, with swapping out a loved one for a qualitatively similar other. I argue that this objection commits the moralistic fallacy, and I show how the quality theory can accommodate the importance of loyalty to relationships without requiring the impossible—that our loved ones be the most fitting of all possible candidates. Another objection claims that the quality theory cannot explain why love manifests differently within different kinds of relationships. Using an analogy with fear, I argue that while (for example) expressions of parental love differ from expressions of romantic love, this does not entail that relationships are what make love fitting.

THE AFFECTIVE-PHENOMENAL REPRESENTATION OF VALUE

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In this paper I argue for a version of ARV:

The Affective-Phenomenal Representation of Value (ARV): if n is a type of value-property, and a subject S represents the world as instantiating n, S does so (at least partially) in virtue of having a particular affective phenomenology.

I argue that, as it is with phenomenal redness and a certain aspect of red, so it is with particular affective-phenomenal qualities (e.g. reverential deference) and a certain aspect of value properties (e.g. the property of being sacred): as with a certain aspect of color properties, a certain aspect of value properties can only be genuinely represented when represented via a particular phenomenal aspect.

There are of course a variety of ways in which value properties might be said to be represented. The phenomenal way of representing value properties is an especially important one, though, because it is the representational mode we should be most concerned to keep in focus when we are tempted to say that someone is praiseworthy for going with her moral reasons, or blameworthy for resisting them. When we do this, we should be concerned about whether or not she had the relevant sort of affective-phenomenal representation of the relevant value properties, and if she did not, then we should (generally) hesitate to call her praise- or blame-worthy. Why so? In short, I argue, because the affective-phenomenal representation of value properties is the representational mode that allows subjects to understand the reason-giving-ness aspect of value properties. Without this sort of phenomenal representation of value properties, the relevant subject will not have the kind of grasp of the reason-giving-ness of value properties she needs to make her properly accountable for responding to them. (So, e.g., zombies could not represent value properties as reason-giving and could not properly be incorporated into our normal practices of praise and blame.)

ARV has important consequences for philosophy of mind, meta-ethics, and democratic deliberation. First, in philosophy of mind, ARV raises problems for any theory of mental representation that doesn't give phenomenal properties a role to play in content determination. Second, in meta-ethics, ARV opens up new ways for cognitivists to defend themselves against non-cognitivist arguments that depend on motivational internalism or the open question argument. Third, in regards to democratic deliberation, ARV suggests that conceptions of what count as legitimate modes of "rational" persuasion need to be expanded. In that context, legitimate appeals to reason are often understood as being in tension with appeals that make heavy use of affect, but ARV suggests that attempting to extricate "reason" from affect when we deliberate about values is counter-productive. People who try to understand and reason about each other's values without allowing themselves to take up the relevant affects associated with the representation of the relevant values will speak right past each other.

Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Emotion?

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Although one of the founding fathers of philosophical pragmatism, William James, was highly influential for the scientific and philosophical study of emotions as well, pragmatism as a whole has not played a prominent role in recent discussions in the philosophy of emotion. This lack of genuinely pragmatist positions is a pity not only because some of the crucial tenets of classical pragmatism resonate in current debates, e.g. the contestation of a mind-body-dualism or the great interest in the advances made in empirical research such as cognitive science, but also because pragmatism, although not exclusively in the Jamesian vein, may be in a good position to help tracing more clearly some of the relations between theoretical and practical philosophy—a task that shall be deemed important since the philosophy of emotion arguably plays a mediating role between questions of philosophy of mind, value theory but also practical philosophy in general. For instance, getting a clearer conception of phenomena such as hope, compassion, or resentment is likely to have far-reaching implications for ethical and political philosophy.

My aim in this presentation is to start from the attitudinal theory Deonna and Teroni (2012) propose as an adequate philosophical understanding of the emotions. After a brief reconstruction of what they mean exactly by 'attitude' I will provide an account of the common pragmatist insight into the role emotions play for belief formation and the acquisition of habits. It can be shown that the pragmatist shared view about the function of emotion is also shared by the attitudinal theorists. Pragmatists' 'habits' and attitudinal theorists' 'attitudes' turn out to be very like-minded conceptions. However, there are important differences in the classical pragmatists' works regarding the nature of emotion that carry over to contemporary concerns of the internalism/externalism-debate. Thus, with respect to the 'correctness conditions' Deonna und Teroni propose for emotions in combination with their implicit argument for value realism, I want to offer support based on an objectivist reading of the pragmatist theory of emotion by focusing on Peirce's largely neglected views on the topic. It can be shown that, somewhat surprisingly, the case for value realism can be made even stronger while at the same time allowing for a qualified pluralism with respect to the formation of 'habits'/'attitudes'. Finally, on this account I want to introduce an argument for the normativity of emotions in the sense that agents, better, "work out" emotionally, for two related reasons: first, because they aim at getting things "really" right; the second reason flows from the idea that, on a pragmatist account, a concept—such as hope, compassion, or resentment—necessarily has conceivable practical implications. Therefore, working out emotionally has important practical implications.

This argument can be tied neatly to the pragmatist idea of the importance of (character) 'growth' and to the idea that emotions lead to 'moral precepts'—and this in an objective way. Again, I assume that this will support and refine the attitudinal theorists' discussion of 'emotional sensitivity' and 'understanding'.

CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY AND THEIR APPLICATION TO EMOTIONS

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In the debate about the nature of emotions a great variety of philosophers share the assumption that those mental phenomena do not stand in a sharp contrast to reason but on the contrary constitute rational states. In the ascription of rationality the authors refer to the ability to justify or criticize emotions, i.e. to evaluate them as appropriate or inappropriate in regard to an objective standard. But how should this normative benchmark be described? Some authors refer to what might be called the criterion of cognitive accessibility. According to this, a mental state can only be characterized as rational when it is embedded in an inferentially network of thoughts and it is therefore principally accessible to considerations and an agent's active exertion of influence. Only then a mental state can be evaluated as correct or incorrect, judged by its consistence with the established inferential system and its faultless deduction. Hence, emotions can be described as rational—in contrast to arational—when they underlie the influence of an agent's intellectual capacities and as rational—in contrast to irrational—when they succeed correct premises and inferences.

In the first step of my paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that this normative criterion might perhaps constitute a useful instrument to evaluate mental states like beliefs, judgments or desire but that it does not do justice to the way people actually assess emotions. The main argument supporting this thesis is based on the fact that emotions sometimes rather happen to an individual than being the result of a reasonable decision-making process. A person's emotions can occur against better knowledge such as a man might fear the height of a rollercoaster although he knows that he is properly secured in his seatbelt. His fear is inferentially encapsulated as the occurrence of the emotion is insensitive against the direct influence of his considerations. Those cases constitute a problem for the mentioned criterion of rationality because, according to this norm, all cognitive inaccessible emotions have to be characterized as simply arational whereas people tend to further distinguish them in regard to their normative status. There seems to exist decisive differences between a person who fears an unfamiliar fighting dog as a direct reaction to its perception and a person who fears dogs, even a Chihuahua, out of pathological reason. Both instantiations of fear occur automatically albeit the first is to be assessed in some way as more appropriate than the second.

As a consequence, another benchmark should be introduced which allows evaluating cognitive accessible as well as cognitive inaccessible emotions. In the second step of my paper I therefore attempt to prove that such a criterion should address the correspondence of an emotion's representational content with the present world state since this norm is not bound to the inferentially connections of the mental state being assessed. Nonetheless it is to demonstrate that this criterion of correspondence still enables us to explain the possible influence of thoughts on emotions and the difference between emotions and pure physiological sensations like itching.

OVERCOMING VICTIMHOOD: STOICISM, ANTI-STOICISM AND LE FILS

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In this paper I use a film by the Belgian filmmakers Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne, Le Fils (2002), to explore the difference between Stoic and Anti-Stoic approaches to overcoming victimhood. By "victim" I mean a person who is suffering as a direct consequence of the wrong-doing of another. By "overcoming victimhood," I mean a process by which a victim ameliorates and transforms their suffering in such a way that (a) they no longer experience their suffering in terms of their victimhood (for example, a parent grieving for a killed child manages to escape unresolved and painful anger towards the child's killer); and (b) their suffering no longer prevents them living a good life – that is, a life rich in pleasure and meaningfulness. Suffering is part of a good life, but not if it thwarts the experience, connectedness and achievement of a life well lived. I contrast two approaches to overcoming victimhood that I label the Stoic approach and the Anti-Stoic approach. The Stoic approach frames the process of overcoming victimhood in terms of the inner resources of victims, in particular their wisdom, self-knowledge and strength of will. A Stoic way of overcoming victimhood involves marshalling powers of reason to ameliorate, transform or perhaps eliminate suffering. Anti-Stoic approaches emphasize the extent to which victims, in their attempts to overcome victimhood, are in imperfect control of their emotions, are imperfect in their self-understanding, act under great uncertainty, and are highly dependent upon others, including, often, those who have made them victims.

Le Fils tells the story of a man whose son has been murdered, the victim of a child killer. The murderer, now a boy of sixteen, becomes the man's apprentice. The film tracks the fragile and dangerous path of this emerging relationship and does so with extraordinary skill and restraint. I argue that the film illustrates how something of value can emerge from emotional confusion and in spite of limited agency and self-understanding. It makes plain a source of value that escapes the notice of Stoic philosophers.

JAMES, NEUROPRAGMATISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS

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Contemporary emotion researchers such as Prinz and Damasio often cite William James, particularly his 1884 article that delivered what came to be known as the James-Lang theory. Rather perplexingly, however, his 1879 "The Sentiment of Rationality," which suggests that emotion undergirds our reasoning capacity, is mostly neglected. This is in spite of the fact that Damasio specifically advances this thesis, and research on the rationality of emotion is in vogue.

James held that our thought about the world is always already emotionally qualified, and others have suggested likewise, as with Heidegger (1927) in his discussions of care and concern. The idea has also been developed by contemporary psychologists such as Frijda (1986), who asserted that the emotional "'to me' or 'for me' dissolves into the propert[ies]" of things, people and events (p. 188).

Because our attitude towards the world is nearly always one of wanting to do, get or avoid something and therefore one of concern or interest, the world is emotionally qualified all along. Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective, we cannot think in the absence of concerned and therefore emotional involvement, a claim also supported by the neurophysiological work of Damasio (e.g., 1994, 1999). As James (1879) suggested, the carpenter conceives oil as a darkener of wood, the mechanic as a lubricant. In each case the essence varies with one's interest or concern (p. 952). Emotion also connects to the type of explanations we seek. So whereas excessive complexity annoys, inordinate simplicity bores, so parsimony attracts us, yet not oversimplification (James, 1879, pp. 950–956; Crippen, 2010, p. 495).

From the pragmatic standpoint, it accordingly follows that we cannot think in the absence of emotionality and interests, and it can be added that we cannot perceive without them either. Thus we perceive a river as an obstacle, as navigable, perhaps drinkable, cooling, freezing or dangerous, which is to say, in terms of possible actions we might take and their effects on us, which again means in terms of use-value and hence interests. If we did not see a rushing river as dangerous and waded heedlessly in, or a wall as an obstacle, smashing into it, we would be functionally blind. Interests are emotion-like, although James and other classical pragmatists did not emphasize this. It follows, then, that emotion is essential not only in cognizing, but also perceiving the world, all the more so in light of Gibsonian theories of perception, which are arguably pragmatically inspired (see Reed, 1988; Held, 2001).

My aim in this paper is to reconnect ideas presented in "The Sentiment of Rationality" and other pieces in which James advanced comparable ideas to more recent philosophical and psychological work mentioned above. I will pay specific attention to connections between James and the neurophysiological work of Damasio. I will thereby fortify the place of James—who was versed in neurophysiology and originally hired as a lecturer of anatomy and physiology at Harvard—in the burgeoning neuropragmatic movement.

EMOTIONAL FITTINGNESS, REASONS TO ACT, AND RETRIBUTIVISM

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It seems that emotional fittingness is normative, in this sense: for it to be fitting for S to feel an emotion F toward some object x entails that there is reason for S to feel F at x. It seems too that some emotions are (at least in part) motivational states. So suppose that in feeling F(x) one is motivated to do some action of type t. Then if F(x) is fitting, there is reason for S to be in a state that motivates him to do something of type t. Must there be, in such a case, a reason for S to do the thing that F(x) motivates him to do? I propose to explore that question, using anger as a case study, and suggest that an affirmative answer to it leads to a modest form of retributivism.

The Private Meaning of Emotions

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The philosopher and psychoanalyst Richard Wollheim holds an exceptional and interesting view about emotions. According to Wollheim, emotions are psychologically real and causally efficacious mental dispositions, where mental dispositions are „persisting modifications of the mind" (Wollheim 1999, On the emotions, 1). Emotions are essentially attitudes that have a characteristic genesis: They arise out of the satisfaction or frustration of our desires. Because of this, emotions are essentially tied to a subject's autobiography. Even though Wollheim's theory is problematic in various ways—for example with respect to his account of mental dispositions—it does point out an important and often neglected aspect of our emotional life, namely the personal significance or the private meaning of emotions.

Of course, most of the contemporary theories of emotions agree upon the fact that emotions are not only representational, but also evaluative and, thus, personally significant. An emotion is usually taken to be a representation of an object in its significance for the subject. However, the referred to significance is usually thought of as being constituted by something objective or relational and not as being something radically subjective. For example: According to Sabine Döring, who proposes a cognitivist theory of emotions, emotions are evaluative in the sense that they point to objective values, that is, to values that mind-independent things in the world mind-independently possess. According to Jesse Prinz, who proposes an embodied theory of emotions, emotions alert us to our concerns, where our concerns are relational properties which evolve in the process of adaptation of the organism to its environment.

In contrast to the aforementioned theories, Wollheim's theory suggests that emotions represent values that are radically subjective. Of course, they are (indirectly) linked to the external world, because they arise out of desires that have an intentional relation to the world. But they are radically subjective in the sense that they represent the individual and unique history of what happened to our desires, namely their satisfactions and their frustrations. Because of this, emotions „colour" or view of the world in a unique way. But how is it possible for emotions to represent the individual history of our desires? The key to understand this lies in the mental processes of association and imagination. This points to another aspect of our mental life that is often neglected: Intrapsychic relations are not only constituted by rationality, but also by non-rational processes like association and imagination.

In my presentation, I would like to explore Wollheim's theory using the examples of envy and jealousy. These complex emotions seem to be paradigmatic when it comes to the important role that desires, association and imagination play in our emotional life. I want to argue that it is indeed necessary to incorporate the autobiographical or ontogenetic perspective of a subject in a theory of emotions, in order to adequately understand the complex emotions of a subject and the significant difference among subjects with respect to their emotional life.

APORIAS IN THE CONTEMPORARY PARADIGM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LOVE: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SOLUTIONS OFFERED BY 20TH CENTURY FRENCH ONTOLOGY

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Whilst the philosophical study of love is divided into a discordant variety of outlooks on how to define and study love, union theorists, robust concern theorists, value theorists and emotion theorists share characteristics particular to the current paradigm of the analytic philosophical study of love: all attempt to construct a framework which adheres to ordinary language and can dismiss the ostensibly paradoxical features of love. This goal has reached aporias in a number of different forms: union theorists—such as Fischer (1990) and Scruton (1986)—struggle to explain how one can have union without jeopardising autonomy; whereas robust concern theorists—such as Frankfurt (1999)—want love to be an end in-itself but cannot explain the initial desire for love without introducing a perpetual lack which would undermine the value of love. Furthermore, this paradigm produces other peculiarities, such as Velleman (1999, 2008) and Badhwar's (2003) conviction that lovers need not desire or demonstrate concern for the welfare of their love-objects. It is the contention of this paper that the root of these problems are the philosophers' adherence to ordinary language and that such aporias can be overcome if attention is given to the ontological status of love. In particular, this paper will advocate the consideration of the developments in continental philosophy as a productive alternative to the current paradigm in the analytic philosophical study of emotions such as love.

One potentially productive avenue for inquiry is the assemblage of 20th Century French ontologies and their framing of love, such as those of Sartre, Lacan and Badiou. This paper will develop upon a paper presented at the Inaugural Conference for the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions which argued that Sartre's framework in *Being and Nothingness* presented a bilateral theory of love which stood in a paradoxical relationship to his fundamental ontology. The previous paper, therefore, concluded that Sartre's ontology was an unsuitable grounding for a cognitivist approach to the interdisciplinary study of emotions. Whilst the previous paper successfully indicated the emergence of continental expressions of the paradoxical features of love and indicated that a more complex ontological framework is necessary, it was not able to articulate the structure of the ontological framework which can embrace the paradox.

This paper will: explain how Lacan's ontological framework affirms that subjectivity is founded upon the same paradoxical structure as love; and, demonstrate how this framework would alleviate the philosophical study of emotion from its concern over the ostensible paradoxical nature of love. This paper will present close readings of Lacan's *Seminar* XI and XX in order to demonstrate how impasses in the philosophical study of love can be overcome. For instance, this paper will demonstrate how—by virtue of being directed at a primordial state prior to consciousness where one's self cannot be distinguished from others: love can be simultaneously selfish and selfless, and personal and collective without losing autonomy; love can be an end in-itself without lack undermining its value; and how love objects can be simultaneously universal and particular.

THE SEVERAL SECOND PERSONS IN THE EXPERIENCE AND STUDY OF SHAME

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Shame, as an emotion, has been subject to much controversy in philosophical discussions. Deonna and Teroni (2011) have deemphasized social aspects of it, while Zahavi (2012) has identified sociality as essential to the self to which shame adheres. Tangney and Dearing (2002) have attempted to create measures of it for experimental and quantitative analysis, and identified defensive reactions to reference to the named emotions of guilt and shame, yet have inadequately addressed that very problem of defense mechanisms. Gallagher (2011), Hutto (2008) and Perez (2013) have argued that a sub-cognitive second-person experience is the basis of "folk-psychological" concepts.

I shall place the problem of understanding shame within the context of the above discussion of folk-psychological concepts. I take from the latter authors the intent to complicate simplistic dualities such as first- vs. third-personal accounts by constructing an alternative. This alternative is both intersubjective and hence shared, yet not objective in the sense that abstractions of third-personal varieties suggest. This alternative construction of point-of-view is especially useful in the resolution of puzzles that plague the literature on shame.

I argue that the nature of shame is such that attempts to understand it require sophisticated subtlety due to the tendency on the part of shame-bearers to hide the shame itself, even from themselves. Because of the painfulness of shame, investigation and understanding of it requires a mixture of first-, third-, and second-personal perspectives. I argue that the kinds of understandings possible through intimate personal relationships, therapeutic spaces, and literary experiences involve complex shifts in perspective that allow for different ways of allaying of painfulness and permit shame to reveal itself more fully.

I thus set a challenge to philosophers and empirical scientists, to adjust their instruments of detection and sounding of this complex emotion. Finally, I offer specific needs that a methodology of taking stock of shame should meet.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEAR AND DISGUST: KOLNAI'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

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Disgust is a particularly interesting emotion from the point of view of the relationship between material and cognitive responses, as well as from the perspective of a differentiation between natural and cultural components. The corporeal aspects in disgust are so prominent that one is tempted to confuse it with mere involuntary reactions such as nausea or startle recoil. Some have argued that disgust is essentially a "natural emotion". For example, Ekman and Griffiths independently

observed that its bodily expressions remain constant across cultures and claimed that its cognitive component is minimal.

In his 1929 essay Kolnai, while devoting a very refined analysis to the bodily phenomena of disgust, argued that it is as cognitively rich as other complex reactive emotions such as fear, hate and contempt; it belongs both to the natural and corporeal and to the cultural, ethical and political reactive attitudes. Differently from Miller ("The Anatomy of Disgust," 1997) who maintained that disgust is a form of fear ("a strong sense of aversion to something perceived as dangerous because of its powers to contaminate, infect, or pollute by proximity, contact, or ingestion"), Kolnai thought that fear and disgust are similar in that they belong to the reactive and defensive attitudes, but he claimed that they are distinct emotions, and provided several arguments to support his point. In this paper, I will examine his arguments towards a differential analysis of disgust and fear.

I will first concentrate on the contrast between fear and disgust from the point of view of their intentional objects and explain why Kolnai thinks that the intentional objects of fear are two (from the threatening object back to the subject and its existential situation), while disgust has only one intentional object (the subject remains in the background while focusing attention on the object and its specific sensuous qualities). Secondarily, I will examine the notion of proximity (and the related qualities of not-selfcontainedness, and intrusiveness), which defines the object of disgust in contrast with the object of fear according to Kolnai. In this context, I will draw a parallel between Kolnai's thesis concerning the obtrusive proximity of the disgusting object and Aristotle's thesis that the danger which causes fear must be imminent but not pressing too close. Without a minimal distance from the perceived danger, the subject will have no hope of safety and, Aristotle argues, without hope there can be no fear. Thirdly, I will examine Kolnai's thesis that while fear intends its object as threatening, and thus potentially stronger than the subject, the objects of disgust can be sinister or uncanny but not threatening, because what is disgusting is usually considered inferior. While we flee from what we fear and we aim at destroying what we hate, we simply want to clean up disgusting places and put out of the way disgusting objects (this characterization of the impulses stemming from disgust has of course some important political implications that I will briefly spell out). Finally, I will analyze Kolnai's critical appropriation of the Freudian analysis of disgust, i.e., the thesis that, differently from fear, disgust is an ambivalent emotion which, besides rejection, entails a fascination with its object which verges on desire.

RATIONALITY OF EMOTION AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FALLACY

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For over a century philosophers have discussed the rationality of emotion. However, this debate is hampered by the fact that "rational" has been used to mean a variety of different things, such as justified, correct, appropriate, fitting, accurate and reasonable: concepts which are not obviously synonymous. This paper will distinguish between a functional notion of "correct emotion" and an epistemological notion of "correct emotion". Emotions can misfire, but their functional correctness conditions are distinct from the correctness conditions of their emotional content. In emotion theory there is widespread agreement that affective experience conveys information, although what kind of information is still debated. (See for example (Duncan & Barrett, 2007) and (Scherer,

1984).) This informational content can be correct or incorrect. However, an emotion can convey incorrect information, while still correctly fulfilling its function. For instance the pleasure we take in eating a lot of sugar is "correct" because our psychology is wired in such a way that we experience pleasure when tasting sugar. However, we know that eating too much sugar is bad for us, and this affective experience is "incorrect" in the sense that it gives us the wrong information, namely the positive appreciation of something that is "bad". Epistemic correctness can therefore be distinct from functional correctness. This distinction is important as it marks the difference between perceptual and affective experience. In perception an incorrect content correlates with a malfunctioning of the perceptual system. An illusion is an "incorrect" perception in the sense that it does not fulfil its function and it is also incorrect in the sense that it conveys wrong information. In emotional experience there is no such correlation: inaccurate emotional content does not necessarily correlate with emotional malfunctioning. In order words, "correct" emotions can convey "incorrect" information.

EMOTION IN MENTAL TIME TRAVEL AND NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING

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Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability we humans have to inhabit the past and imagine the future. It has a particular experiential quality: to *inhabit* times and places beyond the here and now is to feel subjectively present in them. Gerrans & Kennett (2010) argue that MTT is central to our moral agency, because it allows us to understand ourselves as an agent that extends through time. The phenomenology of MTT is crucial for them: factual knowledge of our past and future isn't enough for moral agency.

I argue that emotions can explain the phenomenology of MTT. However, this explanation requires we see MTT as dependent on our capacity for narrative understanding. My argument is based on Velleman's account of narrative understanding (2003), and uses evidence from neuroscience as support. In this theory, emotion is responsible for the embodied, perspectival character of narrative understanding. Emotions are therefore central to experiencing ourselves in relation to events not currently happening. So it turns out that an analysis of narrative understanding also captures what is characteristic of MTT.

THE TEMPORALITY OF EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS

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It is well known that our emotions, moods, and feelings affect the way in which we experience the passage of time, but the temporal nature of these affects themselves is little discussed. In this paper, I wish to shed some new light on the relationship between emotions, feelings, and moods by describing them in the context of temporality. I argue that our affects have different temporal characters—moods as a lived past, emotions as futural, and feelings as present—but that their

different temporal characters demonstrate that they cannot be sharply divided. They are not completely isolated phenomena. Rather, they are intertwined dimensions of affectivity.

I begin by explaining the commonly argued differences between feelings and emotions, and present Matthew Ratcliffe's reasons for rejecting them. I explain his work on existential feelings, which shows that feelings are not the necessarily conscious, merely bodily, non-intentional phenomena they are normally thought to be. As such, the relation between emotions and feelings is left unexplained.

In the second part of this paper, I give a brief explanation of temporality in the Heideggerian sense. Rather than spatializing time and treating past, present, and future as locations into which, if we had the ability, we could move, we need to understand time as it is lived. In this context, the past is not some "now" existing behind us, but rather it is lived as our already-having-been. We experience it as the culmination of the facts of our lives, which serve as the context in which we are being. Likewise, the future is not some "now" into which we will soon be moving, but rather it is lived as our coming-towards. I experience it by being engaged in activities where I project myself ahead of myself. Finally, the present is lived as a "field of presence" which has horizons of the past and future. It is that dimension of temporality in which past and future intertwine.

In the final part of this paper, I describe the temporality of our affects. I build on the work of Jan Slaby, who discusses the temporality of Heideggerian moods. I agree with his argument that moods disclose our lived past by attuning us to our current situation in the world. They are those affects through which the world even shows up for us. I then argue that emotions, understood as enactive phenomena, are lived as futural. They are specific saliences of our coming-towards—anticipations of what we will likely do. Finally, I argue that feelings are more ambiguous, since they have similar temporal characteristics to both emotions and moods. Due to this, I argue that they are temporally present. In the same way that the present has horizons of past and future, feelings have horizons of moods and emotions. They are the field of affectivity, discovered in the context of temporality, in which our moods and emotions intertwine and are made present to us. As such, temporality reveals both the differences and the intimate connection between the dimensions of affectivity.

FEAR

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"Passive fear" denotes a certain type of response to a perceived threat; what is distinctive about the state of passive fear is that its behavioural outlook appears to qualify the emotional experience. I distinguish between two cases of passive fear: one is that of freezing in fear; the other is that of fear-involved tonic immobility. I reconstruct the explanatory strategy that is commonly employed in the field of emotion science, and argue that it leaves certain questions about the nature of passive fear unanswered. I subsequently propose an account of passive fear that builds upon a phenomenological theory of emotions, placing emphasis on the interpretation of current research into human tonic immobility.

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION IN TIMAEUS' NEGLECTED THEORY ON NATURE OF MAN

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At the *Timaeus* 19b4, b5, b7 and c2 Socrates gives emotions as reasons why he wants to hear scientific accounts on mankind. Referring to their recent discussion, Socrates says that he feels like a man who might be seeing a picture of, or even a completely formed noble living creature, but standing still. Timaeus, who has heard Socrates create this spectacle verbally, then gives a causal account of its movements. Throughout the dialogue, the emotion of benevolence is linked to reason and vision and immortal rational soul, whereas the emotion of enthusiasm for justice, termed anger, is linked to the nobler part of the mortal soul, hearing and executing conclusions reached in the internal dialogue of the human rational soul.

To do justice to Plato's philosophy of emotions, we must investigate the very beginning and end of the *Timaeus*; text which is largely neglected, even in current discussion. Here I propose outlines of a new and radical working theory of how this might be begun.

Timaeus' Socrates invokes the sense of vision, of the beauty of the form of the viewed animal and the desire to see it in action. From the visible beauty of the formal features seen, Socrates anticipates that when the beautiful creature is let loose on the tasks of life, strife and persuasion, it will achieve results, not only as promised by her form but also "befitting her training and education" (Cornford, 1937).

In *Timaeus'* scientific principles for care of man, (T.87c-88b), beauty, composition and proportion are central. *Timaeus* reiterates the reasons Socrates gives for anticipating brilliant performance. Man is composed of visible body and invisible soul. The right ratio of strength between these and between divisions within each determines human beauty, health and welfare.

The human soul is invisible, but *Timaeus'* philosophical education enables him to accept certain interpretations of visible macro-cosmic phenomena as starting points for his scientific theory of the human soul. These phenomena are the circular movements of heavenly bodies of stars and of planets, known as the circle of the same, and the band of the different. Accepting that these display the movements of the soul of the universe, a macro-cosmos of which mankind is a micro-cosmic image, *Timaeus* formulates a theory of the human soul in which emotions play an important part. *Timaeus'* psychology is not restricted to the immortal rational soul, for it is a causal property of a rational soul, perhaps logically amounting to self-predication, to want everything to be as good as it can be. Linking divisions of soul to a new and dynamic elemental theory, harbouring a new logical theory for philosophy of science, Plato's emotions stand in relations to soul parts as the powers stand to the elemental bodies, and the logic of their transformation. Investigating emotions in these neglected parts of the *Timaeus* promises rich pickings both for the philosophy of emotions and for understanding of this complex, dense and seminal work.

THE 3 R'S OF RELATING: RECOGNITION – RESONANCE – REGULATION

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In this research we explore how identity-relevant relationships (Hillenbrand and Money 2015) can develop between relationship partners as a function of three important and interlinked processes: (social) recognition, resonance and emotion regulation.

Recognition of a relationship partner is suggested to involve components such as acknowledgement, involvement in, or approval of, a partner's existence, needs or goals. Social recognition provides the basis for initiation/continuation of a relationship and is a necessary condition for relationship partners to affect each other's self-experience (Gregoratto 2015). Being recognised (or "seen") by significant others has been shown to be vitally important for human beings throughout life: as babies we depend for survival on our caretaker(s) to recognise our needs (emotional and physical needs). After infancy and childhood, humans continue to have a strong desire and requirement to be "heard" and "seen" by others in terms of their unique needs, desires and goals to be able to develop self-consciousness, emotional cognizance and interpersonal sensitivity (Lewis et al. 2001).

Resonance in a relationship is a process by which relationship partners move from socially recognising each other to emotionally understanding each other. The process of resonance has been described as the ability to sensing the inner state of each other, or, in other words, to able to broadcasting own emotions while simultaneously intuiting partner emotions in a relational encounter (Lewis et al. 2001). Resonance has been identified as one of the necessary conditions for the formation of profound relationships between partners and has also been suggested as critically important for romantic relationships to last over time (Ben-Ze'ev 2015).

Emotion regulation describes the possibility of relationship partners to move from sensing each other's emotions to actually impacting each other's emotional states and, ultimately, behavioural patterns. The possibility of regulating own and partner emotions in a relational encounter necessitates social recognition and resonance, but also calls for relationship partners to exhibit a certain attitude towards their relational 'dialogue partner' that opens the possibility for change (Kreft 2015). As such, it requires relationship partners to withholding definite judgement about their partner's personality and to behave towards each other as persons who are able to change (Kreft 2015). Emotional and behavioural patterns are typically deeply engrained in human lives and habits, deeply-rooted in factors such as upbringing, education, personal experiences, social and cultural environment. For emotional and behavioural habits and routines to change and develop, emotion regulation processes have to be 'learned' and 'practiced' for sustained periods of time between relationship partners (Lewis et al. 2001). Relationships that move to the level of mutual emotion regulation can, over time, impact partners senses of self and identity (Hillenbrand and Money 2015).

Emotional Fittingness, Reasons to Act, and Retributivism

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It seems that emotional fittingness is normative, in this sense: for it to be fitting for S to feel an emotion F toward some object x entails that there is reason for S to feel F at x. It seems too that some emotions are (at least in part) motivational states. So suppose that in feeling F(x) one is motivated to do some action of type t. Then if F(x) is fitting, there is reason for S to be in a state that motivates him to do something of type t. Must there be, in such a case, a reason for S to do the thing that F(x) motivates him to do? I propose to explore that question, using anger as a case study, and suggest that an affirmative answer to it leads to a modest form of retributivism.

Guilt as Relationship Repair or Practical Damage Limitation

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Compared to basic emotions such as fear and happiness, the emotion of guilt lacks easily recognizable facial expressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1996) but it provokes distinguishable action tendencies (Tangney & Tracy, 2012). Besides being considered negative emotion, guilt contributes towards positive consequences for the transgressor, his/her interpersonal relationship and for society in general (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1994). These beneficial outcomes can be attained by repairing the practical or the relationship damage caused by the transgression. In our view, the main purpose of guilt is to motivate the individual to take reparative steps towards the restoration of the social bonds between the victim and the transgressor. However, contrary findings seem to indicate that individuals experiencing guilt are more concerned with getting rid of negative feelings than attending to the victim's well-being, emotional state and restoration of the interpersonal relationship with the victim. For example, De Hooge and colleagues (2012) found that the transgressor's level of experienced guilt decreases when the practical damage caused to the victim is repaired by a third party. Based on studies which present guilt as a social emotion (Baumeister et al., 1994; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008; Parkinson & Illingworth, 2009) and on the common observation that humans apologize even when practical damage is done, we manipulated apology in addition to practical repair in our research. Our prediction was that apology would serve to repair the damage to the relationship and hence decrease the level of experienced guilt, independent of any guilt-reducing effects of practical repair.

Using vignettes, we analysed differences between the effects of practical repair of the transgression and repair of the interpersonal relationship, as well as their interactions, on general guilt, guilt about practical damage, and guilt about relationship damage. We hypothesised that the transgressor's concern about restoring the relationship with the victim would have a stronger effect on general guilt than the repair of the practical damage, supporting the notion that guilt is a social emotion.

AN EXISTENTIAL UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIENCE

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Conscience (Gewissen) relates to knowing (Wissen), which doesn't necessarily indicate only an ethical awakening, especially in the context of existential philosophy. Conscience makes one to be able to pause in the middle of life and look into oneself. In other words, when conscience calls one to 'come back' to itself, the true sense (Sinn as end) of one's Being is revealed. In the face of death (not-Being), all ethical problems fall into the categories of inauthentic everyday life and only the most authentic problem of Being or not-Being remains. The catalyst of the call for conscience is guilt. Having a good or bad conscience depends on the phenomenon of guilt. The call of the ontological conscience, though, is different from the 'normal' call which reveals the difference between good and evil. This call is the call of reticence, which brings us to the face of nothing, or rather, not-Being as the most authentic possibility of Being. Conscience is the call of care, which arouses the feelings to wake us up to know, or rather, to understand our own existence.

DIMINISHED EMBODIMENT AND AFFECTIVITY IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MOEBIUS SYNDROME: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

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This talk is a comparative phenomenological analysis of bodily and affective experience in Moebius Syndrome (MS) and schizophrenia. MS and schizophrenia might initially seem to have little to do with one another. The former is a congenital neurological disorder resulting in complete bilateral facial paralysis; the latter, a severe mental illness commonly defined as a disruption of thought and the perception of reality. However, closer examination of the experience of people with MS and schizophrenia, respectively, reveals some intriguing points of convergence—along with some important divergences, too—that help us better understand what it's like to live with and through these conditions. As I show, these convergences tend to revolve around some strikingly similar ways that people with MS and schizophrenia experience different aspects of their bodily and affective-emotional life. However, despite an increased interest in phenomenological approaches to psychopathology within the past couple of decades, potential connections between schizophrenia and MS have yet to be considered—in part, perhaps, because the latter is such a rare and under-investigated condition.

In this talk, I argue that phenomenological conceptions of the body and affect are central notions for understanding both Moebius Syndrome (MS) and schizophrenia. I argue specifically that both conditions can be understood to involve a disruption of basic structures of embodiment and affectivity—disruptions that can be portrayed as a diminishment or loss of intimacy with one's embodiment and, subsequently, basic affective and emotional structures linking self and world.

First, I briefly introduce a phenomenological approach to the body and affect. I considerthe traditional phenomenological distinction between, on one hand, the body through which we pre-

reflectively live, the body considered as a subject (Leib), and on the other, the body perceived by me and by other bodies, the body considered as an object (Körper). I also consider phenomenological characterizations of the way that our bodily experiences of self and world are mediated by affectivity, and I discuss empirical evidence motivating this distinction and its affective character. Next, I turn to MS and schizophrenia. Using the conceptual resources introduced in the first part of the talk, I analyse the experiences characteristic of MS and schizophrenia along three dimensions: (1) self-presence, (2) self-world relations, and (3) self-other relations. Drawing upon narrative self-reports and clinical vignettes, I show how these dimensions become experientially disrupted in both conditions—and how the unifying feature of this disruption is the felt diminishment of one's embodiment and affection relation to the world and other people. After exploring phenomenological convergences between MS and schizophrenia in some detail—and pausing to highlight some important divergences—I conclude by briefly indicating how this phenomenological perspective might inform the development of body- and movement-based forms of intervention and therapeutic strategies.

EMOTIONS OF SELF-FORGIVENESS

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While the subject of forgiveness has received a great deal of philosophical attention, self-forgiveness remains relatively neglected. This neglect may be in part due to Hannah Arendt's famous argument that self-forgiveness is not possible. Arendt argues that forgiving, like promising, depends on plurality, on others being with us and acting: 'For no-one can forgive himself … forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role played before oneself.' (1958, 237) Furthermore, Arendt believes that we cannot forgive ourselves as we cannot be both the subject and object of experience. She contends that the most profound reason we cannot forgive ourselves is that 'we are dependent on others, to whom we appear in a distinctness that we ourselves are unable to perceive. Closed within ourselves, we would never be able to forgive ourselves any failing or transgression because we would lack the experience of the person for the sake of whom one can forgive.' (1958, 243) We need others to forgive us, as we do not appear to ourselves as we appear to others. Rather dramatically, she suggests that we are like the sorcerer's apprentice left without the incantation to break a magic spell. She believes that we need to be forgiven by others in order to escape the consequences of our deeds. My paper proposes to show how self-forgiveness is possible while taking seriously Arendt's claim that the forgiveness of others will 'determine the extent and modes in which one may be able to forgive himself'. (1958, 238) We can interpret that idea as meaning that what others can forgive we also can forgive. This may allow self-forgiveness to some degree if we can connect our forgiveness of self with the actual or possible forgiveness of others, trying to see ourselves as others see us. I explain how that possibility allows us to understand the emotions of self-forgiveness, using a range of fictional and everyday examples. Firstly, I argue against claims, for example by Paul Hughes, that resentment towards the self is not coherent and show that we can resent ourselves. This is one of the emotions that we can feel towards ourselves and that we need to give up or control in order to forgive ourselves. Secondly, I demonstrate how self-respect and compassion toward the self are both required to make such self-forgiveness possible, not simply self-respect, as Robin Dillon maintains. A better understanding of these emotions will contribute to the development of a more comprehensive account of self-forgiveness.

BETWEEN ATARAXIA AND HĒDONĒ: AFFECTIVE ARCHITECTURE

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Emotions are embodied, and as such, may be framed as situational. One's emotional state is unavoidably within an environmental context. Whatever one's condition, it includes aspects informed by an engagement with designed, happenstance, and even what Jean-Luc Nancy describes as the sheer givenness of the world. Emotions may be inhibited and driven inward by context, merely occur within a setting, or are enabled, expanded, consummated, when one is engaged within a particular environment. For a designer, instrumental functionalism may be satisfied by objective indices of adequate square meters, maintenance of a temperature range, levels of illumination, or may provide a visual link to favored precedent or style. Architecture, as something one personally or intersubjectively bequests upon a built work, exceeds the conventional for individuals, achieving beauty, or awe, or a kind of comfort and rightness of fit that frames and reveals a particular world. This suggests architecture may reside across a range of conditions and affect or emotive responses, from aesthetic to a more profound sense of dwelling. If the Greek ataraxia suggests the mitigation of all pain, a certain tacit threshold is achieved. An emotive aesthetic sense of beauty or awe, such as suggested by Burke, springs from engagement with the work, suggesting an excess outside of the commonplace, available through perceptions, and where sense may be mapped as mood. For Heidegger, mindfulness of a capacity for dwelling poetically, felt this the challenge of the post-war architect.

Architects rarely overtly program goals of emotion. It is a tacit assumption, from a weak ethical stance, that environmental design should at least be something that leads away from pain, enable a certain tranquility, but in some cases, overtly seek pleasure. Aesthetics may look to the work of architecture as object, and succumbs to a certain Platonic formalism, or semiotic argument of communication and reference. Attempts to quantify aesthetics in situations such as evaluating new works within historic contexts, utilize primarily visual and style-related rationale. This externalized approach devalues the embodiment one gets from architecture that engages temporal aspects of experience, and wider kinetic, haptic, sonic, and olfactory senses.

Drawing from the differing later work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, new existential and phenomenological groundings of architecture, with concurrent emotive and affective aspects, have gained poignancy. This thinking denies emotions as determined from form, and places challenges, on one hand, ideas of materialism, through new interpreters of phenomenology such as Juhani Pallasmaa [Eyes of the Skin], Graham Harman [Quadruple Object], and Sylvia Lavin [Kissing Architecture] and on the other, relation in a broader world as expounded by David Abram [The Spell of the Sensuous], Ted Toadvine [Ecophenomenology], and Timothy Morton [Ecology Without Nature]. Is a new hedonism in our future?

The presentation provides an outline of these relations between emotions, embodiment, philosophy, and architecture, illustrated with images by the author of the works of Finnish architect Alvar Aalto, and Spanish architect Enric Miralles.

Cultivating Compassionate Minds

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Research in neuro, cognitive and developmental science has demonstrated that mental skills and socio-emotional dispositions can enhance pro-social activity (acting well towards others) in educational settings. Self-regulatory skills associated with prosocial dispositions, such as compassion, empathy and sympathy, have been shown to support academic success and positive behaviour in young people. As depression, substance abuse, violence, and risky sexual behaviour increase significantly during adolescence, and are understood to be related to difficulties in controlling emotion, it may be important to identify and incorporate into educational curricula strategies that promote skills in emotion regulation and self-awareness.

The Standards for Registration, General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS), states as mandatory that teachers should provide and ensure 'a safe and secure environment for all learners within a caring and compassionate ethos and with an understanding of wellbeing'. Compassion is an important route to nurturing and stabilizing the appropriate moral attitude to perceptions of suffering and harm. Yet just how compassion, or indeed emotions in general, can aid pedagogical relations and practices, is perhaps not well understood because such a study is barely present on teacher education curricula, at least not in Scotland.

I will suggest that we ought not only to develop such a curricula, but also to cultivate moralised compassion. Moralized compassion means feeling compassion for the right objects, in the right way and in the right circumstances, acting as a powerful guide in pedagogical endeavours. As Kant asserted, human beings should be treated as ends in themselves, and compassion, which he acknowledged as a 'painful feeling', could help ground our obligations to accomplish what it ought: namely the happiness and well-being of others. In feeling compassion for others, we cannot avoid making an evaluation of harm, of determining what is of significance to them (or to us), of taking a position with respect to their concerns, and of making a choice about which action to take. In compassion we recognize others as distinct, autonomous beings whose welfare we value as part of our own important ends. In acknowledging students' concerns, we record and respect their value as dignified beings worthy of respect, so nourishing their self-esteem and disposition to moral consciousness and behavior (pro-social behavior). This is a powerful form of acknowledgement, by which, as Cavell observed, we can conceive of the other from the other's point of view.

In cultivating moralized compassion educators engage in a critical enquiry to ask not only 'what should I do'? but more fundamentally, 'who should I be'? To develop the analyses, and drawing on the work of, for example, Ben-Ze'ev, Nussbaum, Bruce Maxwell, and Robert C. Roberts, I will discuss the morphology of compassion, contrasting compassion with other-regarding emotions to show how the appraisal mechanisms differ from each other. In doing so, I will make the case for why moralised compassion, rather than empathy or sympathy, may be more conducive to pro-social behaviour.

Sentimentalism about Justice

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Many central ethical and evaluative concepts are plausibly understood in terms of their relation to certain emotions. For example, a common understanding of moral wrongness and moral obligation is in terms of the appropriateness of feelings of blame and guilt: to say that some action is morally wrong is to say that someone who performed that action would, absent extenuating circumstances, merit feelings of blame and guilt. Similarly, virtue is frequently understood in terms of the appropriateness of feelings of admiration: to say that some character trait is virtuous is to say that we have reason to feel admiration towards the possessor of the trait. Plausibly, we can understand well-being, and perhaps even goodness in terms of reasons to feel desire. In this paper, I consider the prospects of such a sentimentalist understanding of the concept of justice. The thesis I will evaluate is that to say that some action or outcome would be unjust is to say that it is appropriate to feel the unfairness-feeling in response to it. Such a sentimentalist treatment of justice looks appealing on the basis of introspection. Paradigm instances of judgements of justice and injustice seem laden with a distinctive emotional feel: when we regard someone as having been treated unjustly, we typically experience a distinctive sentiment, a feeling of unfairness, some mixture of a natural order being upset, of sympathy with the victim and of resentment towards those responsible for the injustice.

I begin by considering John Stuart Mill's discussion of justice in chapter 5 of *Utilitarianism*. There Mill offers an overview of domains of human affairs where sentiments of justice and injustice are engaged:

'To find the common attributes of a variety of objects, it is necessary to begin, by surveying the objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore advert successively to the various modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs, which are classed, by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust. The things well known to excite the sentiments associated with those names, are of a very multifarious character.'

Mill goes on to list six domains where the sentiments of injustice are typically engaged: where someone is deprived of what belongs to him as a matter of legal right; where someone is deprived of what he would be entitled to under whichever laws there ought to be; cases of desert, where people receive good in return for bad, or bad in return for good; 'breaking faith', where someone's rightful expectations are disappointed, as in the case of a broken contract or promise; where someone is the victim of unjustified partiality, such as where a judge disfavours him on the basis of irrelevant considerations, such as a person's race, or sex, or relationship to the judge himself; where someone is treated unequally, such as in the unequal protection of his rights.

What ties together these domains (and any others with which we might wish to supplement Mill's list)? I will consider the thesis that the only way to tie together such domains, and hence the only way of specifying the scope of questions of justice and injustice is by reference to proper engagement of unfairness-feelings. I go on to consider how questions of what we have reason to do in the domain of justice (e.g. When do we have reason to punish and to reward? How should we distribute benefits and burdens?) are related to questions about what there is reason to feel.

PREDICTING EMOTIONS, EMOTIONAL PREDICTING

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In recent years predictive coding and hierarchical inference have proven invaluable tools in describing the complex interaction that takes place between high-level cognitive and low-level sensory information in the formation of our conscious experience (Friston, 2002, 2012; Corbetta et al., 2008). While predictive coding frameworks have primarily been applied to exteroceptive signals and the ways in which we model the outside world, there is growing interest in how the same functional models may be used to describe the processing of interoceptive signals.

Anil Seth (2013) has recently proposed a predictive coding theory of emotional awareness. According to the model cascading top-down predictions about the source of interoceptive signals counterflow with bottom-up interoceptive prediction errors. The integration of the various predictive representations results in the felt aspect of an emotion. The model is intended to extend traditional cognitive appraisal theories of emotion by filling out the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the interaction between the affective (eg. neural and physiological arousal) and appraisal (eg. memories, evaluations, predictions, etc.) elements commonly considered to make up an emotional experience (Schachter & Singer, 1962).

In the following paper I will argue that an interoceptive predictive coding account of emotion ends up being embodied in ways that refute the cognitivist assumptions of existing appraisal theories of emotion. The argument will be based on affective neuroscience descriptions of the anterior insula (AI). Seth's account of predictive processing in the AI lends substantial support to recent network models of the brain (see Pessoa 2014) that aim at dissolving the boundaries between emotion and cognition, and between notions of a thinking brain and a feeling body. The aim of the paper will be to highlight the many ways in which predictive coding can contribute to live debates in emotion theory, as well as suggest how affective neuroscience can in turn facilitate a better understand of predictive coding theories of mind. The hope is to contribute support for a theoretical framework that bridges predictive coding, affective neuroscience and embodied cognition.

A PROBLEM FOR SENTIMENTAL PERCEPTUALISM

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Sentimental perceptualism is the view that all substantive knowledge of value is epistemically dependent on perceptual-like affective seemings, usually understood to be desires and/or emotions. (See, for instance, Johnston [2001], Oddie [2005], Kauppinen [2013].) Sentimental perceptualism is attractive because it promises to demystify evaluative knowledge by showing that it really isn't so different from ordinary perceptual knowledge. Just as a visual presentation of an object's being square justifies (to some degree) the belief that it is square, so too can an affective presentation of an act's being good justify the belief that it is good. But this position faces a serious problem, one that has not, as far as I know, been developed. The problem is that there doesn't seem to be an attractive way to answer the question, How is armchair evaluative knowledge possible?

The most obvious sentimental perceptualist account of armchair evaluative knowledge says that it is non-basic. This is the obvious answer because it preserves the similarity with ordinary perception. Armchair empirical reflection (e.g., my thinking about what would happen if I pushed my computer over the edge of the desk) is not a route to knowledge independent of perceptions of actual cases. And perceptual responses to actual cases are a source of knowledge in large part because there are causal connections between those responses and what they are about. Unfortunately, there are powerful reasons to think that armchair evaluative reflection can be a source of basic knowledge, despite the lack of causal connections. Another answer says our armchair evaluative knowledge is grounded in our understanding of the propositions considered. Many rationalists, after all, have argued that intellectual seemings can provide us with knowledge in just this way; and so why can't the sentimental perceptualist transpose the picture over to affective seemings? A problem arises because the relevant affective experiences—desires and emotions—are suited for giving us knowledge of how things in fact are but not how they must be. This means that affect will generally help us to know evaluative contingencies. But if affect were such as to arise on the basis of mere understanding (of propositions), we would expect it to give us knowledge of necessities. The only way forward, one might think, is to model armchair evaluative knowledge on some class of contingent a priori knowledge. The trouble with this maneuver isn't just that the contingent a priori is deeply suspect, for even if there were such knowledge, it wouldn't be grounded in anything like a seeming of a substantive (non-analytic) truth. Sentimental perceptualists, then, lack any clear strategy for demystifying armchair evaluative knowledge; and this is a serious problem.

THE 3 R'S OF RELATING: RECOGNITION – RESONANCE – REGULATION

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In this research we explore how identity-relevant relationships (Hillenbrand and Money 2015) can develop between relationship partners as a function of three important and interlinked processes: (social) recognition, resonance and emotion regulation.

Recognition of a relationship partner is suggested to involve components such as acknowledgement, involvement in, or approval of, a partner's existence, needs or goals. Social recognition provides the basis for initiation/continuation of a relationship and is a necessary condition for relationship partners to affect each other's self-experience (Gregoratto 2015). Being recognised (or "seen") by significant others has been shown to be vitally important for human beings throughout life: as babies we depend for survival on our caretaker(s) to recognise our needs (emotional and physical needs). After infancy and childhood, humans continue to have a strong desire and requirement to be "heard" and "seen" by others in terms of their unique needs, desires and goals to be able to develop self-consciousness, emotional cognizance and interpersonal sensitivity (Lewis et al. 2001).

Resonance in a relationship is a process by which relationship partners move from socially recognising each other to emotionally understanding each other. The process of resonance has been described as the ability to sensing the inner state of each other, or, in other words, to able to broadcasting own emotions while simultaneously intuiting partner emotions in a relational encounter (Lewis et al. 2001). Resonance has been identified as one of the necessary conditions for

the formation of profound relationships between partners and has also been suggested as critically important for romantic relationships to last over time (Ben-Ze'ev 2015).

Emotion regulation describes the possibility of relationship partners to move from sensing each other's emotions to actually impacting each other's emotional states and, ultimately, behavioural patterns. The possibility of regulating own and partner emotions in a relational encounter necessitates social recognition and resonance, but also calls for relationship partners to exhibit a certain attitude towards their relational 'dialogue partner' that opens the possibility for change (Kreft 2015). As such, it requires relationship partners to withholding definite judgement about their partner's personality and to behave towards each other as persons who are able to change (Kreft 2015). Emotional and behavioural patterns are typically deeply engrained in human lives and habits, deeply-rooted in factors such as upbringing, education, personal experiences, social and cultural environment. For emotional and behavioural habits and routines to change and develop, emotion regulation processes have to be 'learned' and 'practiced' for sustained periods of time between relationship partners (Lewis et al. 2001). Relationships that move to the level of mutual emotion regulation can, over time, impact partners senses of self and identity (Hillenbrand and Money 2015).

How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Modes

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It is currently popular to hold that emotions apprehend value properties. This view—which I call the 'epistemic view' of emotion—is most commonly spelled out by likening emotions to perceptual experience: in much the way that perceptual experiences provides access to sensory properties of the perceiver's environment, emotions provide access to its axiological properties. In response to several difficulties with its most common version, Deonna & Teroni (2012, 2014) have recently developed an alternative version of the view. According to them, emotions do not apprehend value in virtue of being experiences of value or having value properties as part of their content, but rather in virtue of the fact that value properties are elements of their intentional mode. That emotions apprehend value is to be made intelligible by recognizing them as relating to values in much the way belief relates to truth: fear is an attitude of regarding-as-dangerous a certain object in the same basic sense in which the attitude of belief is that of regarding-as-true a proposition. In this paper, I first argue that Deonna & Teroni fail to salvage the epistemic view of emotion. As I show, there are reasons to suppose that this view is false to begin with, which simultaneously support a different, non-epistemic understanding of how emotions relate to values along the lines defended by their Geneva colleague Kevin Mulligan (2010). On this understanding, emotions are responses to value, which are based on, rather than constitutive of, apprehensions of value. In the second part of the paper, I go on to show that, whilst failing to save EV, Deonna & Teroni's proposal nonetheless contains an important insight. As I argue, if explicated in terms of the idea that emotions are responses to value, AV provides an adequate understanding of the link between emotions and formal objects, albeit an understanding that is radically different from, and incompatible with, EV. In line with Frege's (1892, 1911) account of judgment, I propose that the sense in which we regard propositions as true in belief is to be understood in terms of their recognition or acknowledgment as true and argue that, likewise, emotions may be understood as ways of regarding objects and events as (dis)valuable in the sense of their recognition or acknowledgment as (dis)valuable. The sense of recognition relevant in

both cases is illustrated by means of ordinary acts of recognition: when we recognize someone's behaviour as honorable or meritorious by rewarding her, our recognition takes the form of a particular type of response to the apparent merit of her behaviour. In the same way, I propose, we recognize propositions as true in judgment (and, derivatively, belief) by responding in a specific way to their apparent truth and recognize objects as (dis)valuable in emotion by responding to their apparent disvalue.

Reconstructing Adam Smith:
The Role of Emotions in the Formation of Society

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In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith's seminal work, our desire to feel mutual sympathy is presented as the basis of human moral sentiments. Many lines could be drawn between Smith's definition of sympathy and the contemporary understanding of empathy. This work will look at Smith's characterization of sympathy and will try to determine whether contemporary thinking supports or refutes Adam Smith's theory. It will then extend the discussion to an additional sentiment, envy, and try to provide an interpretation of Smith's understanding thereof, and to shed some light on how these two sentiments interact and their role in the formation of civic and economic society.

Stories That Kill:
Unpacking the Emotional Content of End-of-Life Discourses

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This paper, which focuses on end-of-life discourse in the healthcare law context, builds on earlier work in which I have claimed a fundamental connectedness between dignity and vulnerability. The argument in this chapter involves several claims. First, that killing has a narrative element; second, that some killing-narratives are dehumanizing and/or 'abjectifying'; third, that the function of dehumanizing and abjectifying narratives is to provoke or promote some emotional responses and to suppress or overcome others; and fourth, that the emotional content of killing narratives provides us with information that can be important in deciding whether such narratives (and the acts they surround) are dignity-congruent or not. I will argue that attention to the emotional content of discourse about end-of-life issues is valuable, since unpacking such content can enhance our understanding of the dignity-status of particular acts (or practices) and the stories that surround them; and that therefore, a legal understanding of dignity which acknowledges dignity's emotional character is to be preferred to more abstract, rationalistic accounts in which emotion is ignored or even disapproved.

Affectus & Intellectus: A Medieval Point of View

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Beginnen wir mit den drei Grundakten der Seele denken, wollen, fühlen. Es fällt auf, dass diese Akte sowohl das Ausgreifen in die äußere Wirklichkeit, als auch die Verankerung in der inneren Wirklichkeit leisten; dass sie sowohl intentional (auf etwas—anderes—bezogen) als auch reflexiv (selbstbezüglich) sind. Lässt sich eine Reihenfolge dieser Akte angeben? Mit Aristoteles, Thomas von Aquin, Descartes und Kant würde man sagen: der Mensch ist vor allem ein denkendes Wesen, animal rationale. Das Denken unterscheidet uns vom Tier. Dem Denken, Wollen und Fühlen sind die drei Kantischen Kritiken gewidmet: die KrV dem Denken, die KpV dem Wollen, die KU dem Fühlen. Die Rede von drei Seelenvermögen etabliert sich erst im 18. Jahrhundert. Die mittelalterliche Anthropologie kommt mit zwei Seelenkräften aus, deren Komple- mentarität man auf den ersten Blick sieht: intellectus und affectus. Mit intellectus ist das aktive Vermögen gemeint, mit dem wir erkennend etwas ins Bewusstsein hereinholen; affectus meint das Vermögen, sich passiv einer größeren Wirklichkeit hinzugeben. Das Mittelalter verglich die Tragfähigkeit der beiden insbesondere unter dem Aspekt: was bringt uns näher zu Gott—intellectus oder affectus? Grob gesprochen halten es die aristotelisch geprägten Dominikaner (Thomas von Aquin) mit dem intellectus, die Fran- ziskaner (Bonaventura) mit dem affectus. Fragen wir uns selber: was bringt in der Liebe weiter—Aktivität, oder passive Hingabe? Aber lässt sich denn beides so scharf trennen? Dass affectus und intellectus gemeinsam nötig sind, um den Menschen ans Ziel zu bringen, veranschaulicht ein Bild, mit dem Bonaventura den Weg zu Gott beschreibt: hier sind beide Vermögen gefragt, den letzten Schritt ins Heiligtum tut aber das Gefühl (non intellectus, sed affectus). Gefühl? Bei uns regt sich die unwiderstehliche Neigung, von "Bauch" zu reden, oder zumindest so zu denken. Das meint affectus nicht. Sondern: dem Geist eignet eine doppelte Komponente, eine aktiv-nehmende, eine passiv-sich-hingebende. Dass nicht nur das Mittelalter so dachte, sieht man bei einer ganzen Reihe von Philosophen, die eine „philosophia affectiva" vertreten—im 20. Jahrhundert insbesondere Buber und Levinas. Das Du, das Antlitz des Anderen fordert meine Antwort, meine Hingabe heraus—die Priorität des Guten vor dem Sein geht einher mit der Priorität der Passivität vor der Aktivität, des affectus vor dem intellectus. Diese Priorität hat der Franziskaner Petrus Johannis Olivi (1247/48 bis 1298) zum Zentrum seiner Philosophie gemacht. In Kurzform: die Grundlage aller Objektivität ist die Subjektivität—womit Olivi zu einem "der ersten Zeugen der 'subjektiven' Verän- derung der Sub-jektität" würde und zum Vorläufer von Descartes oder Kant taugte. Doch für Olivi liegt der Kern der Subjektivität eben nicht im intellectus, sondern im affectus. Dass ich ich bin—diese Urgewissheit, die Vergewisserung meiner selbst in meiner Subjektivität, kann ich nicht nur nicht von der Objektwelt draußen bekommen, ich erwerbe sie auch nicht durch das Denken. Die Gewissheit, ich zu sein, gibt mir nicht das Denken, sondern ein unverbrüchliches Ich-Gefühl, das auf nichts anderes zurückzu- führen ist. Also: Objektivität beruht auf Subjektivität, Subjektivität auf Affektivität. Heidegger hätte dem zugestimmt—schade, dass er Olivi nicht gekannt hat.

Has it Always Felt this Way?
Cognitive Penetrability and Emotional Experience

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Some theorists argue that emotions are cognitively impenetrable. That is, emotions are impervious to, and operate independently from, one's relevant judgments and beliefs. In doing so, some of these theorists appeal to the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions—cases in which one's emotion seems to conflict with one's evaluative judgments. In this way, recalcitrant emotions are like visual illusions—they persist despite one's belief that she inaccurately perceives her situation. The persistence of visual illusions is often cited as evidence in support of the idea that cognition cannot alter perception—that the visual system is modular, informationally encapsulated, and thus cognitively impenetrable. Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion. One cannot help but see the lines as being of different lengths, despite believing them to be the same length. The claim that vision is cognitively impenetrable explains why one cannot help but see the lines as being of different lengths despite knowing otherwise. Peter Goldie (2000) explains the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions in a similar way—one cannot help but feel fear despite believing himself to be free of danger because emotions are, to some extent, cognitively impenetrable. But, if emotions are cognitively impenetrable, then it seems they are also involuntary. How one feels in a given situation is beyond her control—her feelings occur almost instinctively. This calls into question the extent to which one can be held responsible for one's emotionally charged actions and reactions, thus implicating theories of blame and notions of blameworthiness. So, one might resist the explanation that renders the subject of a recalcitrant emotion a victim of his cognitively impenetrable emotions in favor of the explanation that renders him irrational. Thus, that Goldie's notion of cognitive impenetrability admits of degrees is significant. First, it evades the charge of irrationality while holding agents responsible for their emotional actions and reactions. Second, it avoids commitment to a view of emotions that are, like Fodor's perceptual systems, modular and informationally encapsulated. Third, it allows for the cognitive penetration of emotional experience. This latter point—the idea that one's emotions can be influenced by one's relevant judgments and beliefs—is the focus of this paper. I explore what it might mean for an emotional experience to be cognitively penetrable in light of what might qualify as a cognitively penetrated visual experience. I conclude with a suggestion that the more interesting question concerns the role of emotions as cognitive penetrators of visual experience.

Are Autobiographical Accounts of Mental Illness a Reliable Source for the Study of Affective Experience?

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The affective experience associated with mental illness in general and depression in particular has been studied by different disciplines such as psychiatry, sociology, anthropology and philosophy, in order to, on the one hand, enrich, substantiate and explicate the wide range of affective phenomena that individuals experience, and on the other, to analyse norms and structures of affective states in

cases of pathologies. One of the most widely available and frequently deployed sources for such research endeavours are autobiographical accounts of mental illness. The genre of pathography has received an increasing emphasis as it offers the possibility to provide insight in the phenomenal profile of the particular mental illness and also in the alterations of background and foreground structures of experience, for instance in the case of phenomenological psychopathology and the philosophy of emotions. By examining the various alterations and symptomatic experiences reported by individuals suffering from affective disorders in general and depression in particular, one can investigate, analyse and refine conceptualizations of various affective phenomena. However, the reliability and epistemological value of autobiographies of depression have not remained uncontested. It has recently been argued that they should be approached with great caution as they are representative of the literary, social, and cultural contexts and meanings associated with (the experience of) depression rather than of the (phenomenal) experience individuals afflicted with the disorder are subjected to. In the case of studying these accounts for the purposes of obtaining a deeper understanding of affective experience in the context of philosophy of emotions, this would imply that the insight obtained from such memoirs are related to the literary and socio-cultural representations of affective states.

The goal of this paper is to argue that some of the influences impacting and shaping descriptions of depressive experience as reported in autobiographies operate at the level of individual subjective experience, as well. Thereby, first-person autobiographical accounts might be appropriate and reliable sources for the study of the experience of depression as they already incorporate the social and cultural embeddedness of affective experience of mental illness. Depression, by virtue of being a mental illness, is not to be dissociated from the larger context of one's life and its social and cultural environment. The experience of depression, I would like to argue, does not happen in isolation and is shaped and constituted by a myriad of factors and influences that impact the specific requirements posed by autobiographical accounts, as well. In order to examine these influences in more detail, I would like to focus on a comparative study of some of the most prominent memoirs of mental illness and anonymous responses provided by depressive individuals to an online survey of the experience of depression. In doing this, I would aim at analysing the impact these influences exert on the most frequently reported affective phenomena and the way these experiences are described in both formats.

REFRAMING THINKING ON EMOTIONS

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In recent years a certain renaissance in the philosophical discourse of the role, importance and general significance of emotions has taken place. Nevertheless a contradiction is embedded within. As if there were antagonistic traditions one group (the larger one) focusses on emotions from a more individual perspective. The other group (rather a minority) takes emotions as a social phenomenon. Considering, what drives society we could rather say, that emotions have an eminent political relevance. Of course everybody can feel their emotions individually and nobody would doubt that emotions have a decisive function for human actions. But it makes a difference if we try to explain society, not individual behaviour.

Taking up philosophical traditions two important thinkers will be discussed, Descartes and Hobbes. They stand for the aforementioned antagonistic perspectives. Descartes stands for the description of the human being as a potentially reflective being. With Hobbes we can discover another dimension, he is a "relational" thinker, emotions either bind people together or separates from one another. Either way it is the relation as a container for emotions that counts. This will be explained in my contribution.

There is not only a difference between individual and collective emotions in general, there is also a need to differentiate between various kinds of collectivity. We can observe collective emotions in (small) groups, also organizations can have their emotions, and last not least the whole political process is driven by collective emotions.

ARISTOTLE AND HIS ARCHETYPAL CLASSICAL COGNITIVE THEORY OF EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL MYTH

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In this paper, I will raise some objections to the assumption that Aristotle is a classical cognitivist about emotions; the adjective "classical" is here used to indicate the original core of ideas at the root of cognitive theories of emotions.

Those who define Aristotle's theory as "the prototypical cognitive theory of emotion" (Power and Dalgleish, 1997: 41), base their view on the claim that Aristotle "recognised cognition as the efficient cause and formulated a demonstrative account of emotional response" (Forenbaugh, 1975: 13). This cognition takes the shape of judgement in *The Art of Rhetoric*, which is the book generally used to support that Aristotle is a cognitivist.

After examining fragments in *The Art of Rhetoric*, where Aristotle's delineates his concept of judgment and its relation with emotions, I am convinced that those who believe that Aristotle is a cognitivist rightly interpret the passages where Aristotle delimits the double function of judgment as something that can both be changed by, and cause, an emotion (see Aristotle, 2008: 1378 a 24-33 and 1378 a-1378 b 34-4). Nevertheless, the very same fragments of his work reveal an aspect of Aristotle's view of emotions far less commented upon: the importance played by feelings, which can be traced through his concept of "state of mind". A concept that, if well interpreted, reveals it is a philosophical falsehood to consider him a classical cognitivist.

According to my reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of emotions, he uses the notion of the "state of mind" to indicate a feeling which prompts us to emotionally react in a given way in front of an object. The shape assumed by that state of mind is dependent upon previous experiences and emotions. Why do we respond differently to the same judgement?

Because previous experiences, which were, in former emotions, a mix of feelings and judgement attached to an object, present themselves in the shape of feelings – states of mind – when we live a new experience and those feelings influence how we emotionally react to judgements about an object.

Acknowledging that Aristotle attributes the qualities of previous emotions and experiences to the state of mind has two fundamental consequences. The first is that Aristotle's view of emotions does not coincide with (or is not consistent with) the original core of ideas at the root of the classical cognitive theories of emotions. The second consequence is the most astonishing: Aristotle's work seems to display the qualities of a hybrid theory of emotions that confers equal importance to cognition and feelings. Those two elements cannot work and operate individually as they trigger, together, the arousal of an emotion. Our judgement regarding the object of an emotion is not purely rational, but is always influenced by previous states of mind and emotional experiences that resurface when we formulate a new judgment. This creates a sort of flux in which our ulterior emotions are influenced by, and connected to, our previous emotional experiences.

MUSIC, RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS, AND LOVE: THE CASE OF SCRIABINIAN ECSTASY

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Elation and bliss, abandon, devotion and piety, passion and compassion, desire and longing, ardent affection, wonder, shame, and pity: many attitudes, moods, emotions, characters, and other states of being known from the realm of religious experience are also part of the realm of musical experience. While in some cases these states are about the music, such as reverence, wonder, or adoration for the beauty of a composition or performance, others are states we feel or recognise the music to be about. Those latter ones are of particular philosophical interest as they concern the relation between aesthetic experience and our psychological life: just how could music have a content the very aesthetic experience of which may lead one to recognise or even engage in religious experience?

Alexander Scriabin's music is a paradigmatic example of a music which has often been characterised as religiously motivated, as partaking of a Dionysian character, as an erotically charged meditation on the sacred and the profane, as culminating in ecstatic states, and as being expressive of the composer's mystic experience. In my interrogation of the music's emotional depth, I shall distinguish between states a listener might potentially arrive at in the course of listening, such as moods that can be likened to ecstasy (drawing on Otto Friedrich Bollnow's illuminating discussion of Nietzschean thought on Dionysian intoxication in his *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* of 1956), and states she might recognise or experience the music as having, such as being of a longing, ardent, affectionate, blissful, or ecstatic character. I take as a starting point Roger Scruton's conception of music as a medium for quasi-interpersonal moral experience. Scruton, in his *The Soul of the World* (2014), argues that music "contains a soul" (166), and that works of a certain quality offer the experience of an "overreaching intentionality" (140), in which musical character is shared via sympathy, which can leave the listener morally enriched or even transformed. Thus music's space, to Scruton, is sacred, in the sense that it permits an I-to-You encounter (166) which, on Scruton's account, transcends the natural relation between isolated subjects.

Engaging with Scruton's view, I shall show that, for further clarification of the relation between religious and musical experience, we shall have to give up the idea of a singular musical content, and rethink prevailing ideas of expression. Music's soul is not no-one's, but individuates hermeneutically via numerous culturally and individually shaped modes and interpretive frames of listening. As the

individuation unfolds and reconfigures itself, moods become emotions, become experiences of character, and so forth; and those in which the listening self forgets itself (with Hegel a condition of love) open a space for the profound experience of interpersonal oneness, which, as Peter Goldie revealed (in Lemmens and Van Herck, 2008), can have, after Freud, the quality of an oceanic feeling, one found both in religious, and musical, experience.

AFFECTIVE AFFORDANCES: A MISSING LINK IN EMOTION THEORY

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The idea that emotions are a special kind of perception is widely popular these days, among both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theorists. Cognitivist theorists tend to model emotion on perception because identifying the intentional content in perceptual terms avoids the problems of overintellectualization and anthropocentrism that characterized early cognitive definitions in terms of thoughts, beliefs, or evaluative judgments. Emotions are now described as 'perceptions of value', 'ways of seeing', 'sense-perceptions' or 'concern based construals', they can have nonconceptual content, and occur in infants and animals, not just in adult humans.

Non-cognitive theorists feel attracted to perception theories as well. Over the past decade, noncognitivists like Jesse Prinz have argued that emotions are (conscious or unconscious) perceptions of changes in the body that have intentional content and represent matters of concern in the world.

By thus combining intentionality and phenomenality, perceptual theories seem to offer a third way between mainstream cogitivism and noncognitivism (Salmela 2011); their popularity suggests that the disagreement between the two camps may be of a smaller scale, and of a different kind, than commonly assumed. But although perceptual views are an improvement over traditional theories and conceptualizations, they are still not entirely satisfying. Many problems remain unsolved—the notion of perception continues to be vague, existing perceptual theories fail to close the gap between causal accounts of emotions as perceptions of objective matters of concern in the world, and emotional perceptions understood from the personal point of view, as experiences of an emotional subject.

In my paper I argue that we need additional concepts that can bridge the gap between the personal and the causal account of emotional perception. I'll suggest that Gibson's term 'affordance'—possibility for action—might be helpful here.

Invideo et Amo, or the Paradox of Love and Envy

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"Love does not envy," states Paul in a frequently quoted passage from the First Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13: 4). The original Greek term (agape) and its Latin translation (caritas) refer to the theological virtue by which, according to the Catholic catechism, we love God above all things for his own sake, and our neighbors as ourselves for the love of God. Charity is often considered as the opposite of envy, one of the capital sins. Most biblical commentators, however, use the Pauline passage to illustrate the incompatibility between envy and not just charity, but also the intense, personal love that we feel for our friends, romantic partners, and relatives. Indeed, the idea that love and envy are incompatible extends beyond the context of the Christian doctrine, and constitutes a pervasive and widespread belief. It is in virtue of this incompatibility that love is often proposed as a cure for, or a way of coping with, envy. If one manages to feel love toward an envied person, envy will be extinguished, since they cannot coexist.

Call this general intuition that love and envy are opposite that cannot coexist the incompatibility of love and envy. I show that this intuition is mistaken and that love and envy can not only coexist, but can, in their best forms, be mutually beneficial. I start by refuting, in the first section, descriptive incompatibilism—the thesis that love and envy do not coexist. Such a thesis can be refuted by looking at people's experience in a variety of contexts: conversations, artistic representations, popular culture discussions, and psychoanalytic therapy. The coexistence of love and envy happens. In the second section, I draw from Aristotle's discussion of similarity in both envy and philia to argue that this coexistence is foreseeable, given that the kind of people we are inclined to love are also the kind of people we tend to envy: those who are similar and close to us. But it is possible to reject this natural tendency as inappropriate. In the third section I face normative incompatibilism, according to which we should not envy those whom we love. While more plausible, this version of the incompatibility intuition is rejected as well, because it relies on a simplistic view of human morality and emotionality. It fails to see the deeper connection between love and envy, a connection that explains why their coexistence is not just foreseeable, but unavoidable. Love and envy are opposite sides of the same coin: the unsociable sociability (in Kant's words) that essentially characterizes human nature. Analyzing the paradox of love and envy from this perspective helps us to move beyond a regretful acceptance that love and envy coexist, and allows us to realize that the coexistence of love and envy is beneficial. The fourth section thus articulates normative compatibilism, according to which emulative envy and wise love can contribute to flourishing loving relationships and human lives.

PROJECTING THE FUTURE:
HOPE IN KANT'S, BLOCH'S AND FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHY

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In Kant's work hope is closely linked to the issue of knowledge; its terrain begins where knowledge encounters its limits. Hope commences where certain knowledge is no longer possible, originating from the needs of human reason. It is thus anchored in anthropology. Kant's central concerns with regard to hope are, on the one hand, ethics and, on the other, the philosophy of history. His concept of "worthiness to be happy" is based on the hope that morally appropriate actions will be compensated for at some later point; this compensation should follow upon dutiful actions. Acting in accordance with the categorical imperative results in the need for compensation for the abstinence which is exercised with regard to moral actions. Hope becomes a central pillar of Kantian morality. Viewed within the scope of Kant's theory of the philosophy of history hope is also the momentum which facilitates actions focused on the future in the first place, by generating confidence in terms of the model of perpetual peace. In this case it is based on the expediency of nature, which corresponds to human actions and is not at odds with human objectives. In common with respect for moral law as a moral sentiment, hope represents a constitutive emotive element of Kantian philosophy and is conceived as being linked to rationality and originating from reason itself.

Kant's conception of hope is expanded in Bloch's work until it becomes a fundamental principle upon which it is based. Bloch links hope with the blueprint for, and shaping of, the future in general, which is expressed in particular in the terms 'abstract' and 'concrete' utopia; the 'not-yet'. Kant's philosophy itself together with its theories of the categorical imperative, the realm of purposes and perpetual peace is promoted as a utopia. Bloch views hope on the one hand as an anthropological fundamental determinant and, on the other, as a principle running through all areas of human life. His philosophy explores day dreams, wishes and yearnings in everyday life; art as an illusion and social utopias. The terms 'being according to possibility' and 'being within the scope of possibility' mirror the discrepancy between the desirable and the doable. Hope as defined by Bloch manifests itself as a feeling of confidence, which is linked with anticipation of the future to create an attitude of positive expectation. He argues that the anticipatory consciousness of humans means that they are beings which are primarily focused on the future.

Foucault's revised subject theory, in contrast, argues that the future as an intentional project is obsolete. The constitution of the subject through knowledge discourses and power strategies limit personal room for manoeuvre. Autonomy has to be painstakingly wrested from heteronomy. It is not possible to develop a vision of the future, either in the sense of Kantian perpetual peace or Bloch's concrete utopia. Within the scope of the historical process the future is unforeseeable. Does Foucault's theory, which proclaims the death of the subject, nevertheless allow room for hope? It becomes clear that Foucault's definition of heterotopy is located between the topical and the utopian and that his ad-hoc theory allows for a dimension of the critical within the political in the sense of Kantian enlightenment as the basis for human hope. A hope which also encompasses the shaping of the self in ethics respectively the aesthetics of the self. Foucault's quasi-utopian focus, which is based on the perfecting of the self and of society in equal measure, cannot function without referencing Kant. Unlike Bloch's work, Foucault's work does not view Kant's philosophy as merely a documentation of the utopian in order to illustrate his own fundamental standpoint but rather, by integrating the Kantian theory of criticism, becomes a cornerstone for his hopes.

EMOTIONS AND AKRASIA

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Akrasia is an old philosophical problem: while it appears all too common, it remains puzzling how we are able to act knowingly and intentionally against our best judgement. Drawing on a perceptual model of emotion which highlights the way we can learn both about the world and our values through emotion, in this paper I shall argue that the role emotion plays in akrasia is normatively and phenomenologically distinct from the role it plays in non-akratic action, and that the way in which it is distinct has important consequences for our normative assessment and analysis of such action. Apart from presenting reasons that compete with other reasons for action and that could be acted on despite a judgement to the contrary, emotions (in both akratic and non-akratic cases) also provide strong motivation for action, given their connection with what the subject values. One way that emotions could play a distinct role in akrasia as opposed to everyday action is that they can 'drown' out or trump other motivations (in particular, those associated with one's best judgement), without drowning out the judgement that a certain action is the best one to do. In cases of 'recalcitrant' emotion, the emotion can evaluatively present the subject with a feel of the world that accompanies motivations that are in conflict with his judgement. Even while emotions can reveal to us what it is that we value – the insight brought forward by the perceptual model, they can also motivate us to act against what we take ourselves to value, which often occasions further (painful) emotions, such as regret and guilt. I argue that if this is true, then it suggests that emotional akrasia is a painful and uncomfortable phenomenon, and this explains some of the negative moral judgments typically associated with akrasia. Other important consequences follow for how we analyse emotion and action, such as we that cannot base our analysis of emotion in non-akratic action on emotion in akrasia.

EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES TO EMOTIONS

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Emotions and emotional subjects are subject to evaluation. Emotions are, for example, assessed with respect to appropriateness, proportionality, and fittingness. Subjects themselves are assessed in a number of ways. We pay attention to the bodily expression of emotion, in facial expression or as autonomic effects, say. These aspects of emotional experience attract evaluation which often accords with some established norms. Subjects may also be assessed on some dimension of a character description, based on their expressions of emotion and on their responses to or management of their emotional states. They might be evaluated negatively as "too emotional" (or just "emotional"), as a pejorative description of one who fails to exert control over their emotional experiences and expressions. A common idiom makes the point: "crying over spilled milk" suggests that to have strong and expressed feelings about mistakes that cannot be rectified is a pointless display of emotional expression. We feel quite free to formulate judgements about the emotions of others with respect to some notion of how one ought or ought not to respond emotionally to a given object.

I wish to explore the notion that we can judge the emotions of others fairly and responsibly, or not. I argue that many philosophers have failed to be charitable in the frameworks they provide for understanding emotional fittingness, and neglect the importance of a particular sort of knowledge of a subject, namely knowledge of a subject's previous experiences, perhaps narratively construed. Such knowledge makes a central contribution to responsible evaluations of the subject's emotion, and the employment of such knowledge, I argue, is what makes a judgement about the emotions of another (or even oneself) epistemically responsible, in being well-founded as a result of drawing on considerations beyond a current context. On this view if one wants to pose the question of whether an emotion is fitting or not, one poses this question at the level of the subject concerned rather than the particular instance of the occurrent or episodic emotion or its immediate object. Subjects come with past experiences, which I construe as narratives. An aspect of the informed evaluation of emotions, I contend, examines not only the immediate situation and the object of the emotion, but the longer history of the subject herself.

One certainly does not usefully pose the question of whether in general certain objects merit certain emotions. Asking generally how "crying over spilled milk" should be evaluated is, on this view, an invitation not to an answer, but to further questions about who is crying, and what features of their psychological causal history might suggest reasons for the emotional expression. Any answer to general questions about the cognitive relations which obtain between subjects and intentional objects of emotions should acknowledge that such general answers are of limited use in understanding individual cases. So whilst the object of the emotion (the spilled milk) is the apparent stimulus for the crying, its explanatory role in describing the cognitive relation between subject and object is, in principle, incomplete.

I argue that this way of thinking about certain reactive attitudes has implications for understanding the rationality of emotions, and that it also has practical applications in a therapeutic context, in mental healthcare, in a legal setting, and in our daily interactions.

(In)validating emotions

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In Robert Frost's poem "Home Burial", two grieving parents, confused and further distressed by each others' different ways of handling mourning, alienate, wound and antagonize each other, often at the same time as they try to reach out to and comfort each other. On larger scales, similar kinds of situations often apply between different groups within societies, and in clashes between cultures. These different faultlines also cross-cut each other, whether on "generic" grounds such as class, ethnicity or gender, or because of divergent emotional backgrounds and idiolects.

A somewhat peculiar aspect of how we tend to approach these cases, from the personal, micro-level cases to the global political ones, is that emotions are both held to be answerable to certain kinds of standards of "reasonableness" and treated as exempt from—and even exempting those who feel them from—those same standards. These approaches tend to fall under—but also, importantly, often conflate—two different kinds of assumptions. One draws on assumptions (themselves not always well distinguished or articulated) about emotions as a-rational, involuntary, subjective. The

other draws on the idea that questions of value (though sometimes also of outlook on the world more generally) are or should be open, and should not be imposed from "outside".

What aspects of emotions are treated as exempt varies considerably: does just having an occurrent emotion count? Dispositions? Expressions that fall short of overt action? These divisions tend in part to fall along the lines of which aspects of emotions agents are thought to exercise control over, but that issue in itself is a contested one: while there is a popular truism that "You can't control how you feel, but you can control how you act", there are also arguments that suggest emotions at the level of "mere" feelings may not always be involuntary or non-voluntary. And there are various cultural traditions, sometimes encoded into law (e.g. defenses of provocation or crime passionel) that suggest a view of actions, at least when driven by emotions, as not being fully or sufficiently under control for "normal" standards of accountability to apply.

In matters of value, the question of how a person's values relate to reason or choice are of course themselves fraught ones, meta-ethically as well as in terms of descriptive issues of how agents actually acquire their views. But it is notable, too, that the idea that someone's emotions, especially when considered as an expression of their values, or an assumed, more general, right to their own beliefs, cannot be invalidated, seems to both invoke and reject notions of minimal requirements for adequate, reason-responsive and other-responsive agency. This is not to say that the idea of externally imposed or imposable standards of how we "should" feel is not disturbing, even before the question of which specific standards, and how they will be enforced. But a retreat into viewing emotions as incorrigible—in both senses—is neither plausible nor likely to produce good outcomes.

THE CHALLENGE OF FORGIVENESS: SHALLOW AND DEEP, MORAL AND NON-MORAL

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Forgiving is a deeply human affair—as is the denial or inability to forgive another's misdeed. The relating processes harbor feelings that, in both drastic and subtle ways, mirror our dependence on recognition by our human fellows. Forgiving is a complex affective and cognitive mental state that represents a possible response to having been seriously injured or wronged by others. It appears appropriate only on condition that the injury at issue has been an unjustified and non-excused moral injury. Forgiving a person for what she did to me involves overcoming certain typical reactive attitudes like, for example, anger, resentment, contempt or hate. On closer consideration it turns out that forgiveness does not involve reconciliation and that it must not be confused with forgetting, excusing, condoning or waiving punishment. Neither does it require reentering into social relation with the wrongdoer.

It is my suggestion that seizing the complexity of the phenomenon in a proper way requires taking into account different aspects of a 'deep' approach to sociality which seem to be inextricably connected with one another: a) the emotional underpinning of both individual lives and the social structure of culturally diversified life-worlds, b) the intentional-teleological constitution of consciousness, human agency and person, and c) those moral concerns and commitments that typically manifest themselves in more or less steady narratives that the agents consider crucial for understanding their purposes and deeds, their aspirations and failures. I take it that it is only when

we consider the forgiving person as a moral agent with reference to a) – c) that the full-blown phenomenon of forgiveness comes to light. Arguing along these lines does not deny that forgiving can also become real on more pragmatic or shallow terms as it happens, for instance, on those many occasions when we choose to respond to wrongdoing by way of conventional behavior.

Given this roughly sketched general approach to the topic of forgiveness, I shall focus on some intriguing aspects of an existentially deepened understanding of forgiveness. The crucial question then is: how do experiences of forgiveness touch upon and shake the self-understanding of those who (deny to) approach forgiveness? Inquiring into the related experiences, I shall focus on the temporal horizon of acts of forgiveness and its impact on the (tacit) self-understanding of the person at issue. The starting-point of my attempt to lay down a new phenomenological description of experiences of forgiveness, which revolves round the issues of intentionality, temporality and first-person perspective, is a profound tension experiences of this kind seem to inevitably harbor. On the one hand, the successful performance of acts of deep forgiveness requires a relatively stable and integral self-conception that allows for projection into the future. On the other hand, the rational and emotional need for forgiveness would not arise if the offended person's self-conception had not suffered serious impairment. How does this tension interfere with the offended person's willingness to forgive and her capability of doing so?

EMOTIONS AS COMMANDS

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The paper considers emotional pains, and whether they can be accommodated under an intentionalist theory of mind. Drawing on recent work concerning the nature of bodily pain, I argue that emotional pains have both descriptive and imperative contents, and that their aversive character is determined by the latter.

A plausible intentionalist account of the felt character of certain bodily sensations is that they possess not only indicative but also imperative contents: states such as itches are command-like (Hall 2008)—they issue an instruction that some embodied action, in this case scratching, be completed. The imperativist theory of bodily pain holds that the intentional content of pain states, too, shares this command-like structure (e.g. Klein 2007; Martinez 2011). A pain in one's sprained ankle, for instance, is partly constituted by a command not to move the ankle, or a command to make it the case that the damage in the ankle is remediated. On the imperativist theory, this content explains the affective character of bodily pains, and does so while retaining the core principles of intentionalism.

In this paper, I apply the imperativist view to cases of emotional pain (construed broadly so as to include a range of emotional episodes with aversive phenomenal character, such as panic, grief, envy, and so forth). I argue that the imperativist thesis gives us a powerful framework for understanding the content of painful emotions, and allows us to avoid some problems that face extant intentionalist approaches to emotion.

The case of the unpleasant feeling of alarm or panic that is felt when one approaches the edge of a steep cliff provides an introductory example. I suggest that part of the content of this affective state constitutes a command to retreat from the precipice, and that this content determines the aversive character of the episode. Like an itch or a bodily pain that demands to be treated, the affective response to the cliff edge issues an imperative that motivates the agent to act in a characteristic way. From these beginnings, I explore how the imperativist view can be applied to a substantial set of painful emotional experiences.

THE MSCEIT MISSES THE MARK: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS A PRACTICAL ABILITY

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In recent years, researchers have been greatly interested in how differences in abilities to perceive, understand, and regulate emotions influence personal well-being and life success. In investigating these interpersonal differences, researchers coined the term "emotional intelligence" to refer to the capacity to reason about emotions and use emotions to assist reasoning. Although researchers lack consensus on the construct of emotional intelligence, or EI, the practical ability to regulate one's emotions in order to produce constructive responses to one's environment seems to be an essential feature of EI and arguably the most important feature in predicting personal well-being and life success. This paper draws attention to the practical feature of EI by evaluating a popular ability-based measure of the construct: the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, or MSCEIT (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2002). Despite widespread controversy surrounding the validity of emotional intelligence tests and the conceptions of emotional intelligence that they rely on, many organizations are currently using the MSCEIT to predict workplace performance (Zeider, Matthews, Roberts, 2004). It is argued that the MSCEIT lacks validity as a measure of EI in so far as it fails to capture its essential practical feature. In support of this argument, it is claimed that the MSCEIT (a) relies too heavily on participants' knowledge of a particular set of social norms and the consensual interpretation of emotional information, (b) does not account for participants' relevant interpersonal differences, and (c) does not measure one's ability to reason about emotions when one's emotions are involved. The MSCEIT may to some extent measure emotional knowledge, or knowledge about emotions, but when it comes to measuring emotional intelligence the MSCEIT misses the mark.

COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS AND NORMATIVITY

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A few theorists of collective intentionality, Margaret Gilbert in particular and Raimo Tuomela in passing have suggested that collective emotions are inherently normative by virtue of involving the participants' joint or collective commitment to the emotion. This position does not find much support from philosophical and empirical theorizing on collective emotions even if there is wide

agreement that emotions and normativity are closely related. First, there is sociological evidence that most human emotions are regulated by culture- and group-specific norms that concern the appropriateness of emotions in certain roles and/or situations (Hochschild 1983). The second, more radical view turns the relation between collective emotions and normativity the other way round, suggesting that the normativity of norms and values emerges from collective emotions. Support for this view comes from both the Durkheimian tradition of sociology in which collective emotions generate and reinforce social norms and values and from sentimentalist theories of metaethics such as Adam Smith's in which convergence of sentiments—that typically means their being shared—in somewhat idealized conditions is a necessary if not sufficient criterion of emotional appropriateness. The conclusion is that instead of being normative, collective emotions may underlie social and moral normativity.

SHAME AND GENOCIDE:
PLACING "SURVIVOR SHAME" IN A BROADER EMOTIONAL TERRITORY

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Shame, the so-called "survivor shame," is one of the central emotions associated with the plight of genocide survivors and victims of abuse. This, to a large extent, is baffling: it seems that nobody ought to reproach themselves for having been victims of abuse. Yet we argue that even if survivor shame is morally unjustified, it is not irrational: it is intelligible and it connects a world of moral value. We argue that in order to understand what the shame of trauma victims means, we need to distinguish different varieties of shame, how they arise and how they are experienced. We also need to distinguish the emotional responses elicited by the abuses as they happen, from the subsequent phenomenon of survivor shame. Analysing carefully the possible range of immediate shame-related responses can help clarify some puzzles about survivor shame. In this sense, we argue that the difference between being shamed and being ashamed is crucial. The relation between both phenomena is not entirely straightforward: being shamed can elicit a wide range of emotional responses, and shame is not always one of them. Indeed, in the debates shame often gets confused with the feeling of humiliation. While shame and humiliation share some similarities, there are important differences between them. Both involve a negative assessment of ourselves, but in humiliation, as opposed to shame, this assessment is perceived as external and undeserved. We discuss whether, and to what extent, the shamed has to recognize and respect the evaluation of the shamer in order for the shame experience to occur. We argue that the self-evaluation in shame is complex, and the shamer's evaluation is one of its elements, but not the only one. In the light of this, we offer some thoughts on the contrast established by some theorists between survivor shame and survivor guilt, and argue that even if survivor shame might be morally unjustified, it is not irrational and it points to a world of moral value.

POETRY AND HEDONIC ERROR IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

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This paper shows that Socrates' third, "most decisive" argument for the main thesis of the *Republic* extends all the way through his second discussion of poetry. That is, it runs not just from 583b-588a or so, as scholars have universally assumed, but continues all the way to 608b. That revises our understanding of two crucial parts of the *Republic*: Socrates' "most decisive" argument for his main thesis, and his second critique of poetry. The paper also makes two other contributions. First, it offers new Platonic answers to a puzzle in philosophical aesthetics: why we enjoy painful art (the "paradox of tragedy"). Second, it offers a neat fit between accounts of hedonic error in the *Republic* and *Philebus*, especially when it comes to mixed pleasures in the soul.

I begin by sketching some puzzles about the structure of *Republic* II-X, including why Socrates returns to poetry in book X (§1). Then, I give my new reading of 583b-608b. First, I review Socrates' core claims about hedonic error and real hedonic magnitudes at 583b-585e (§2). Next, I show that most of the discussion of poetry in book X argues that tragic pleasures are much smaller than they seem. From within Socrates' basic framework for analyzing hedonic error, it is clear enough how tragic pleasures are magnified by juxtaposition with painful pity. However, it is unclear why we enjoy tragedy at all—why there is any pleasure there to be magnified—so I explore several possibilities. Thus, I recover Platonic explanations both for why we enjoy painful art and for why we (wrongly think that we) enjoy painful art so much (§3).

So, most of Socrates' second discussion of tragedy (595c-605b) continues his earlier explanation of hedonic error and real hedonic magnitudes (583b-585e) and of the hedonic conditions of the virtuous and vicious (586a-588a). Two puzzles remain. First, why is this line of argument interrupted by Socrates' image of the soul and its parts, and his discussion of how the just person chooses her activities (588a-592a)? Second, why does Socrates keep discussing poetry after arguing that tragic pleasures are smaller than they seem (605b-608b)? I argue that 583a-608b has an ABAB structure. After explaining the constitutive problems with certain hedonic experiences in book IX (583c-588a), Socrates turns to causal problems with those same hedonic experiences—how they nourish the soul and its parts (588a-592a). He then explains the constitutive problems with tragic pleasures (595c-605b) and the causal problems with those pleasures—again, how they nourish the soul (605b-606b). In particular, he argues that tragic pleasures feed our appetite for grief, thereby corrupting our psychic constitution (§4). Socrates' critique of poetry in X thus completes his discussion of hedonic error in IX. In particular, book IX mentions mixed pleasures in the body and mixed pleasures combining bodily pain with pleasure in the soul (583c-584c). Book X completes his account by examining mixed pleasures in the soul. This is readily seen through a comparison of *Republic* 583b-608b and *Philebus* 41a-51a, which shows that those two passages actually complete each other; the former foregrounds tragic pleasures, while the latter foregrounds comic pleasures (§5).

EMOTIONS AS DYNAMIC PROCESSES

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In philosophical investigations, emotions have mostly been seen as discrete states, categories of experience. Through the discourse of cause and effect emotions have also been seen as processes, but mainly in the narrower sense of a punctuation of the emotional state arising and submerging within temporal experience. The issues of intensity and temporality within the emotional experience have been looked at, though not to an appreciable extent. Indeed, when the concepts have entered the discourse either in philosophy or experimental science they have almost invariably done so individually. I briefly review some such relevant work and present also occasions when they have been addressed jointly. These projects, inspired by the connections emotions have with music and affective touch, bring together the ideas of temporal duration and experiential intensity, to give temporal signatures to emotional categories. Whether the findings of such experimental work are correct or not, at least in the particular results, I discuss the implications that these concepts have on our understanding of emotions in general and how they may affect the position of emotions as timeless states within a bodily and/or psychic structure.

POETIC EMOTIONS AND THE PERSPECTIVIAL VIEW

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In recent years, there has been an increased interest in narrative and how with narratives can help us to understand our emotional lives and reveal the evaluative role of emotion in our thinking (e.g. Jenefer Robinson, Peter Goldie, Martha Nussbaum). Discussions of narrative, whether in reference to a work of literature or to the emotions, often allude to a perspective. For example, philosophers will talk of narratives being from a point of view, perspectival, representing or involving an interpretation. Such description of narrative indicates that there is a more basic mechanism at work. Therefore, I will argue that we need to look beyond narrative structures in our attempts to gain full understanding of our emotional lives. Not only do we need an appreciation of a causal, sequential and historical relation between an object and an emotional response that the narrative view promotes, we also need to look at the more basic structure of perspective.

A perspective is more than a mere point of view. Developed from Adrian Moore's notion of point of view, I take it that a perspective captures a particular complex orientation towards experience that encompasses (i) our location in space and time, (ii) what we believe the world is like, (iii) what we value and, (iv) what we take to be significant, which affects what we will attend to. As a result, a perspective governs interpretations of experience, including one's experience of connected events, with a normative dimension (distinguishing it from a mere point of view).

I argue that by reflecting on our emotional responses to lyric poetry (which is non-narrative in structure and promotes perspectival engagement), we can explore the perspectival nature of the emotions. By looking at poetry, we can see the potential for art and literature to offer more than an

appreciation of narrative structures as relevant to our emotional lives. In particular, such works can enhance our understanding of the evaluative nature of our emotional responses and how this is tied to the notion of a perspective. In making my claim, I will give a reading of 'The Butterfly Farm' by Medbh McGuckian, which centres around bringing together images of butterflies with women in Japanese tea houses, rather than offering a narrative in order to demonstrate the potential for a perspectival understanding of emotion.

I will argue that reading poetry is able to make clear the influence of perspectives that gives rise to our emotions because of the nature of our engagement with such works. Consequently, at the same time as showing the importance of engaging with works of poetry, I am also showing that exclusive focus on narrative in any discussion of emotion and value is incomplete.

<center>RELATIONAL AFFECT</center>

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This paper sketches a conceptual proposal to productively address some core issues within the philosophy of emotion. Instead of starting from established categorical emotion types such as fear, pride or anger, as most work in the philosophy of emotion does, I propose starting from what I call relational affect. The concept of 'relational affect' brings into focus moments of pre-reflective relational intensity between individuals, and likewise between individuals and their surroundings. These affective episodes are strictly a matter of relatedness and thus never correctly attributable to an individual in isolation. Taking relational affect as my conceptual starting point, I will develop an approach that explicates categorical emotion types and both individual as well as culturally entrenched repertoires of emotion as variously clustered aggregates or patterns of relational affect. Concerning the overall conceptual architecture of my proposal, I take an important inspiration from Bennett Helm's theory of felt evaluations (Helm 2001). Like Helm, I focus on the systematic interrelatedness of instances of momentary feeling. Such a framework allows accounting for the intentionality, the evaluative character and evaluative rationality of affectivity, without neglecting the rich phenomenology of our affective lives. It is not a form a reductionism or conceptual primitivism, as it construes the relationship between single instance and overarching pattern of affective episodes as one of a complex mutual co-constitution—neither the general pattern nor the singular episode of affect has explanatory priority; there are no primitive building blocks. The main difference between my approach and Helm's theory of felt evaluations is that 'relational affect' is from the outset transindividual. Relational affect is never a matter of individual feeling states, as it is relational in a maximally strong sense: It unfolds either between two or more individuals, between individual and material surroundings, or between human collectives, or collectives and their environments. By precluding an individualist construal of affect at the deepest point possible, the proposed account can circumvent various puzzles in the philosophy of emotion in a manner that is phenomenologically plausible, for instance the notorious question of shared and collective emotions. All sorts of phenomena of relatedness, for instance the affective dynamics in agitated groups or crowds, the strong dyadic mutuality between infant and caretaker, the atmospheric immersion of a person in their surroundings or a wealth of phenomena of interpersonal attunement and resonance can be addressed in a precise manner, while justice is still done to the intelligibility, rational evaluability and socio-cultural groundedness of categorical repertoires of emotion. A second

difference to Helm's approach is that my account allows for more leeway in the relationship between single instances of relational affect and the overarching systematic patterns to which they belong. Affect, especially in its dynamic social-relational manifestations, tends to be more unruly, disruptive and transformative with regard to frameworks of intelligibility than Helm's rationalist account allows. By foregrounding the dynamics of relational affect, my proposal also contributes to the rapprochement—long overdue—between the philosophy of emotion and the blossoming field of 'affect studies' within social and cultural theory.

EMOTIONAL REINFORCEMENT AND CHARACTER TRAITS

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How is emotion related to character? The relation between emotion and character traits is something that we can't take for granted. Even if we believe that emotions bear on character traits, this can take many possible forms. Emotions might be a necessary component of what character traits are. However, this doesn't seem to be the case because emotion is not part of the concept of character in the way that it is, for instance, part of the concept of joy: we can imagine character traits without emotion in a way that we can't imagine joy without emotion. Another possibility is that emotions are relevant to character because they reflect character, i.e. they are an indicator of someone's character traits. A person's arrogance may be revealed by their anger at the reasonable assertions of their colleagues. But if this is the case then emotions serve to provide other people with information about the person's character, which has nothing in itself to do with that person's character. A third possibility is that emotions underlie the possession of character traits because they produce or support such traits. I'll provide a new argument for this last claim, that emotions underlie the persistence of character traits by preventing axiological entropy—the diminishment over time of the sense of the importance of values on which character traits are based. In this paper I outline the nature and function of axiological entropy and provide evidence that emotions prevent such axiological entropy and, in doing so, serve to sustain character traits. In making this claim I argue that both the pairing of emotional responses and values and the concept of the flux in the significance of values correspond with and are supported by the principles of classical and operant conditioning, particularly the concept of the extinction of learned responses. The features of these forms of conditioning shed light on axiological entropy because conditioning creates attractions and aversions to not only the specific object involved in the conditioning process, but to more general properties possessed by that object, including values. I conclude by arguing that without emotions the significance of values related to those emotions would fade and the character traits that involve those values would diminish.

CAN (CONCEPTUAL) ART BE EMOTIONAL?

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"It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with conceptual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually he would want it to become emotionally dry (…) The expectation of an emotional kick (…) would deter the viewer from perceiving this art."

According to this self-understanding of "conceptual art" in the famous "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art" by Sol LeWitt, emotions should play a minor part in the context of (conceptual) art—in creating art as well as in perceiving and interpreting art. First of all art—at least conceptual art—should encourage thinking and because of that art should be more mentally interesting than emotionally overpowering. In other words: conceptual art aims to have so called "cognitive" value rather than so called "aesthetic value"—given that aesthetic experience is essentially sensual-emotional and without regard to insight, cognition and knowledge.

Of course: Art can make us wonder and wondering is not least a matter of thinking and of reason. It's not the artist's business to generate pleasure and intensive emotions. In contrast to art so called "Kitsch" or just pleasant decoration can generate such emotions without making us wonder.

But against Sol LeWitt's self-description it shows that experience of art usually is a specific manner of feeling too. Even my experience of "emotionally dry" (and maybe de-materialized) conceptual art only succeeds if I'm relating to the object (to the concept, to the process, to the artwork) in a feeling way too—which doesn't rule out that there are a lot of thoughts, and which doesn't mean, that I must have intensive feelings or emotions. Given that conceptual art is best described in terms of the transmission of ideas and given that conceptual art aims to convey a specific meaning the spectator (in my view) cannot comprehend, understand and interpret this idea or meaning without feeling it—not least in this way the artwork makes us wonder and thinking. So the specific question whether conceptual art can be emotional brings up a fundamental question: What do we mean (particularly but not only in the context of art) when we talking about "feeling something"?

WAYS OF EMOTIONAL APPROPRIATENESS

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Emotions can be appropriate in many ways. It is the aim of this presentation to offer a map of different normative criteria that are used to attribute appropriateness to emotions. Among these criteria are whether an emotion is justified, correct (or fitting), morally apt, prudentially recommended, a member of a coherent pattern of emotions. In addition, the appropriateness of an emotion can be calibrated according to intensity, duration and expressiveness. Furthermore, most, if not all of these ways of being appropriate seem to have a basis in culture. This fact raises problems when strong disagreements about the appropriateness of an emotion occur—synchronically or diachronically. Examples would be disagreements about the appropriateness of indignation about cartoons or guilt about one's nation's misdeeds. We try to shed some light on these interrelated issues.

THE ROLE OF SHAME, HONOUR AND PRIDE IN GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE TRIBAL REGIONS OF NORTH WEST PAKISTAN

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The literacy rate for women in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is very low in comparison to other provinces, and is continuing to decrease. While many government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pay close attention to girls' education by, for example, building schools, they rarely pay attention to why girls' status in the region is so low or why gender disparities continue to be so great. Rarely do policy makers or researchers examine how the Pashtunwali codes of honour, shame and pride play a role in hindering gender inequality and in restricting girls' access to education.

The Pashtunwali code is fundamental to the organisation and observances of cultural traditions, norms and values of the FATA region. Honour, as a code of behaviour from which all the codes of Pashtunwali derive, defines the duties of an individual within a social group, and what person is in the eyes of other people. Honour describes the value a person has in his or her own eyes, as well as the extent to which society values the individual. Honour, in other words, is the individual's claim to pride, as well as his or her right to it. One earns the right to pride by adhering to a socially constructed system of symbols that includes values as well as rules of conduct. The sanctions, as I will discuss in this paper, are severe if those rules and values are transgressed, especially for girls and women.

Shame is closely allied to honour and pride, emerging quickly in the wake of dishonour and loss of pride. Shame involves seeing one's self in the light of certain norms, especially those adopted by others. Shame is largely derived from an interest in how others regard us (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001: 512). Shame is felt, to follow Bernard Williams (1993: 78), when one is 'seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition'. The root of shame lies in being at a disadvantage, in fearing loss of power, especially when one has few material or social resources, as many people in FATA do not. Shame can shade into embarrassment, humiliation, chagrin, guilt, dishonor, regret, remorse, prudishness, or disgrace (Kekes, 1986: 283). The reaction is to hide, or to cover oneself, to avoid further shame or humiliation, or to exact punishment. Girls and women are often the only resource poor men have, and they are valuable as wives, mothers, domestic workers, sexual partners and the family's moral guardians. If they shame or dishonour their families, the price is punishment or further restrictions on their liberty.

Based on extensive interview research collected for my PhD thesis in the FATA region, data which strongly corroborates the philosophical and psychological accounts of these emotions, I will explore how honour, shame and honour, perpetuate gender inequality. I will suggest that if we understand how these emotions affect girls' educational inequality, this research may open avenues to the government, national and local, and other stakeholders, allowing them to address these problems in informed and sensitive ways.

SELF-AWARENESS, DISCLOSURE, AND EVALUATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY

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In her paper "Evaluative Phenomenology" (2014), Michelle Montague argues for an account of evaluative property ascription in emotional experience where self-awareness takes centre stage. Montague argues that in emotional experience we are intentionally aware both of the phenomenal character of the experience and of the object or state of affairs represented evaluatively. Montague then gives the following account of evaluative property ascription: during the emotional experience of, for instance, sadness we are intentionally aware of both the disvalue inherent in the affective phenomenology characteristic of sadness and of the disvalue experienced as inherent in the object or state of affairs. We then notice the resemblance between the intentional contents of the two instances of awareness as both instantiating the disvalue "sad" and we consequently conclude that the close resemblance means that the object instantiates the disvalue "sadness". In this paper I argue that Montague's account distorts the evaluative phenomenology of emotional experience due to its inability to account for one of its essential experiential aspects: disclosure. Disclosure refers to the non-inferential ascription of an evaluative property to an intentional object (see Scheler 1973; Johnston 2001; Goldie 2007). Montague's account, by contrast, entails an inferential conception of evaluative property ascription as the upshot of a comparison between the intentional contents of the two instances of intentional awareness. Crucially, I argue that Montague is inevitably led to this impasse by her mistaken conception, adopted by other theories of emotion, of self-awareness (see Slaby and Stephan 2008). The sort of self-awareness in play in emotional experience should not be construed as an intentional about-ness directed towards one's ongoing experience but rather as a non-reflective, phenomenal awareness of the intentional object (Sartre 2004). Thus I suggest that any account of emotional experience that fails to distinguish between these two sorts of self-awareness is phenomenologically deficient.

EMOTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVE IN EARLY CHINA

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In recent years, scholars of Chinese thought have paid increasing attention to the role of emotions and desires in early philosophy. An emphasis on the negative discourse of emotions, particularly in Confucian and Daoist texts, has given way to a recognition that, in these same texts, emotions play a quite necessary and positive role in early conceptions of knowledge and ethics. While a certain degree of reinterpretation is at work in this re-evaluation—a reinterpretation that is very much in line with the cognitivist approach that has become mainstream in philosophy—this does not explain quite explain the reversal. The passages that warned against the moral dangers of excessive or mis-directed emotions did not simply disappear.

There is, then, a problem of how to read these early accounts. Texts such as the *Daodejing*, the *Zhuangzi*, and the *Xunzi* are full of passages that seem to be in tension with one another: exhortations to reduce, control and suppress one's emotions are found within close proximity to

those passages that affirm the emotions and desires as what is constitutionally human and as therefore needing to be fully realized. Both the negative and positive readings seem to have been based on a partial reading of the evidence. But if this is the case, what are we to make of these apparently self-contradictory texts?

I propose that the problem has been the deployment of ill-fitting conceptual categories—namely, those of reason/cognition, on the one hand, and emotion/feeling, on the other. The question of whether early Chinese philosophers made a conceptual distinction between thinking and feeling, or simply conflated the two, has exercised many scholars for a number of decades. But to search for the ethical meaning of emotions in terms of these categories is simply to look in the wrong place. Focusing on chapters from the *Mozi*, *Zhuangzi* and *Xunzi*, I argue that the apparent contradictions in these texts vis-à-vis the normative status of emotions can be resolved by way of a different conceptual distinction that was, in fact, a matter of direct concern: namely, that of an embedded, first-person perspective vs. the self-transcendent perspective that has access to knowledge of universal and objective patterns. These perspectives were neither mutually exclusive, nor decisive in determining the normative status of emotions for any given thinker. But they introduced important refinements in the conceptualization of emotions, and helped provide standards for distinguishing between different types and levels of emotions. More fundamentally, they represented the poles within which human beings navigated and made their way through the world in their endeavor to fulfill their ethical potential.

EMOTIONS ON TRIAL: AFFECTIVE DYNAMICS IN THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL RISK

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In this paper, I bring contemporary research on the epistemology of risk to bear on how emotions can impact the evaluation of legal risk. I first review a distinction between two understandings of risk—the probabilistic account and the modal account—and argue that the probabilistic account is flawed. I then examine what emotions might contribute to the cognitive process of evaluating risk along these modal lines. Next, I sketch a framework of how emotion ought to be reflected in the norms of legal decision-making practice in situations of risk. In particular, I focus on possible problems and solutions regarding the acceptability of certain levels of risk of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals in criminal trials.

CAN THOUGHTS DESTROY EMOTIONS?

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How far can the thoughts of a person influence the emotions of this person? Studies concerning this question normally consider the therapeutic function of thoughts: how can we intentionally get rid of inappropriate emotions by thinking about them or by engaging cognitively with them and their

(missing) reasons? In my talk I want to address a different question: Can thoughts of a person destroy appropriate emotions of hers? Spinoza once answered this question positively. In his view, that he elaborates in his *Ethics*, persons can destroy affects by knowing them "clearly and distinctly" (Baruch de Spinoza (1988/1677): *The Ethics*. Curley, Edwin (Ed.): *The Collected Works of Spinoza*. Vol. 1. Princeton University Press. 5p4s). I am going to make a proposal how this claim can be understood in a contemporary framework that is not committed to Spinozas metaphysics. Colin Marshall has already made a suggestion to this question namely that the relevant act of mind that Spinoza was thinking of is philosophizing: "Philosophizing about a mood kills the mood" (Colin Marshall (2012): "Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 85 (1). 152). This act is explained as "thinking about that passion as a passion [and as] contemplating the general truths which that passion exemplifies" (ibid. 154). I think this description of the relevant cognitive action is not plausible, at least not sufficiently. Aside from the fact that we have to distinguish precisely between mood and emotions and that it is something different to understand the features of a type of emotion (which would mean to understand the general truth concerning a concrete emotion) than to understand a concrete (token of an) emotion itself I think we have to extrapolate at least three different aspects that could lead to the destruction of an emotion by thinking about it: a) We think in notions and by trying to formulate the content of an emotion in words we may miss its specific intentional content or we may determinate the emotion in a way that contrasts with its fundamental or partial vagueness; b) to think about emotions means also to analyze their parts, history, and connection with other mental events in a way that the holistic nature of the emotion gets dissolved; c) by thinking about emotions we detract our attention from the body towards concepts in our mind so that the bodily aspects of an emotion are ignored and may disappear. I want to suggest that these three moments of thinking about an emotion may lead to its destruction because they dissolve the unity of an emotion that is normally experienced in a vague or non-conceptual, holistic and bodily way.

How can we be Moved by the Fate of an Abstract Artefact? Created Non-Spatial Entities as Intentional Objects of Fictional Emotions

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Anna is watching a movie about vampires and is seriously scared of these bloodsucking monsters. But she knows that this film is fictional and she believes that there are no such things as vampires. Why is she so scared anyway? It seems to be the default case within fiction that we believe that the people, places and situations the stories are about do not exist. But nevertheless, we are often emotionally involved. This problem—the so called Paradox of Fiction—arises because the following three conditions seem to be satisfied:
  a. Subjects experience emotional responses towards fictional entities
  b. Subjects believe that these entities are purely fictional, i.e., do not exist
  c. In order to have genuine (and rational) emotional responses towards an entity, one must not believe that the (entity is purely fictional / does not exist.

In his 1975 paper C. Radford claimed that the emotions we have towards fictional entities (fictional emotions) are "irrational, incoherent, and inconsistent". Radford's account has been criticized by

many philosophers and many different solutions have been proposed within the last forty years. This has usually involved rejecting one of the three conditions. Conditions a (s. Walton) and c (s. Caroll, Lamarque, Gendler) have been particularly subject to rejection, or at least modification.

In my paper I will discuss whether it is possible and useful to reject condition b on the basis of Amy Thomasson's ontological claim that fictional characters exist as so-called abstract artefacts, i.e., created non-spatial entities. One reason why such an approach appears promising is a claim she makes about the everyday perspective on fiction: according to Thomasson, it is a common sense belief that fictional characters exist—and not only a theoretical claim. If she is right, then one of Radford's premises—condition b—is wrong. Hence, the approach I will discuss rejects this condition but accepts condition a and c.

If an account can developed on the basis of rejecting b, this would have various attractions: first, it would be acceptable for representatives of different theories of emotions and, second, it would support the fictional realist's ontology and thus perhaps help to move the debate between fictional realists and anti-realists beyond its present impasse.

Such an account would appear to require an affirmative answer to the question of whether fictional entities in Thomason's sense are good candidates for the intentional objects of fictional emotions. The central and obvious problem is the following: Anna in my example is scared of the vampires because of some of their properties, such as that of tending to bite people and drink their blood. But abstract artefacts cannot have these properties. Therefore I will try to explain why we are moved by fictional characters because of properties they cannot have as non-spatial entities, but only have according to the story.

POSSIBILITIES OF THE FACE-TO-FACE AS AN EMPATHIC RELATION: LEVINAS AND THE EMPATHY AS MORALITY DEBATE

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From Barack Obama's 'empathy deficit' speech to news stories about video game playing reducing capacities for empathy and thus morality, the value attached to our empathic capabilities seems to be being given increasing prominence. In both these cases 'empathy' is ascribed a direct relationship to morality. However, it remains unclear what precisely this 'empathy' is that is being given so much weight, thus making its link to morality difficult to productively debate. This paper will explore whether the work of Emmanuel Levinas, particularly his conception of the 'face-to-face' encounter, could provide an alternative perspective from which to approach a definition of empathy. It will aim at a definition that avoids much of the confusion, and many of the objections, present in the current 'empathy as morality' debate.

The parameters of the current debate have pro-empathy commentators on one side claiming that empathy must underpin any form of moral life, on the basis that if we could recognise that others are the same as us, we would then treat them as we would wish to be treated ourselves. On the other side, commentators claim that as empathy is only possible with those who we conceive of as similar to our selves, it cannot be the basis of morality, as we necessarily conceive of others as different on

social, political and cultural grounds. On both sides of this debate there seems to be little consensus as to what exactly the central term of 'empathy' means, which leads to a somewhat unclear field of discussion clouded by various social and political conceptions of human relationships.

Levinas claims that the felt encounter with the face of another; the 'face-to-face', is the basis of ethics, and that this encounter is a purely affective experience. This paper will ask if stripping 'empathy' of the cognitive content that is commonly ascribed to it; making it purely affective like the Levinasian 'face-to-face', could avoid objections levelled at both sides of the debate. This would be a conception of a purely affective encounter with another, one that precedes cognition and thus conceptions of similarity and difference. I will argue that if it is possible to strip 'empathy' of the cognitive content that most definitions contain, it may be possible to free empathy of it's theoretical ties to the social, cultural and political contexts necessarily associated with it's cognitive content.

GRIEF MEETS JEALOUSY

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Julie was suffering from an intense grief since she found that her husband was killed in a car accident. Distancing herself from all connections with the past, her grief still lingered. Not until she discovered that her husband had had an affair with a mistress for a few years did her intense jealousy relieve her from the emotional turmoil. (Krzysztof Kieślowski, Blue). When grief meets jealousy, instead of making one extra miserable, the two negative emotions cancel out each other. How is that possible? What does this surprising result tell us about the nature of grief and jealousy?

Cognitive theories can explain why Julie's jealousy cannot sustain after the death of her husband in terms of its intentional content. No matter how intense the feeling of betrayal was, Julie cannot help realize that she failed to receive the love of her husband not because it was given to someone else but because her husband was dead. However, cognitive theories cannot explain why Julie's grief will disappear along with her jealousy. When Julie found that she was not loved by her husband exclusively, it is dubious to suggest that she would no longer want his love or found it acceptable that his love was given to someone else. Her jealousy may instead force her to recognize that her husband played an indispensable role in her life even if his love toward her was not exclusive. In this way, her grief toward the death of her husband will not be ameliorated but intensified or reconfirmed.

To explain how jealousy obliterates grief, I argue that not only the intentional contents of the emotions but also the judgments and action tendencies that are triggered by them must be taken into consideration. Grief is associated with a tendency to avoid. A person in deep grief tends to avoid everything that is related to the tragedy, which may confine her to a stage of denial (Kübler-Ross's Five stages of grief) that makes her grief lingers recalcitrantly. Jealousy can overcome grief by serving as an antidote to this tendency of avoidance. Leila Tov-Ruach suggests that jealousy will generate "a need to know" and "a need to visualize" because these tendencies may allow the jealous person to regain control as playwright of their lives. Jealousy people, feeling they no longer being the focus of attention, tend to entertain obsessive and imagistic thoughts about every little details of the relation between one's lover and the third party. They may repeatedly recall scenarios after

scenarios, or imagine all the possible scenarios between them even though these memories or imagination may worsen their pain. This tendency to know and visualize produced by jealousy may help neutralize the tendency of avoidance produced by grief by pushing the subjects back to the real world, facing the tragedy, and eventually reaching a stage of acceptance. Combing with the explanation offered by the cognitive theories, we may explain why grief and jealousy can cancel out each other.

THINGS WE CAN GET EXCITED ABOUT: SHARED EMOTIONS AND OTHER MINDS

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A number of philosophers have suggested we might address skepticism about other minds by defending a naïve realist account of our knowledge of other minds, on which we have direct perceptual access to the mental states of others. (Pickard 2003, Stout 2010, MacNeill 2012a,b) Our knowledge of the emotions of other people seems to provide us with a particular plausible point of entry for a naïve realist account, insofar as it seems possible to regard the behavioural and bodily manifestations of emotion as being part of the emotion, rather than merely indirect evidence of it. However, it is unclear whether what can be attributed on these grounds should be seen as a full-blooded mental state. One reason why is that it is not entirely obvious whether a state's having an intentional object can be a part of what is directly perceived (Wringe 2003). If we see an emotion's intentional directedness as being essential to its being a mental state, then what we are able to attribute on directly perceptual grounds seems to fall somewhere short of being a mental state, at least as philosophers have traditionally conceived of them.

In this paper I argue that the problem I have just identified cannot be solved by naïve realists who retain a 'spectatorial' approach to accounting for our capacity to attribute mental states to others. (Hutto 2004) An alternative approach, which I explore in this paper focuses on our capacity for shared emotional involvement with objects in the world. (Salmela 201) Briefly, the suggestion is that my capacity to know what you are feeling is grounded in a more basic capacity to know what we are feeling, One attraction of this view is that it explains why a capacity for shared attention might play a fundamental role in our ability to engage with other minded subjects. (Baron-Cohen 1997) On the approach I propose, the problem I raised for the spectatorial direct realist does not arise, since the directedness of mental states which I share is not something I could fail to be aware of. Furthermore, the approach provides for a plausible response to skepticism about other minds, since our knowledge of shared mental states is as securely grounded and direct as any knowledge could be.

AMBIVALENT EMOTION AND THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF AKRATIC ACTION

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In this paper, I consider the problem implicated by the perceptual account of emotions by raising the question whether two contrary emotions, for example, fear and delight, can be both present in a single subject. To this end, I shall present an emotionally ambivalent situation such as a dangerous and attractive addiction case. The unwilling addiction case tells us that a person feels both delight and hatred of the same object, for example, a drug. Those emotions can be about distinct aspects of the object. Thus the unwilling drug addict may both feel thrilled about and hate his forthcoming taking of the drug. He is thrilled about the experience that he expect to get from the drug, and hates the prospect of hurting himself and others. The former emotion is about the intrinsic phenomenal quality of taking the drug, whereas the latter focuses on its potentially disastrous consequences.

Contemporary cognitivists have a difficulty in explaining this kind of ambivalent emotion, because they take the object of an emotion to be its propositional content. If an intentional object of emotion is one that has a propositional content, cognitivists might run into a contradictory state, i.e., p&-p, such as the case of unwilling addition: He may feel both thrilled about and afraid of his forthcoming taking of the drug. We can have propositions here as follows:

> He is happy that he expects to get from the drug (feels good about taking the drug).
> He is unhappy that he expects to get from the drug (feels bad about taking the drug).

In order to solve the difficulty that cognitivists face, I shall take account of a perceptual theory of emotion. I shall take the unwilling addict's emotion to be an irrational one, such as when one fears something while judging that there is absolutely no danger involved. Furthermore, I shall take unwilling addiction case to be akrasia, which is taken to be paradigmatic of practical irrationality. The unwilling addict is to blame for taking a drug owing to his weakness of will, an act which we can suppose he committed against his better judgment that, all things considered, it would have been better to abstain. But it is said that he is not responsible for the action because his action is compulsive: his emotion gave rise to a desire that forced him to act against his better judgment.

I shall show that if we take unwilling addiction case to be the case for ambivalent emotion, we can understand his behavior.

1) If he takes dangerousness (hatred) and attractiveness to be "ambivalent feeling", we can say that the two feelings are, in some sense, inconsistent. 2) He both believes that drug taking is dangerous and believes that it is attractive, this is the case for a contradictory (p & -p). However, 3) it is not contradictory that he believes that it is dangerous and feels attractive at the same time. On the one hand, he is directed to the formal object of fear in that he represents dangerousness. Yet we can say that he feels attraction of the drug. Hence, it makes sense that someone believes that it is dangerous and feels attraction simultaneously toward the same object.

If this is right, cases of akrasia caused by emotions involve a conflict between a value perception and an evaluative judgment that can be compared to perceptual illusion such as the Mueller-lyre

illusion, in which one sees the lines as being of a different length even though one judges or even knows that they are of the same length.

Perceptual illusion like the Muller-Lyre illusion shows that there is no contradiction involved in having a perception that rationally conflicts with judgment. As S. Dőring points out, it is not paradoxical to say, for example, 'The two lines are the same length, but I do not see it. I see one line as longer than the other.' (2009, p. 298)

In a similar vein, the addict's desire (attraction) for drug may persist, and represents it as meriting even when his better judgment is that he ought to stop it. It is not contradictory for him to judge that he ought to refrain it whilst at the same time feeling attraction of taking the drug. This shows us that the logic of emotion is different from that of inference. Having established this, what we ought to do for the addict is to cultivate for his/her emotion over time. Refraining from the desired behavior as a result of cultivating an appropriate emotional experience, it could save his life.

Affectivity in its Relation to Personal Identity

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When looking into the very support of the personal identity one of possible candidates is his affectivity. At first glance, it could be a surprising suggestion given that emotions, feelings and affects are often considered as fleeting phenomena. Yet, if we proceed by reduction of components which are repeatable or imitable, affectivity appears to be an element which could hardly be quoted or borrowed. In other word, a quoted or remembered thought is still a thought, while a quoted or remembered feeling is no longer a feeling. Two persons can be like, even indistinguishable in their way of thinking but it seems improbable they are so in their way of feeling. If, then, identity is understood as what defines the person in her distinctness, affectivity could be accepted as a core of such distinctness, unrepeatability and uniqueness.

If, on the other hand, personal identity is defined as what is lasting throughout the whole life of the person, then, one should wonder whether some of affective phenomena are not what support her personal identity. This is especially the case of some abiding and profound experiences which are built mainly by or through person's affectivity. These are particularly those of her experiences which last the whole life despite several transformations of the personality. It is often the case that they distinguish the person from her environment more than her intellect.

The paper will discuss some of arguments supporting the idea that affectivity is what sustains or builds personal identity in its momentary as well as long–lasting perspective.